

तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय

SANTINIKETAN
VISWA BHARATI
LIBRARY

888.4 (1)

J 83

v.

THE
REPUBLIC OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY
BENJAMIN JOWETT

(THIRD EDITION)

VOL II

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1922

Oxford University Press

London Edinburgh Glasgow Copenhagen

New York Toronto Melbourne Cape Town

Bombay Calcutta Madras Shanghai

Humphrey Milford Publisher to the UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS OF VOL. II

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS TO BOOK VI . . .	5
" " " VII . . .	25
" " " VIII . . .	44
" " " IX . . .	67
" " " X . . .	79
INTRODUCTION (GENERAL)	105
TRANSLATION OF BOOKS VI-X	176
INDEX	380

INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS

Steph. Book VI. Having determined that the many have no
484 knowledge of true being, and have no clear patterns in their
minds of justice, beauty, truth, and that philosophers have
such patterns, we have now to ask whether they or the many
shall be rulers in our State. But who can doubt that philo-
sophers should be chosen, if they have the other qualities
485 which are required in a ruler? For they are lovers of the
knowledge of the eternal and of all truth; they are haters
of falsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in the
interests of knowledge; they are spectators of all time and
486 all existence; and in the magnificence of their contempla-
tion the life of man is as nothing to them, nor is death fearful.
Also they are of a social, gracious disposition, equally free
from cowardice and arrogance. They learn and remember
easily; they have harmonious, well-regulated minds; truth
flows to them sweetly by nature. Can the god of Jealousy
487 himself find any fault with such an assemblage of good
qualities?

Here Adimantus interposes:—‘No man can answer you,
Socrates; but every man feels that this is owing to his own
deficiency in argument. He is driven from one position to
another, until he has nothing more to say, just as an unskilful
player at draughts is reduced to his last move by a more
skilled opponent. And yet all the time he may be right.
He may know, in this very instance, that those who make
philosophy the business of their lives, generally turn out
rogues if they are bad men, and fools if they are good. What
do you say?’ I should say that he is quite right. ‘Then
how is such an admission reconcilable with the doctrine
that philosophers should be kings?’

488 I shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see

how poor a hand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to their governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take an illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of a ship, taller by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a little deaf, a little blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman's art. The sailors want to steer, although they know nothing of the art; and they have a theory that it cannot be learned. If the helm is refused them, they drug the captain's posset, bind him hand and foot, and take possession of the ship. He who joins in the mutiny is termed a good pilot and what not; they have no conception that the true pilot must observe the winds and the stars, and must be their master, whether they like it or not;—such an one would be called by them fool, prater, star-gazer. This is my parable; which 489 I will beg you to interpret for me to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher has such an evil name, and to explain to them that not he, but those who will not use him, are to blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should not beg of mankind to be put in authority over them. The wise man should not seek the rich, as the proverb bids, but every man, whether rich or poor, must knock at the door of the physician when he has need of him. Now the pilot is the philosopher—he whom in the parable they call star-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by whom he is rendered useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of philosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own professing sons when they are corrupted by the world. Need 490 I recall the original image of the philosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he loved truth and hated falsehood, and that he could not rest in the multiplicity of phenomena, but was led by a sympathy in his own nature, to the contemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as well as truth, who is the leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. But as you were observing, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see that the persons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and useless class, are utter rogues.

The point which has to be considered, is the origin of this
491 corruption in nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our description of him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy these rare beings ! There is no good thing which may not be a cause of evil—health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when placed under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable world the strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good air and soil, so the best of human characters turn out the worst when they fall upon an unsuitable soil ; whereas weak natures hardly ever do any considerable good or harm ; they are not the stuff out of which either
492 great criminals or great heroes are made. The philosopher follows the same analogy : he is either the best or the worst of all men. Some persons say that the Sophists are the corrupters of youth ; but is not public opinion the real Sophist who is everywhere present—in those very persons, in the assembly, in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses and hisses of the theatre re-echoed by the surrounding hills ? Will not a young man's heart leap amid these discordant sounds ? and will any education save him from being carried away by the torrent ? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to opinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or death. What principle of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such an unequal contest ? Characters there
493 may be more than human, who are exceptions—God may save a man, but not his own strength. Further, I would have you consider that the hireling Sophist only gives back to the world their own opinions ; he is the keeper of the monster, who knows how to flatter or anger him, and observes the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is what pleases him, evil what he dislikes ; truth and beauty are determined only by the taste of the brute. Such is the Sophist's wisdom, and such is the condition of those who make public opinion the test of truth, whether in art or in morals. The curse is laid upon them of being and doing what it approves, and when they attempt first principles the failure is ludicrous.

Think of all this and ask yourself whether the world is more likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the multiplicity of phenomena. And the world if not a believer in the idea cannot be a philosopher, and must therefore be 494 a persecutor of philosophers. There is another evil :—the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and so they flatter the young [Alcibiades] into a magnificent opinion of his own capacity ; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, ‘ Now the gods lighten thee ; thou art a great fool ’ and must be educated—do you think that he will listen ? Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted towards philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil and corrupt him ? Are we not right in saying 495 that the love of knowledge, no less than riches, may divert him ? Men of this class [Critias] often become politicians—they are the authors of great mischief in states, and sometimes also of great good. And thus philosophy is deserted by her natural protectors, and others enter in and dishonour her. Vulgar little minds see the land open and rush from the prisons of the arts into her temple. A clever mechanic having a soul coarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by becoming her suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her own—and he, like a bald little blacksmith’s apprentice as he is, having made some money and got out of durance, washes and dresses himself as a bridegroom and marries his master’s daughter. What will be the issue of 496 such marriages ? Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature ? ‘ They will.’ Small, then, is the remnant of genuine philosophers ; there may be a few who are citizens of small states, in which politics are not worth thinking of, or who have been detained by Theages’ bridle of ill health ; for my own case of the oracular sign is almost unique, and too rare to be worth mentioning. And these few when they have tasted the pleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at that den of thieves and place of wild beasts, which is human life, will stand aside from the storm

under the shelter of a wall, and try to preserve their own innocence and to depart in peace. 'A great work, too, will have been accomplished by them.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a social being, and can only attain his highest development in the society which is best suited to him.

497 Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name. Another question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one of them; at present she is like some exotic seed which degenerates in a strange soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of heavenly growth. 'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in all points but one, which was left undetermined. You may remember our saying that some living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in states. But we were afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, and now the question recurs and has not grown easier:—How may philosophy be safely studied? Let us bring her into the light of day, and make an end of the inquiry.

498 In the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the present mode of study. Persons usually pick up a little philosophy in early youth, and in the intervals of business, but they never master the real difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally go to a lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy, unlike that of Heracleitus, sets never to rise again. This order of education should be reversed; it should begin with gymnastics in youth, and as the man strengthens, he should increase the gymnastics of his soul. Then, when active life is over, let him finally return to philosophy. 'You are in earnest, Socrates, but the world will be equally earnest in withstanding you—no one more than Thrasymachus.' Do not make a quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies and are now good friends enough. And I shall do my best to convince him and all mankind of the truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for the future when, in another life, we may again take part in similar discussions. 'That will be a long time hence.' Not long in

comparison with eternity. The many will probably remain incredulous, for they have never seen the natural unity of ideas, but only artificial juxtapositions ; not free and generous thoughts, but tricks of controversy and quips of law ;—a perfect man ruling in a perfect state, even a single one they have 499 not known. And we foresaw that there was no chance of perfection either in states or individuals until a necessity was laid upon philosophers—not the rogues, but those whom we called the useless class—of holding office ; or until the sons of kings were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of past time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever will be hereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain that there has been, is, and will be such a state whenever the Muse of philosophy rules. Will you say that the world is of another mind? O, my 500 friend, do not revile the world ! They will soon change their opinion if they are gently entreated, and are taught the true nature of the philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? or be jealous of one who has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many hate not the true but the false philosophers—the pretenders who force their way in without invitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles, which is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher despises earthly strife ; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in accordance with which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not himself only, but other men), and is the creator of the virtues private as well as public. When mankind see that the happiness of states is only to be found in that image, will they be angry with us for attempting to delineate it? ‘Certainly not. But what will be the process of delineation?’ The artist will do nothing until he has 501 made a *tabula rasa* ; on this he will inscribe the constitution of a state, glancing often at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving the godlike among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and painting in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine and human. But perhaps the world will doubt the existence of such an artist. What will

they doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature akin to the best?—and if they admit this will they still quarrel with us for making philosophers our kings?

502 ‘They will be less disposed to quarrel.’ Let us assume then that they are pacified. Still, a person may hesitate about the probability of the son of a king being a philosopher. And we do not deny that they are very liable to be corrupted; but yet surely in the course of ages there might be one exception—and one is enough. If one son of a king were a philosopher, and had obedient citizens, he might bring the ideal polity into being. Hence we conclude that our laws are not only the best, but that they are also possible, though not free from difficulty.

I gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose concerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that we must go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the education of our guardians? It was agreed that they were to be lovers of
503 their country, and were to be tested in the refiner’s fire of pleasures and pains, and those who came forth pure and remained fixed in their principles were to have honours and rewards in life and after death. But at this point, the argument put on her veil and turned into another path. I hesitated to make the assertion which I now hazard,—that our guardians must be philosophers. You remember all the contradictory elements, which met in the philosopher—how difficult to find them all in a single person! Intelligence and spirit are not often combined with steadiness; the stolid, fearless nature is averse to intellectual toil. And yet these opposite elements are all necessary, and therefore, as we were saying before, the aspirant must be tested in pleasures and
504 dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in the highest branches of knowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke of the virtues mention was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied to leave unexplored. ‘Enough seemed to have been said.’ Enough, my friend; but what is enough while anything remains wanting? Of all men the guardian

must not faint in the search after truth ; he must be prepared to take the longer road, or he will never reach that higher region which is above the four virtues ; and of the virtues too he must not only get an outline, but a clear and distinct vision. (Strange that we should be so precise about trifles, so careless about the highest truths !) ‘ And what are the highest ? ’ You to pretend unconsciousness, when you 505 have so often heard me speak of the idea of good, about which we know so little, and without which though a man gain the world he has no profit of it ! Some people imagine that the good is wisdom ; but this involves a circle,—the good, they say, is wisdom, wisdom has to do with the good. According to others the good is pleasure ; but then comes the absurdity that good is bad, for there are bad pleasures as well as good. Again, the good must have reality ; a man may desire the appearance of virtue, but he will not desire the appearance of good. Ought our guardians then to be ignorant of this supreme principle, of which every man has a presentiment, 506 and without which no man has any real knowledge of anything ? ‘ But, Socrates, what is this supreme principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what ? You may think me troublesome, but I say that you have no business to be always repeating the doctrines of others instead of giving us your own.’ Can I say what I do not know ? ‘ You may offer an opinion.’ And will the blindness and crookedness of opinion content you when you might have the light and certainty of science ? ‘ I will only ask you to give such an explanation of the good as you have given already of temperance and justice.’ I wish that I could, but in my present mood I cannot reach to the height of the knowledge of the good. To the parent or principal 507 I cannot introduce you, but to the child begotten in his image, which I may compare with the interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the account, and do not let me give you a false statement of the debt.) You remember our old distinction of the many beautiful and the one beautiful, the particular and the universal, the objects of sight and the objects of thought ? Did you ever consider that the objects

of sight imply a faculty of sight which is the most complex and costly of our senses, requiring not only objects of sense, but also a medium, which is light ; without which the sight will
508 not distinguish between colours and all will be a blank? For light is the noble bond between the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and the god who gives us light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to be confounded with the eye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call the child of the good, standing in the same relation to the visible world as the good to the intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the intellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that which is the sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of knowledge and truth, yet other and fairer than they are, and standing
509 in the same relation to them in which the sun stands to light. O inconceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth ! (‘ You cannot surely mean pleasure,’ he said. Peace, I replied.) And this idea of good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and the author not of knowledge only, but of being, yet greater far than either in dignity and power. ‘ That is a reach of thought more than human ; but, pray, go on with the image, for I suspect that there is more behind.’ There is, I said ; and bearing in mind our two suns or principles, imagine further their corresponding worlds—one of the visible, the other of the intelligible ; you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction under the image of a line divided into two unequal parts, and may again subdivide each part into two lesser segments representative of the stages of knowledge in either sphere. The lower
510 portion of the lower or visible sphere will consist of shadows and reflections, and its upper and smaller portion will contain real objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere of the intelligible will also have two divisions,—one of mathematics, in which there is no ascent but all is descent ; no inquiring into premises, but only drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with figures and numbers, the images of which are taken not from the shadows, but from

the objects, although the truth of them is seen only with the mind's eye; and they are used as hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other division reason uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the idea of good, 511 to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking firmly in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as descent, and finally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; 'you mean that the ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, metaphorical conceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, whichever is to be the name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse to make subjects of pure intellect, because they have no first principle, although when resting on a first principle, they pass into the higher sphere.' You understand me very well, I said. ✓ And now to those four divisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding faculties—pure intelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence to the second; to the third, faith; to the fourth, the perception of shadows—and the clearness of the several faculties will be in the same ratio as the truth of the objects to which they are related. . ✓

Like Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In language which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country, he is described as 'the spectator of all time and all existence'. He has the noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his desires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth. None of the graces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he fear death, or think much of human life. The ideal of modern times hardly retains the simplicity of the antique; there is not the same originality either in truth or error which characterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance; nor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by regular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has abated; there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive reflection upon nature and human life as a whole;

more of exact observation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost ; and there may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the language of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes his mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, not on fragments or pictures of nature ; on history, not on controversy ; on the truths which are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of the many. He is aware of the importance of 'classifying according to nature', and will try to 'separate the limbs of science without breaking them' (Phaedr. 265 E). There is no part of truth, whether great or small, which he will dishonour ; and in the least things he will discern the greatest (Parmen. 130 C). Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world pervaded by analogies, but he can also tell 'why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for an induction' (Mill's Logic, 3, 3, 3), while in other cases a thousand examples would prove nothing. He inquires into a portion of knowledge only, because the whole has grown too vast to be embraced by a single mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the divisions of science and of their relation to the mind of man than was possible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of the unity of knowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be attained by a study of elementary mathematics, but as the far-off result of the working of many minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are preliminary to almost every other ; at the same time, he will not reduce all varieties of knowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have a nobility of character, without which genius loses the better half of greatness. Regarding the world as a point in immensity, and each individual as a link in a never-ending chain of existence, he will not think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of death.

Ademantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, thus showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. He brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against him by a modern

logician—that he extracts the answer because he knows how to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change their meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions inferred with rather too much certainty or universality; the variation at each step may be unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes considerable. Hence the failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or algebraic formulae to logic. The imperfection, or rather the higher and more elastic nature of language, does not allow words to have the precision of numbers or of symbols. And this quality in language impairs the force of an argument which has many steps.

The objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance, may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of reasoning. And here, as at p. 506 B, Plato seems to intimate that the time had come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates must be superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples are given in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the ideal is wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves philosophers to be either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation (cp. p. 497 for a similar surprise) Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth of this, and explains the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically depreciating his own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are distinguished from the professional politicians, and, as at pp. 499, 500, are spoken of in a tone of pity rather than of censure under the image of ‘the noble captain who is not very quick in his perceptions’.

The uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that mankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided between contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no other weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the best is most liable to corruption; and that the finer nature is more likely to suffer from alien conditions. We too observe that there are some kinds of excellence which spring from

a peculiar delicacy of constitution ; as is evidently true of the poetical and imaginative temperament, which often seems to depend on impressions, and hence can only breathe or live in a certain atmosphere. The man of genius has greater pains and greater pleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and often a greater play of character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can assume the disguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil personal enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy, —he can say the word which all men are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible into the follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a Napoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in states, or 'of great good, when they are drawn in that direction'.

Yet the thesis, '*corruptio optimi pessima*,' cannot be maintained generally or without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. The alien conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of culture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest development in a congenial state or family, among friends or fellow-workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse circumstances to such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms them. And while weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of evil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of society, and live on happily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or stronger natures may be crushed or spoiled by surrounding influences—may become misanthrope and philanthrope by turns ; or in a few instances, like the founders of the monastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in themselves or in their age, may break away entirely from the world and from the church, sometimes into great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes into both. And the same holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school, a family.

Plato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered by public opinion, and what efforts the rest

of mankind will make to get possession of them. The world, the church, their own profession, any political or party organization, are always carrying them off their legs and teaching them to apply high and holy names to their own prejudices and interests. The 'monster' corporation to which they belong judges right and truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual becomes one with his order ; or, if he resists, the world is too much for him, and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a one-sided but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of mankind when they 'sit down together at an assembly', either in ancient or modern times.

When the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take possession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic expression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at intervals. The question is asked,—Why are the citizens of states so hostile to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet there is also a better mind of the many ; they would believe if they were taught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of philosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them ; a [divine] person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend of man holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the state in that image, they have never known. The same double feeling respecting the mass of mankind has always existed among men. The first thought is that the people are the enemies of truth and right ; the second, that this only arises out of an accidental error and confusion, and that they do not really hate those who love them, if they could be educated to know them.

In the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be considered : 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which is contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book, IV ; 2nd, the heavenly pattern or idea of the state ; 3rd, the relation of the divisions

of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding faculties of the soul.

1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse. Neither here nor in the *Phaedrus* or *Symposium*, nor yet in the *Philebus* or *Sophist*, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would probably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a system of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole rather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised by him in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of the soul; there, like Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he argues from experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the sixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which all ideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a connected whole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is the test of truth. He does not explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like many other thinkers both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be filled with a vacant form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the sciences to have a natural order and connexion in an age when they can hardly be said to exist. He is hastening on to the 'end of the intellectual world' without even making a beginning of them.

In modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of acquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. In all science *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths mingle in various proportions. The *a priori* part is that which is derived from the most universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by them; the *a posteriori* is that which grows up around the more general principles and becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato erroneously imagines that the synthesis is separable from the analysis, and that the method of science can anticipate science. In entertaining such a vision of *a priori* knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at least his meaning may be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts of Descartes,

Kant, Hegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Anticipations or divinations, or prophetic glimpses of truths whether concerning man or nature, seem to stand in the same relation to ancient philosophy which hypotheses bear to modern inductive science. 'These 'guesses at truth' were not made at random; they arose from a superficial impression of uniformities and first principles in nature which the genius of the Greek, contemplating the expanse of heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the distance. Nor can we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and the human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, if philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience.

2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist will fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid up in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye? The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the omission of particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form which experience supplies (*Phaedo*, 74). Plato represents these ideals in a figure as belonging to another world; and in modern times the idea will sometimes seem to precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand of the artist. As in science, so also in creative art, there is a synthetical as well as an analytical method. One man will have the whole in his mind before he begins; to another the processes of mind and hand will be simultaneous.

3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge are based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and intellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is implied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the universal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived seemed to require a further distinction;—numbers and figures were beginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard justice as a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that the abstractions of sense were distinct from

The confusion of ideas and numbers 21

the abstractions of mind. Between the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the Pythagorean principle of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle remarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led to introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme of his philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; they were the best preparation for higher studies. The subjective relation between them further suggested an objective one; although the passage from one to the other is really imaginary (Metaph. I, 6, 4). For metaphysical and moral philosophy has no connexion with mathematics; number and figure are the abstractions of time and space, not the expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested of metaphor, a straight line or a square has no more to do with right and justice than a crooked line with vice. The figurative association was mistaken for a real one; and thus the three latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were constructed.

There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first term of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no reference to any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of shadows to objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas. Probably Plato has been led by the love of analogy (cp. *Timaeus*, p. 32 B) to make four terms instead of three, although the objects perceived in both divisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of sense. He is also preparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of images at the beginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation in the tenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and is divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; each lower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four faculties, faith in the lower division has an intermediate position (cp. for the use of the word 'faith' or 'belief', *πίστις*, *Timaeus*, 29 C, 37 B), contrasting equally with the vagueness of the perception of shadows (*εἰκασία*)

and the higher certainty of understanding (διάνοια) and reason (νοῦς).

The difference between understanding and mind or reason (νοῦς) is analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts and the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at rest; consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this self-evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed to correspond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which is incomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in the subordinate ideas. Those ideas are called both images and hypotheses—images because they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because they are assumptions only, until they are brought into connexion with the idea of good.

The general meaning of the passage 508-511, so far as the thought contained in it admits of being translated into the terms of modern philosophy, may be described or explained as follows:—There is a truth, one and self-existent, to which by the help of a ladder let down from above, the human intelligence may ascend. This unity is like the sun in the heavens, the light by which all things are seen, the being by which they are created and sustained. It is the *idea* of good. And the steps of the ladder leading up to this highest or universal existence are the mathematical sciences, which also contain in themselves an element of the universal. These, too, we see in a new manner when we connect them with the idea of good. They then cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and become essential parts of a higher truth which is at once their first principle and their final cause.

We cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but we may trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are common to us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the sciences, or rather of science, for in Plato's time they were not yet parted off or distinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or life or idea or cause or reason, not yet conceived or no longer conceived as in the *Timaeus* and elsewhere under the form

of a person ; (3) the recognition of the hypothetical and conditional character of the mathematical sciences, and in a measure of every science when isolated from the rest ; (4) the conviction of a truth which is invisible, and of a law, though hardly a law of nature, which permeates the intellectual rather than the visible world.

The method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller explanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the seventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of Socrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The allusion to 'Theages's bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic sign, of Socrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory ; the remark that the salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil state of the world is due to God only ; the reference to a future state of existence, 498 D, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book, 608 D, and in which the discussions of Socrates and his disciples would be resumed ; the surprise in the answers at 487 E and 497 B ; the fanciful irony of Socrates, where he pretends that he can only describe the strange position of the philosopher in a figure of speech ; the original observation that the Sophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders of public opinion ; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the shower of sleet under a wall ; the figure of ' the great beast ' followed by the expression of goodwill towards the common people who would not have rejected the philosopher if they had known him ; the ' right noble thought ' that the highest truths demand the greatest exactness ; the hesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of the idea of good ; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon ; the comparison of philosophy to a deserted maiden who marries beneath her—are some of the most interesting characteristics of the sixth book.

Yet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft discussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, would fain, if possible, have

a clearer notion. Like them, we are dissatisfied when we are told that the idea of good can only be revealed to a student of the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined to think that neither we nor they could have been led along that path to any satisfactory goal. For we have learned that differences of quantity cannot pass into differences of quality, and that the mathematical sciences can never rise above themselves into the sphere of our higher thoughts, although they may sometimes furnish symbols and expressions of them, and may train the mind in habits of abstraction and self-concentration. The illusion which was natural to an ancient philosopher has ceased to be an illusion to us. But if the process by which we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be really imaginary, may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction? We remark, first, that in all ages, and especially in primitive philosophy, words such as being, essence, unity, good, have exerted an extraordinary influence over the minds of men. The meagreness or negativeness of their content has been in an inverse ratio to their power. They have become the forms under which all things were comprehended. There was a need or instinct in the human soul which they satisfied; they were not ideas, but gods, and to this new mythology the men of a later generation began to attach the powers and associations of the elder deities.

The idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became evident to intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all things, the power by which they were brought into being. It was the universal reason divested of a human personality. It was the life as well as the light of the world, all knowledge and all power were comprehended in it. The way to it was through the mathematical sciences, and these too were dependent on it. To ask whether God was the maker of it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God could be

conceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God. The God of the *Timaeus* is not really at variance with the idea of good; they are aspects of the same, differing only as the personal from the impersonal, or the masculine from the neuter, the one being the expression or language of mythology, the other of philosophy.

This, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as conceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may also be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the stage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming at, better than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw darkly and at a distance. But if he could have been told that this, or some conception of the same kind, but higher than this, was the truth at which he was aiming, and the need which he sought to supply, he would gladly have recognized that more was contained in his own thoughts than he himself knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent and tentative, so must the style of his interpreter be. We should not approach his meaning more nearly by attempting to define it further. In translating him into the language of modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit of ancient philosophy. It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of his disciples in a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to them. Nor does the mention of it in Aristotle appear to have any reference to this or any other passage in his extant writings.

Steph. BOOK VII. And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or unenlightenment of our nature:—Imagine
514 human beings living in an underground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into

the den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which marionette players show their puppets. Behind the wall appear moving figures, who hold ⁵¹⁵ *in their hands various works of art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the passers-by are talking and others silent.* 'A strange parable,' he said, 'and strange captives.' They are ourselves, I replied; and they see only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to these they give names, and if we add an echo which returns from the wall, the voices of the passengers will seem to proceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly turn them round and make them look with pain and grief to themselves at the real images; will they believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be dazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to something which they are able to behold without blinking? And sup- ⁵¹⁶ pose further, that they are dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself, will not their sight be darkened with the excess of light? Some time will pass before they get the habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will be able to perceive only shadows and reflections in the water; then they will recognize the moon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper place as he is. Last of all they will conclude:—'This is he who gives us the year and the seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will they rejoice in passing from darkness ⁵¹⁷ to light! How worthless to them will seem the honours and glories of the den! But now imagine further, that they descend into their old habitations;—in that underground dwelling they will not see as well as their fellows, and will not be able to compete with them in the measurement of the shadows on the wall; there will be many jokes about the man who went on a visit to the sun and lost his eyes, and if they find anybody trying to set free and enlighten one of their number, they will put him to death, if they can catch him. Now the cave or den is the world of sight, the fire is the sun,

the way upwards is the way to knowledge, and in the world of knowledge the idea of good is last seen and with difficulty, but when seen is inferred to be the author of good and right—parent of the lord of light in this world, and of truth and understanding in the other. He who attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he is unwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for his eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they behold in them—he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never in their lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance. But blindness is of two kinds, and may be caused either by passing out of darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense will distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both of them, but the blindness which arises from fullness of light he will deem blessed, and pity the other; or if he laugh at the puzzled soul looking at the sun, he will have more reason to laugh than the inhabitants of the den at those who descend from above. There is a further lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some persons fancy that instruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the faculty of sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to be turned round towards the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are almost like bodily habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but intelligence has a diviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to good or evil according to the direction given. Did you never observe how the mind of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does? Now if you take such an one, and cut away from him those leaden weights of pleasure and desire which bind his soul to earth, his intelligence will be turned round, and he will behold the truth as clearly as he now discerns his meaner ends. And have we not decided that our rulers must neither be so uneducated as to have no fixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to be unwilling to leave their paradise for the business of the world? We must choose out therefore the natures who are most likely to

ascend to the light and knowledge of the good ; but we must not allow them to remain in the region of light ; they must be forced down again among the captives in the den to partake of their labours and honours. ‘ Will they not think this a hardship ? ’ You should remember that our purpose in framing the State was not that our citizens should do what they like, but that they should serve the State for the common good of all. May we not fairly say to our philosopher,— 520 Friend, we do you no wrong ; for in other States philosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, but you have been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our hive, and therefore we must insist on your descending into the den. You must, each of you, take your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and with a little practice you will see far better than those who quarrel about the shadows, whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a waking reality. It may be that the saint or philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least inclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer live in the heaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. 521 For those who rule must not be those who are desirous to rule ; and, if you can offer to our citizens a better life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance that the rich, not only in this world’s goods, but in virtue and wisdom, may bear rule. And the only life which is better than the life of political ambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for the government of a State.

Then now comes the question,—How shall we create our rulers ; what way is there from darkness to light ? The change is effected by philosophy ; it is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul from night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul upwards ? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, which was occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused a natural harmony into 522 mind and literature ; but neither of these sciences gave any promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us but

that universal or primary science of which all the arts and sciences are partakers, I mean number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the art of war? 'Yes, certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about Palamedes in the tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and had counted the ranks and set them in order. For if Agamemnon could not count his feet (and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty sort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and indeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these
523 practical applications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is rather to be regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain what I mean by the last expression :—Things sensible are of two kinds ; the one class invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now the stimulating class are the things which suggest contrast and relation. For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes three fingers—a fore finger, a middle finger, a little finger—the sight equally recognizes all three fingers, but without number cannot further distinguish them. Or again, suppose two objects to be relatively great and small, these ideas of greatness and smallness are supplied not by the sense, but by
524 the mind. And the perception of their contrast or relation quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is puzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in order to find out whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number replies that they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from one another. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a confused chaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question arise of their respective natures ; we are thus led on to the distinction between the visible and intelligible. That was what I meant when I spoke of stimulants to the intellect ; I was thinking of the contradictions which arise in perception. The idea of unity, for example, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought unless involving some conception of plurality ;
525 but when the one is also the opposite of one, the contradiction

gives rise to reflection ; an example of this is afforded by any object of sight. All number has also an elevating effect ; it raises the mind out of the foam and flux of generation to the contemplation of being, having lesser military and retail uses also. The retail use is not required by us ; but as our guardian is to be a soldier as well as a philosopher, the military one may be retained. And to our higher purpose no science can be better adapted ; but it must be pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, not of a shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with visible objects, but with abstract truth ; for numbers are pure abstractions—the true arithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is capable of division. When you divide, 526 he insists that you are only multiplying ; his ‘one’ is not material or resolvable into fractions, but an unvarying and absolute equality ; and this proves the purely intellectual character of his study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of sharpening the wits ; no other discipline is equally severe, or an equal test of general ability, or equally improving to a stupid person.

Let our second branch of education be geometry. ‘I can easily see,’ replied Glaucon, ‘that the skill of the general will be doubled by his knowledge of geometry.’ That is a small matter ; the use of geometry, to which I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the idea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not at generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any one who is the least of a mathematician is aware, is mean and ridiculous ; they are made to look downwards to the arts, and not upwards to eternal existence. The geometer 527 is always talking of squaring, subtending, apposing, as if he had in view action ; whereas knowledge is the real object of the study. It should elevate the soul, and create the mind of philosophy ; it should raise up what has fallen down, not to speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and in the improvement of the faculties.

Shall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy ? ‘Very good,’ replied Glaucon ; ‘the knowledge

of the heavens is necessary at once for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.' I like your way of giving useful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the world. And there is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only useful information but a purification of the eye of the soul, which is better than the bodily eye, for by this alone is
528 truth seen. Now, will you appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher? or would you prefer to look to yourself only? 'Every man is his own best friend.' Then take a step backward, for we are out of order, and insert the third dimension which is of solids, after the second which is of planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion. But solid geometry is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor is the use of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of the study are conceited and impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit wins upon men, and, if government would lend a little assistance, there might be great progress made. 'Very true,' replied Glaucon; 'but do I understand you now to begin with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of solids, and thirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids?' Yes, I said; my hastiness has only hindered us.

'Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about
529 which I am willing to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.' I am an exception, then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the soul not upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the ceiling—no better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water—he may look up or look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of knowledge of which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind. All the magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy which falls far short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about the absolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the
530 beauty of figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great artist, which may be used for illustration, but no

mathematician would seek to obtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How ridiculous then to look for these in the map of the heavens, in which the imperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a disturbing element, marring the symmetry of day and night, of months and years, of the sun and stars in their courses. Only by problems can we place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let the heavens alone, and exert the intellect.

Still, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say, and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to the ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications also. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that we have an aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences to the idea of good. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades harmonics. The musicians put 531 their ears in the place of their minds. 'Yes,' replied Glaucon, 'I like to see them laying their ears alongside of their neighbours' faces—some saying, "That's a new note," others declaring that the two notes are the same.' Yes, I said; but you mean the empirics who are always twisting and torturing the strings of the lyre, and quarrelling about the tempers of the strings; I am referring rather to the Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost equally in error. For they investigate only the numbers of the consonances which are heard, and ascend no higher,—of the true numerical harmony which is unheard, and is only to be found in problems, they have not even a conception. 'That last,' he said, 'must be a marvellous thing.' A thing, I replied, which is only useful if pursued with a view to the good.

All these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if they are regarded in their natural relations to one another. 'I dare say, Socrates,' said Glaucon; 'but such a study will be an endless business.' What study do you mean—of the prelude, or what? For all these things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician is also a dialectician? 'Certainly not. I have 532

hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason.' And yet, Glaucon, is not true reasoning that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the intellectual world, and which was by us compared to the effort of sight, when from beholding the shadows on the wall we arrived at last at the images which gave the shadows? Even so the dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by the pure intellect at the contemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the very end of the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into the light, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to contemplate the shadows of reality, not the shadows of an image only—this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by the help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the soul to the contemplation of the highest ideal of being.

533 'So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed to the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither?' Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There can be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been disciplined in the previous sciences. But that there is a science of absolute truth, which is attained in some way very different from those now practised, I am confident. For all other arts or sciences are relative to human needs and opinions; and the mathematical sciences are but a dream or hypothesis of true being, and never analyse their own principles. Dialectic alone rises to the principle which is above hypotheses, converting and gently leading the eye of the soul out of the barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the upper world, with the help of the sciences which we have been describing—sciences, as they are often termed, although they require some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science, and this in our previous sketch was understanding. And so we get four names—two for intellect, and two for opinion,—reason or mind, understanding, faith, perception of shadows—which make
14 a proportion—being : becoming :: intellect : opinion—and

science : belief : : understanding : perception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature, which distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all opponents in the cause of good. 'To him who is not a dialectician life is but a sleepy dream ; and many a man is in his grave before he is well waked up. And would you have the future rulers of your ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid as posts? 'Certainly not the latter.' Then you must train them in dialectic, which will teach them to ask and answer questions, and is the coping-stone of the sciences.

I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were 535 chosen ; and the process of selection may be carried a step further :—As before, they must be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but now they must also have natural ability which education will improve ; that is to say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil, retentive, solid, diligent natures, who combine intellectual with moral virtues ; not lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and indolent in mind, or conversely ; not a maimed soul, which hates falsehood and yet unintentionally 536 is always wallowing in the mire of ignorance ; not a bastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb, and in perfect condition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind. Justice herself can find no fault with natures such as these ; and they will be the saviours of our State ; disciples of another sort would only make philosophy more ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my enthusiasm ; I am becoming excited ; but when I see her trampled under foot, I am angry at the authors of her disgrace. 'I did not notice that you were more excited than you ought to have been.' But I felt that I was. Now do not let us forget another point in the selection of our disciples—that they must be young and not old. For Solon is mistaken in saying that an old man can be always learning ; youth is the time of study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and dainty, and,

unlike the body, must not be made to work against the grain.
537 Learning should be at first a sort of play, in which the natural bent is detected. As in training them for war, the young dogs should at first only taste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over which during two or three years divide life between sleep and bodily exercise, then the education of the soul will become a more serious matter. At twenty years of age, a selection must be made of the more promising disciples, with whom a new epoch of education will begin. The sciences which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now be brought into relation with each other and with true being; for the power of combining them is the test of speculative and dialectical ability. And afterwards at thirty a further selection shall be made of those who are able to withdraw from the world of sense into the abstraction of ideas. But at this point, judging from present experience, there is a danger that dialectic may be the source of many evils. The danger may be illustrated by a parallel case:—Imagine a person who has been brought up in wealth and luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, and who is suddenly in-
538 formed that he is a supposititious son. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the flatterers, and now he does the reverse. This is just what happens with a man's principles. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home and which exercised a parental authority over him. Presently he finds that imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks, 'What is the just and good?' or proves that virtue is vice and vice virtue, and his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour,
539 and obey them as he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure, and becomes a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very pitiable, and, in order that our thirty-years-old pupils may not require this pity, let us take every possible care that young persons do not study philosophy too early. For a young man is a sort of puppy who only plays with an argument; and is reasoned into and out of his opinions every day; he soon begins to believe

nothing, and brings himself and philosophy into discredit. A man of thirty does not run on in this way; he will argue and not merely contradict, and adds new honour to philosophy by the sobriety of his conduct. What time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training of the soul?—say, twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body; six, or perhaps five years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen years let the student go down into the den, and command armies, and gain experience of life. At fifty let him return 540 to the end of all things, and have his eyes uplifted to the idea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if necessary, taking his turn at the helm of State, and training up others to be his successors. When his time comes he shall depart in peace to the islands of the blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, and receive such worship as the Pythian oracle approves.

‘You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our governors.’ Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere aspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise philosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and will be the servants of justice only. ‘And how will they begin their work?’ Their first act will be to send away into the country 541 all those who are more than ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are left. . . .

At the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation of the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in this, as in other passages, following the order which he prescribes in education, and proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the commencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening towards a fire and a way upwards to the true light, he returns to view the divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the result which had been hardly won by a great effort of thought in the previous discussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the dialectical process, which is repre-

sented by the way leading from darkness to light. The shadows, the images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the water, the stars and sun themselves, severally correspond,—the first, to the realm of fancy and poetry,—the second, to the world of sense,—the third, to the abstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences furnish the type,—the fourth and last to the same abstractions, when seen in the unity of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning and power. The true dialectical process begins with the contemplation of the real stars, and not mere reflections of them, and ends with the recognition of the sun, or idea of good, as the parent not only of light but of warmth and growth. To the divisions of knowledge the stages of education partly answer :—first, there is the early education of childhood and youth in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and customs of the State ;—then there is the training of the body to be a warrior athlete, and a good servant of the mind ;—and thirdly, after an interval follows the education of later life, which begins with mathematics and proceeds to philosophy in general.

There seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,—first, to realize abstractions ; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the true education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a comprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human mind the faculty of seeing the universal in all things ; until at last the particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He then seeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from sense, not perceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis but the common use of language. He never understands that abstractions, as Hegel says, are ‘ mere abstractions ’—of use when employed in the arrangement of facts, but adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them, or with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the faculty of abstraction apart from facts has enlarged the mind, and played a great part in the education of the human race.

Plato appreciated the value of this faculty, and saw that it might be quickened by the study of number and relation. All things in which there is opposition or proportion are suggestive of reflection. The mere impression of sense evokes no power of thought or of mind, but when sensible objects ask to be compared and distinguished, then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first suggests such distinctions. There follow in order the other sciences of plain and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which is astronomy or the harmony of the spheres,—to this is appended the sister science of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the possibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical proportions, such as we employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such as the Pythagoreans and even Aristotle make use of in Ethics and Politics, e.g. his distinction between arithmetical and geometrical proportion in the Ethics (Book V), or between numerical and proportional equality in the Politics (iii. 8, iv. 12, &c.).

The modern mathematician will readily sympathize with Plato's delight in the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with him :—Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure in themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the arts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which figures are to be dispensed with ; thus in a distant and shadowy way seeming to anticipate the possibility of working geometrical problems by a more general mode of analysis. He will remark with interest on the backward state of solid geometry, which, alas ! was not encouraged by the aid of the State in the age of Plato ; and he will recognize the grasp of Plato's mind in his ability to conceive of one science of solids in motion including the earth as well as the heavens,—not forgetting to notice the intimation to which allusion has been already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the science of solids in motion may have other applications. Still more will he be struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato,

at a time when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied in relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle of truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise) that in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has fallen into the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens *a priori* by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of harmony irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The illusion was a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty of astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and complexity of the world of sense; hence the circumstance that there was some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of distance or time or vibrations on which they must ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The modern predecessors of Newton fell into errors equally great; and Plato can hardly be said to have been very far wrong, or may even claim a sort of prophetic insight into the subject, when we consider that the greater part of astronomy at the present day consists of abstract dynamics, by the help of which most astronomical discoveries have been made.

The metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes mathematics as an instrument of education,—which strengthens the power of attention, develops the sense of order and the faculty of construction, and enables the mind to grasp under simple formulae the quantitative differences of physical phenomena. But while acknowledging their value in education, he sees also that they have no connexion with our higher moral and intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato makes to connect them, we easily trace the influences of ancient Pythagorean notions. There is no reason to suppose that he is speaking of the ideal numbers at p. 525 E; but he is describing numbers which are pure abstractions, to which he assigns a real and separate existence, which, as ‘the teachers of the art’ (meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would have affirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision, and in which unity and every other number are

conceived of as absolute. The truth and certainty of numbers, when thus disengaged from phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of an ancient philosopher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and fixedness may have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of men, 'who,' in the words of the *Timaeus*, 'might learn to regulate their erring lives according to them' (47 C). It is worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean ethical symbols still exist as figures of speech among ourselves. And those who in modern times see the world pervaded by universal law, may also see an anticipation of this last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic idea of good, which is the source and measure of all things, and yet only an abstraction. (Cp. *Philebus*, sub fin.)

Two passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that which relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage may be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of conception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the perceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which accompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is indistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of them. Whereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not the vision of objects in the order in which they actually present themselves to the experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to appear confused and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The first action of the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this chaos, and the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under which the confused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the question, 'What is great, what is small?' and thus begins the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

The second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. Three classes of harmonists are distinguished by him:—first, the Pythagoreans, whom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion on music he was to consult

Damon—they are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are altogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to the good ; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse with them, and whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as experimenting by mere auscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of these fall short in different degrees of the Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good.

The allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The den or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (cp. the description of the philosopher and lawyer in the *Theaetetus* 172–176), and the light of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing influence on the minds of those who return to this lower world. In other words, their principles are too wide for practical application ; they are looking far away into the past and future, when their business is with the present. The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions of actual life, and may often be at variance with them. And at first, those who return are unable to compete with the inhabitants of the den in the measurement of the shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them ; but after a while they see the things below in far truer proportions than those who have never ascended into the upper world. The difference between the politician turned into a philosopher and the philosopher turned into a politician, is symbolized by the two kinds of disordered eyesight, the one which is experienced by the captive who is transferred from darkness to day, the other, of the heavenly messenger who voluntarily for the good of his fellow men descends into the den. In what way the brighter light is to dawn on the inhabitants of the lower world, or how the idea of good is to become the guiding principle of politics, is left unexplained by Plato. Like the nature and divisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently demands to be informed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation could not

be given except to a disciple of the previous sciences. (Compare Symposium 210 A.)

Many illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern politics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been two sorts of politicians or statesmen, whose eyesight has become disordered in two different ways. First, there have been great men who, in the language of Burke, 'have been too much given to general maxims,' who, like J. S. Mill or Burke himself, have been theorists or philosophers before they were politicians, or who, having been students of history, have allowed some great historical parallel, such as the English Revolution of 1688, or possibly Athenian democracy or Roman Imperialism, to be the medium through which they viewed contemporary events. Or perhaps the long projecting shadow of some existing institution may have darkened their vision. The Church of the future, the Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the future, have so absorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their true proportions the politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with great ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no longer care to consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or harmonized with the conditions of human life. They are full of light, but the light to them has become only a sort of luminous mist or blindness. Almost every one has known some enthusiastic half-educated person, who sees everything at false distances, and in erroneous proportions.

With this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another—of those who see not far into the distance, but what is near only, who have been engaged all their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to a set or sect of their own. Men of this kind have no universal except their own interests or the interests of their class, no principle but the opinion of persons like themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond what they pick up in the streets or at their club. Suppose them to be sent into a larger world, to undertake some higher

The dangers of times of transition 43

calling, from being tradesmen to turn generals or politicians, from being schoolmasters to become philosophers :— or imagine them on a sudden to receive an inward light which reveals to them for the first time in their lives a higher idea of God and the existence of a spiritual world, by this sudden conversion or change is not their daily life likely to be upset ? and on the other hand will not many of their old prejudices and narrownesses still adhere to them long after they have begun to take a more comprehensive view of human things ? From familiar examples like these we may learn what Plato meant by the eyesight which is liable to two kinds of disorders.

Nor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young Athenian in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new ideas, and the student of a modern University who has been the subject of a similar 'aufklärung'. We too observe that when young men begin to criticize customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human nature, they are apt to lose hold of solid principle (*ἀπαι το βέβαιον αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται*). They are like trees which have been frequently transplanted. The earth about them is loose, and they have no roots reaching far into the soil. They 'light upon every flower', following their own wayward wills, or because the wind blows them. They catch opinions, as diseases are caught—when they are in the air. Borne hither and thither, 'they speedily fall into beliefs' the opposite of those in which they were brought up. They hardly retain the distinction of right and wrong ; they seem to think one thing as good as another. They suppose themselves to be searching after truth when they are playing the game of 'follow my leader'. They fall in love 'at first sight' with paradoxes respecting morality, some fancy about art, some novelty or eccentricity in religion, and like lovers they are so absorbed for a time in their new notion that they can think of nothing else. The resolution of some philosophical or theological question seems to them more interesting and important than any substantial know-

ledge of literature or science or even than a good life. Like the youth in the *Philebus*, they are ready to discourse to any one about a new philosophy. They are generally the disciples of some eminent professor or sophist, whom they rather imitate than understand. They may be counted happy if in later years they retain some of the simple truths which they acquired in early education, and which they may, perhaps, find to be worth all the rest. Such is the picture which Plato draws and which we only reproduce, partly in his own words, of the dangers which beset youth in times of transition, when old opinions are fading away and the new are not yet firmly established. Their condition is ingeniously compared by him to that of a supposititious son, who has made the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones, and, in consequence, they have lost their authority over him.

The distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also noticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician is quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and combines first principles (531 E). The contempt which he expresses at p. 533 for distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the apology which Socrates makes for his earnestness of speech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic style and mode of thought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number Agamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by which we are made to believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity with which the first step is taken in the actual creation of the State, namely, the sending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of age, in order to expedite the business of education by a generation, are also truly Platonic. (For the last, compare the passage at the end of the third book (415 D), in which he expects the lie about the earth-born men to be believed in the second generation.)

that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common ; and the education and pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common, and kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the State are to live together, having all things in common ; and they are to be warrior athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the other citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed. 'That is easily done,' he replied : 'You were speaking of the State which you had constructed, and of the individual who answered to this, 544 both of whom you affirmed to be good ; and you said that of inferior States there were four forms and four individuals corresponding to them, which although deficient in various degrees, were all of them worth inspecting with a view to determining the relative happiness or misery of the best or worst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led to another argument,—and so here we are.' Suppose that we put ourselves again in the same position, and do you repeat your question. 'I should like to know of what constitutions you were speaking?' Besides the perfect State there are only four of any note in Hellas :—first, the famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan commonwealth ; secondly, oligarchy, a State full of evils ; thirdly, democracy, which follows next in order ; fourthly, tyranny, which is the disease or death of all government. Now, States are not made of 'oak and rock', but of flesh and blood ; and therefore as there are five States there must be five human natures in individuals, which correspond to them. And first, there is the ambitious nature, which answers to the 545 Lacedaemonian State ; secondly, the oligarchical nature ; thirdly, the democratical ; and fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with the perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know which is the happier, and then we shall be able to determine whether the argument of Thrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before we began with the State and went on to the individual, so now, beginning with timocracy, let us go on to

the timocratical man, and then proceed to the other forms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.

But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all changes of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came division? 'Sing, heavenly Muses,' as Homer says ;—let them condescend to answer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in jest. 'And what will they say?' They will say that human 546 things are fated to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this law of destiny, when 'the wheel comes full circle' in a period short or long. Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the intelligence of rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable them to ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas divine creations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation is in a number which declines from perfection, and has four terms and three intervals of numbers, increasing, waning, assimilating, dissimilating, and yet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base of the number with a fourth added (or which is 3 : 4), multiplied by five and cubed, gives two harmonies :—The first a square number, which is a hundred times the base (or a hundred times a hundred) ; the second, an oblong, being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which is five, subtracting one from each square or two perfect squares from all, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is geometrical and contains the rule or law of generation. When this law is neglected marriages will be unpropitious ; the inferior offspring who are then born will in time become the rulers ; the State will decline, and education fall into decay ; gymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold and silver and brass and iron will form 547 a chaotic mass—thus division will arise. Such is the Muses' answer to our question. 'And a true answer, of course :—but what more have they to say?' They say that the two races, the iron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different ways ;—the one will take to trade and

money-making, and the others, having the true riches and not caring for money, will resist them : the contest will end in a compromise ; they will agree to have private property, and will enslave their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and nurturers. But they will retain their warlike character, and will be chiefly occupied in fighting and exercising rule. Thus arises timocracy, which is intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy.

The new form of government resembles the ideal, in obedience to rulers and contempt for trade, in having common meals, and in devotion to warlike and gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy, and simplicity of character, which was once her note, is now looked for only
548 in the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of peace ; the ruler is no longer a philosopher ; as in oligarchies, there springs up among them an extravagant love of gain—get another man's and save your own, is their principle : and they have dark places in which they hoard their gold and silver, for the use of their women and others ; they take their pleasures by stealth, like boys who are running away from their father—the law ; and their education is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the strong arm of power. The leading characteristic of this State is party spirit and ambition.

And what manner of man answers to such a State? ' In love of contention,' replied Adeimantus, ' he will be like our friend Glaucon.' In that respect, perhaps, but not in others.
549 He is self-asserting and ill-educated, yet fond of literature, although not himself a speaker,—fierce with slaves, but obedient to rulers, a lover of power and honour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of arms,—fond, too, of gymnastics and of hunting. As he advances in years he grows avaricious, for he has lost philosophy, which is the only saviour and guardian of men. His origin is as follows :—His father is a good man dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who has retired from politics in order that he may lead a quiet life. His mother is angry at her loss of precedence among other

women; she is disgusted at her husband's selfishness, and she expatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence of his father. The old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the youth:—'When you grow up you must be more of a man than your father.' All the world are agreed 550 that he who minds his own business is an idiot, while a busy-body is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man compares this spirit with his father's words and ways, and as he is naturally well disposed, although he has suffered from evil influences, he rests at a middle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour.

And now let us set another city over against another man. The next form of government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor is it difficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with the possession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are invented; one draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches outweigh virtue; lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; 551 misers of politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined by law to the rich, who do not shrink from violence in order to effect their purposes.

Thus much of the origin,—let us next consider the evils of oligarchy. Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the analogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: two nations are struggling together in one—the rich and the poor; and the rich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to pay for defenders out of their own money. And have we not already condemned that State in 552 which the same persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his property and have no place in the State; while there is one class which has enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But observe that these destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature in them when they were rich than now that they are poor; they were miserable spendthrifts always.

They are the drones of the hive ; only whereas the actual drone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the two-legged things whom we call drones are some of them without stings and some of them have dreadful stings ; in other words, there are paupers and there are rogues. These are never far apart ; and in oligarchical cities, where nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler, you will find abundance of both. And this evil state of society originates in bad education and bad government.

- 553 Like State, like man,—the change in the latter begins with the representative of timocracy ; he walks at first in the ways of his father, who may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps ; and presently he sees him ‘ fallen from his high estate ’, the victim of informers, dying in prison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he thus receives, makes him cautious ; he leaves politics, represses his pride, and saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as his bosom’s lord, and assumes the style of the Great King ; the rational and spirited elements sit humbly on the ground at either side, the one immersed in calculation, the other absorbed in the admiration of wealth. The love of honour turns to love of money ; the conversion is instantaneous.
- 554 The man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one passion which is the master of the rest : Is he not the very image of the State ? He has had no education, or he would never have allowed the blind god of riches to lead the dance within him. And being uneducated he will have many slavish desires, some beggarly, some knavish, breeding in his soul. If he is the trustee of an orphan, and has the power to defraud, he will soon prove that he is not without the will, and that his passions are only restrained by fear and not by reason. Hence he leads a divided existence ; in which the better desires
- 555 mostly prevail. But when he is contending for prizes and other distinctions, he is afraid to incur a loss which is to be repaid only by barren honour ; in time of war he fights with a small part of his resources, and usually keeps his money and loses the victory.

Next comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the oligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an oligarchy; and they encourage expensive habits in order that they may gain by the ruin of extravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose their property or rights of citizenship; but they remain in the city, full of hatred against the new owners of their estates and ripe for revolution. The usurer with stooping walk pretends not to see them; he passes by, and leaves his sting—that is, his money—in some other victim; and many a man has to pay the parent or principal sum multiplied into a family of children, and is reduced into a state of dronage by him. The only way of diminishing the evil is either to 556 limit a man in his use of his property, or to insist that he shall lend at his own risk. But the ruling class do not want remedies; they care only for money, and are as careless of virtue as the poorest of the citizens. Now there are occasions on which the governors and the governed meet together,—at festivals, on a journey, voyaging or fighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in the hour of danger he is not despised; he sees the rich man puffing and panting, and draws the conclusion which he privately imparts to his companions,—‘that our people are not good for much;’ and as a sickly frame is made ill by a mere touch from without, or sometimes without external impulse is ready to fall to pieces of itself, so from the least cause, or with none at all, the city falls ill and fights a battle for life or death. And 557 democracy comes into power when the poor are the victors, killing some and exiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the rest.

The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes, and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours and figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and children, prefer this variety to real

beauty and excellence. The State is not one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as you like ; you may govern if you like, let it alone if you like ; go to war and make peace if you
558 feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody else. When you condemn men to death they remain alive all the same ; a gentleman is desired to go into exile, and he stalks about the streets like a hero ; and nobody sees him or cares for him. Observe, too, how grandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our fine theories of education,—how little she cares for the training of her statesmen ! The only qualification which she demands is the profession of patriotism. Such is democracy ;—a pleasing, lawless, various sort of government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike.

Let us now inspect the individual democrat ; and first, as in the case of the State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly oligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary pleasures. Perhaps
559 I ought to explain this latter term :—Necessary pleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot do without ; unnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of which the desire might be eradicated by early training. For example, the pleasures of eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a certain point ; beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and the excess may be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called expensive pleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as we called him, is the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, whereas the miserly oligarch is subject only to the necessary.

The oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner :—The youth who has had a miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone's honey ; he meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new pleasure. As in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on both sides, temptations from without and passions from within ;

there is reason also and external influences of parents and 560 friends in alliance with the oligarchical principle; and the two factions are in violent conflict with one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but then again new desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of passions gets possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, which they find void and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods and illusions ascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into the country of the Lotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance or parley of individual elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the gates of the castle and permit no one to enter,—there is a battle, and they gain the victory; and straightway making alliance with the desires, they banish modesty, which they call folly, and send temperance over the border. When the house has been swept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, and, crowning them with garlands, bring them back under new names. Insolence they call good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage. Such is the process by which 561 the youth passes from the necessary pleasures to the unnecessary. After a while he divides his time impartially between them; and perhaps, when he gets older and the violence of passion has abated, he restores some of the exiles and lives in a sort of equilibrium, indulging first one pleasure and then another; and if reason comes and tells him that some pleasures are good and honourable, and others bad and vile, he shakes his head and says that he can make no distinction between them. Thus he lives in the fancy of the hour; sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns abstainer; he practises in the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then again he would be a philosopher or a politician; or again, he would be a warrior or a man of business; he is

Everything by starts and nothing long.

There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and 562 all States—tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from

democracy much as democracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise from excess ; the one from excess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. 'The great natural good of life,' says the democrat, 'is freedom.' And this exclusive love of freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the change from democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of freedom, and unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and insults them ; equality and fraternity of governors and governed is the approved principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State onl^y, but of private houses, and extends even to the animals.

563 Father and son, citizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a level ; fathers and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom of the young man is a match for the elder, and the old imitate the jaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being thought morose. Slaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and there is no difference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in a democratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The she-dogs are as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march along with dignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in their way. 'That has often been my experience.' At last the citizens become so sensitive that they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten ; they would have no man call himself their master. Such is the glorious beginning of things out of which tyranny springs.

564 'Glorious, indeed ; but what is to follow?' The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy ; for there is a law of contraries ; the excess of freedom passes into the excess of slavery, and the greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will remember that in the oligarchy were found two classes—rogues and paupers, whom we compared to drones with and without stings. These two classes are to the State what phlegm and bile are to the human body ; and the State-physician, or legislator, must get rid of them, just as the bee-master keeps the drones out of the hive. Now in

a democracy, too, there are drones, but they are more numerous and more dangerous than in the oligarchy ; there they are inert and unpractised, here they are full of life and animation ; and the keener sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and prevent their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in democratic States, of respectable, thriving individuals, who can be squeezed when the drones have need of their possessions ; there is moreover a third class, who are the labourers and the 565 artisans, and they make up the mass of the people. When the people meet, they are omnipotent, but they cannot be brought together unless they are attracted by a little honey ; and the rich are made to supply the honey, of which the demagogues keep the greater part themselves, giving a taste only to the mob. Their victims attempt to resist ; they are driven mad by the stings of the drones, and so become downright oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow informations and convictions for treason. The people have some protector whom they nurse into greatness, and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature of the change is indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus, which tells how he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other victims will turn into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human blood, and slays some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at abolition of debts and division of lands, must either perish 566 or become a wolf—that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back from exile ; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by lawful means, they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the people makes his well-known request to them for a body-guard, which they readily grant, thinking only of his danger and not of their own. Now let the rich man make to himself wings, for he will never run away again if he does not do so then. And the Great Protector, having crushed all his rivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot of State, a full-blown tyrant : Let us inquire into the nature of his happiness.

In the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody ; he is not a ' dominus ', no, not he : he has *only* come to put an end to debt and the monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes himself necessary
567 to the State by always going to war. He is thus enabled to depress the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work ; and he can get rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy. Then comes unpopularity ; some of his old associates have the courage to oppose him. The consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the State ; but, unlike the physician who purges away the bad, he must get rid of the high-spirited, the wise and the wealthy ; for he has no choice between death and a life of shame and dishonour. And the more hated he is, the more he will require trusty guards ; but how will he obtain them ? ' They will come flocking like birds—for pay.' Will he not
568 rather obtain them on the spot ? He will take the slaves from their owners and make them his body-guard ; these are his trusted friends, who admire and look up to him. Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and say that he is wise by association with the wise ? And are not their praises of tyranny alone a sufficient reason why we should exclude them from our State ? They may go to other cities, and gather the mob about them with fine words, and change commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies, receiving honours and rewards for their services ; but the higher they and their friends ascend constitution hill, the more their honour will fail and become ' too asthmatic to mount '. To return to the tyrant—How will he support that rare army of his ? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which will enable him to lighten the taxes ; then he will take all his father's property,
569 and spend it on his companions, male or female. Now his father is the demus, and if the demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking son ought not to be a burden on his parents, and bids him and his riotous crew begone, then will the parent know what a monster he has been nurturing,

and that the son whom he would fain expel is too strong for him. 'You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?' Yes, he will, after having taken away his arms. 'Then he is a parricide and a cruel, unnatural son.' And the people have jumped from the fear of slavery into slavery, out of the smoke into the fire. Thus liberty, when out of all order and reason, passes into the worst form of servitude. . .

In the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at the end of Book IV. These he describes in a succession of parallels between the individuals and the States, tracing the origin of either in the State or individual, which has preceded them. He begins by asking the point at which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the substance of the three former books, which also contain a parallel of the philosopher and the State.

Of the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, which to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the natural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of mystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to ignorance of the law of population. Of this law the famous geometrical figure or number is the expression. Like the ancients in general, he had no idea of the gradual perfectibility of man or of the education of the human race. His ideal was not to be attained in the course of ages, but was to spring in full armour from the head of the legislator. When good laws had been given, he thought only of the manner in which they were likely to be corrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or restored in accordance with their original spirit. He appears not to have reflected upon the full meaning of his own words, 'In the brief space of human life, nothing great can be accomplished' (x. 608 B); or again, as he afterwards says in the *Laws* (iii. 676), 'Infinite time is the maker of cities.' The order of constitutions which is adopted by him represents an order of thought

rather than a succession of time, and may be considered as the first attempt to frame a philosophy of history.

The first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of soldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State ; this is a government of force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses, but imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of organization have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the love of truth, and the soldier, who is of a simpler and honest nature, rules in his stead. The individual who answers to timocracy has some noticeable qualities. He is described as ill educated, but, like the Spartan, a lover of literature ; and although he is a harsh master to his servants he has no natural superiority over them. His character is based upon a reaction against the circumstances of his father, who in a troubled city has retired from politics ; and his mother, who is dissatisfied at her own position, is always urging him towards the life of political ambition. Such a character may have had this origin, and indeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a feminine jealousy of a similar kind (vii. 34). But there is obviously no connexion between the manner in which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere accident by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman.

The two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less historical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity like the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of history appears to be different ; first, in the Homeric times there is the royal or patriarchal form of government, which a century or two later was succeeded by an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and in which wealth was only the accident of the hereditary possession of land and power. Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a government based upon a qualification of property, which, according to Aristotle's mode of using words, would have been called

a timocracy ; and this in some cities, as at Athens, became the conducting medium to democracy. But such was not the necessary order of succession in States ; nor, indeed, can any order be discerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in the Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from monarchy to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there appears to be a similar inversion in the last step of the Platonic succession ; for tyranny, instead of being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history appears rather as a stage leading to democracy ; the reign of Peisistratus and his sons is an episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and the constitution of Cleisthenes ; and some secret cause common to them all seems to have led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance in the dawn of history, e.g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every State with the exception of Sparta, through a similar stage of tyranny which ended either in oligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember that Plato is describing rather the contemporary governments of the Sicilian States, which alternated between democracy and tyranny, than the ancient history of Athens or Corinth.

The portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek delighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of mediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was no enormity which the Greek was not ready to believe of them ; the tyrant was the negation of government and law ; his assassination was glorious ; there was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with probability be attributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the common thought of his countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated with all the power of his genius. There is no need to suppose that he drew from life ; or that his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal acquaintance with Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would rather tend to render

doubtful his ever having 'consorted' with them, or entertained the schemes, which are attributed to him in the Epistles, of regenerating Sicily by their help.

Plato in a hyperbolic and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of democracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy is a state of individualism or dissolution ; in which every one is doing what is right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of liberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading idea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think. But if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of tyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved for the tyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness, and who in his utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an almost impossible existence, without that remnant of good which, in Plato's opinion, was required to give power to evil (Book I, p. 352). This ideal of wickedness living in helpless misery, is the reverse of that other portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour, which first of all Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn, and is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of his subjects.

Each of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical gradation : the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing but harmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue ; in the timocracy and the timocratic man the constitution, whether of the State or of the individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the love of honour ; this latter virtue, which is hardly to be esteemed a virtue, has superseded all the rest. In the second stage of decline the virtues have altogether disappeared, and the love of gain has succeeded to them ; in the third stage, or democracy, the various passions are allowed to have free play, and the virtues and vices are impartially cultivated. But this freedom, which leads to many curious extravagances of character, is in reality only

a state of weakness and dissipation. At last, one monster passion takes possession of the whole nature of man—this is tyranny. In all of them excess—the excess first of wealth and then of freedom, is the element of decay.

The eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful allusions ; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark, (1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and more divided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps also in our own ; (2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula as equality among unequals ; (3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the tyrant ; (4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a speculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in modern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern legislation. Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the ancient lawgiver : in modern times we may be said to have almost, if not quite, solved the first of these difficulties, but hardly the second.

Still more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals : there is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant of the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent meanness of the oligarchical ; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the democrat, in which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right or wrong as he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a far country (note here the play of language by which the democratic man is himself represented under the image of a State having a citadel and receiving embassies) ; and there is the wild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his successor. The hit about the tyrant being a parricide ; the representation of the tyrant's life as an obscene dream ; the rhetorical surprise of a more miserable than the most miserable of men in Book IX ; the hint to

the poets that if they are the friends of tyrants there is no place for them in a constitutional State, and that they are too clever not to see the propriety of their own expulsion; the continuous image of the drones who are of two kinds, swelling at last into the monster drone having wings (see *infra*, Book IX), are among Plato's happiest touches.

There remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the Republic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as great as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though apparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of obscurity (*Ep. ad Att. vii, 13, 5*). And some have imagined that there is no answer to the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. But such a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the number (*Pol. v, 12, § 7*), and would have been ridiculous to any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics. As little reason is there for supposing that Plato intentionally used obscure expressions; the obscurity arises from our want of familiarity with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself indicates that he is not altogether serious, and in describing his number as a solemn jest of the Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire on the symbolical use of number. (*Cp. Cratylus, passim; Protag. 342 ff.*)

Our hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the passage (from *ὦν ἐπίτριστος πύθμην, κτλ.*) describes a solid figure.¹ Some further clue may be gathered from the

¹ *Pol. v, 12, § 8*:—‘He only says that nothing is abiding, but that all things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of 4:3; and this when combined with a figure of five gives two harmonies; he means when the number of this figure becomes solid.’

appearance of the Pythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in which, as in every right-angled triangle, the squares of the two lesser sides equal the square of the hypotenuse ($3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$, or $9 + 16 = 25$).

Plato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (cp. Tim. 39 D), i.e. a number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the divine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are complete. He also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms and three intervals of numbers which are related to one another in certain proportions; these he converts into figures, and finds in them when they have been raised to the third power certain elements of number, which give two 'harmonies', the one square, the other oblong; but he does not say that the square number answers to the divine, or the oblong number to the human cycle; nor is any intimation given that the first or divine number represents the period of the world, the second the period of the State, or of the human race as Zeller supposes; nor is the divine number afterwards mentioned (cp. Arist.). The second is the number of generations or births, and presides over them in the same mysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or in which, according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice, marriage, are represented by some number or figure. This is probably the number 216.

The explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up the number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from the circumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens (Herod. vii, 34), and would be what Plato might have called 'a number which nearly concerns the population of a city' (588 A); the mysterious disappearance of the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him the first cause of his decline of States. The lesser or square 'harmony', of 400, might be a symbol of the guardians,—the larger or oblong 'harmony', of the people, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might

refer respectively to the three orders in the State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the five forms of government. The harmony of the musical scale, which is elsewhere used as a symbol of the harmony of the State (Rep. iv, 443 D), is also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which represent the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of the scale.

The terms used in the statement of the problem may be explained as follows. A perfect number (τέλειος ἀριθμὸς), as already stated, is one which is equal to the sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or cyclical number, = $1 + 2 + 3$. The words ὅροι, 'terms' or 'notes', and ἀποστάσεις, 'intervals,' are applicable to music as well as to number and figure. Πρώτῃ is the 'base' on which the whole calculation depends, or the 'lowest term' from which it can be worked out. The words δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστεύμεναι have been variously translated—'squared and cubed' (Donaldson), 'equalling and equalled in power' (Weber), 'by involution and evolution,' i.e. by raising the power and extracting the root (as in the translation). Numbers are called 'like and unlike' (ὁμοιοῦντές τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντες) when the factors or the sides of the planes and cubes which they represent are or are not in the same ratio: e.g. 8 and 27 = 2^3 and 3^3 ; and conversely. 'Waxing' (αὐξοντες) numbers, called also 'increasing' (ὑπερτελείς), are those which are exceeded by the sum of their divisors: e.g. 12 and 18 are less than 16 and 21. 'Waning' (φθίνοντες) numbers, called also 'decreasing' (ἐλλιπεῖς), are those which exceed the sum of their divisors: e.g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words translated 'commensurable and agreeable to one another' (προσῆγορα καὶ ῥητά) seem to be different ways of describing the same relation, with more or less precision. They are equivalent to 'expressible in terms having the same relation to one another', like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which numbers is in the relation of $1\frac{1}{2}$ to the preceding. The 'base', or 'fundamental number, which has $\frac{1}{3}$ added to it' ($1\frac{1}{3}$) = $\frac{4}{3}$ or a musical fourth. Ἀρμονία is a 'proportion'

of numbers as of musical notes, applied either to the parts or factors of a single number or to the relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a 'square' number (*ἴσην ἰσάκεις*); the second harmony is an 'oblong' number (*προμήκη*), i.e. a number representing a figure of which the opposite sides only are equal. *Ἀριθμοὶ ἀπὸ διαμέτρων* = 'numbers squared from' or 'upon diameters'; *ῥητῶν* = 'rational', i.e. omitting fractions, *ἄρρητων*, 'irrational,' i.e. including fractions; e.g. 49 is a square of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which = 5 : 50, of an irrational diameter of the same.

For several of the explanations here given and for a good deal besides I am indebted, to an excellent article on the Platonic Number by Dr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society, vol. i. p. 81 ff.).

The conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him as follows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle is the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the number of the State, he proceeds: 'The period of the world is defined by the perfect number 6, that of the State by the cube of that number or 216, which is the product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic Tetractys¹; and if we take this as the basis of our computation, we shall have two cube numbers (*αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστεύμεναι*), viz. 8 and 27; and the mean proportionals between these, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three intervals and four terms, and these terms and intervals stand related to one another in the *sesqui-altera* ratio, i.e. each term is to the preceding as $\frac{3}{2}$. Now if we remember that the number 216 = $8 \times 27 = 3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3$, and that $3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$, we must admit that this number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which musicians attach so much importance. And if we combine the ratio $\frac{4}{3}$ with the number 5, or multiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by first squaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which

¹ The Platonic Tetractys consisted of a series of seven terms, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27.

denote the ratio of the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former multiplied by the square, the latter by the cube of the number 10, the sum of the first four digits which constitute the Platonic Tetractys.'

The two *ἀρμονίαι* he elsewhere explains as follows: 'The first *ἀρμονία* is ἰσὴν ἰσάκεις ἑκατὸν τοσαντάκεις, in other words $(\frac{4}{3} \times 5)^2 = 100 \times \frac{25}{9}$. The second *ἀρμονία*, a cube of the same root, is described as 100 multiplied (α) by the rational diameter of 5 diminished by unity, i.e., as shown above, 48: (β) by two incommensurable diameters, i.e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and (γ) by the cube of 3, or 27. Thus we have $(48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 \times 2^3$. This second harmony is to be the cube of the number of which the former harmony is the square, and therefore must be divided by the cube of 3. In other words, the whole expression will be: (1), for the first harmony, $\frac{400}{9}$: (2), for the second harmony, $\frac{8000}{27}$.

The reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also with Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of births are: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number given in the first part of the passage (ἐν ᾧ πρῶτον . . . ἀπέφηναν): (2) that the number 216 with its permutations would have been familiar to a Greek mathematician, though unfamiliar to us: (3) that 216 is the cube of 6, and also the sum of $3^1, 4^3, 5^3$, the numbers 3, 4, 5 representing the Pythagorean triangle, of which the sides when squared equal the square of the hypotenuse ($3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$): (4) that it is also the period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate terms or bases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third, fourth, fifth in the musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the product of the cubes of 2 and 3, which are the two last terms in the Platonic Tetractys: (7) that the Pythagorean triangle is said by Plutarch (de Is. et Osir., 373 E), Proclus (super prima Eucl. iv, p. 111), and Quintilian (de Musica iii, p. 152) to be contained in this passage, so that the tradition of the school seems to point in the same

direction : (8) that the Pythagorean triangle is called also the figure of marriage (*γαμήλιον διάγραμμα*).

But though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for supposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, the human or imperfect number the State ; nor has he given any proof that the second harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that ἀρρήτων δὲ δυνεῖν can mean ‘two incommensurables,’ which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, but rather, as the preceding clause implies, δυνεῖν ἀριθμοῖν ἀπὸ ἀρρήτων διαμέτρων πεμπάδος, i.e. two square numbers based upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is $5 = 50 \times 2$.

The greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the words ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν κτλ., ‘a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied by 5.’ In this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the numbers of the Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the numbers which follow are in favour of the explanation. The first harmony of 400, as has been already remarked, probably represents the rulers ; the second and oblong harmony of 7600, the people.

And here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle would be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The point of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that so much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His general meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is represented or presided over by a perfect or cyclical number ; human generation is imperfect, and represented or presided over by an imperfect number or series of numbers. The number 5040, which is the number of the citizens in the Laws, is expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, the convenience of the number for division ; it is also made up of the first seven digits multiplied by one another. The contrast of the perfect and imperfect number may have been easily suggested by the corrections of the cycle, which were made first by Meton and secondly by

Callippus ; (the latter is said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or of exactness to be attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in Book IX ($729 = 365 \times 2$), and the slight correction of the error in the number $5040 \div 12$ (Laws, 711 C), may furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in the circumstance that those who were seeking for order in nature and had found order in number, should have imagined one to give law to the other. Plato believes in a power of number far beyond what he could see realized in the world around him, and he knows the great influence which 'the little matter of 1, 2, 3' (vii. 522 C) exercises upon education. He may even be thought to have a prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of Quetelet and others, that numbers depend upon numbers, e.g.—in population, the numbers of births and the respective numbers of children born of either sex, on the respective ages of parents, i.e. on other numbers,

Steph. Book IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about
 571 whom we have to inquire, Whence is he, and how does he live—in happiness or in misery? There is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of the appetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them are unlawful, and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various degrees by the power of reason and law. 'What appetites do you mean?' I mean those which are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which get up and walk about naked without any self-respect or shame ; and there is no conceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which, in imagination, they may not be guilty. 'True,' he said ; 'very true.' But when a man's pulse beats temperately ; and he has supped on a feast of reason and come to a knowledge of himself before going to rest, and
 572 has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their perturbing his reason, which remains clear and luminous, and when he is free from quarrel and heat,—the visions which he has on his bed are least irregular and abnormal. Even in good

men there is such an irregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.

To return :—You remember what was said of the democrat ; that he was the son of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and repressed the ornamental and expensive ones ; presently the youth got into fine company, and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways ; and being a better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean, and led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and successive indulgence. Now imagine that the youth has become a father, and has a son who is exposed to the same temptations, and has companions who lead him into every sort of iniquity, and parents and friends who try to keep him right. The counsellors of evil find that their only chance of retaining him is to implant in his soul a monster drone, or love ; while other desires buzz around him and mystify him with sweet sounds and scents, this monster love takes possession of him, and puts an end to every true or modest thought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and madness, is a tyranny ; and the tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is just a drinking, lusting, furious sort of animal.

And how does such an one live ? ‘ Nay, that you must tell me.’ Well then, I fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will be the lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, and so he spends all that he has and borrows more ; and when he has nothing the young ravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for food. Love urges them on ; and they must be gratified by force or fraud, or if not, they become painful and troublesome ; and as the new pleasures succeed the old ones, so will the son take possession of the goods of his parents ; if they show signs of refusing, he will defraud and deceive them ; and if they openly resist, what then ? ‘ I can only say, that I should not much like to be in their place.’ But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some new-fangled and unnecessary love he will give up his old father and mother,

best and dearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the hour ! Truly a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother ! When there is no more to be got out of them, he turns burglar or pickpocket, or robs a temple. Love overmasters the thoughts of his youth, and he becomes in sober reality the monster that he was sometimes in sleep.

- 575 He waxes strong in all violence and lawlessness ; and is ready for any deed of daring that will supply the wants of his rabble-rout. In a well-ordered State there are 'only a few such, and these in time of war go out and become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of peace they stay at home and do mischief ; they are the thieves, footpads, cut-purses, man-stealers of the community ; or if they are able to speak, they turn false-witnesses and informers. ' No small catalogue of crimes truly, even if the perpetrators are few.' Yes, I said ; but small and great are relative terms, and no crimes which are committed by them approach those of the tyrant, whom this class, growing strong and numerous, create out of themselves. If the people yield, well and good ; but, if they resist, then, as before he beat his father and mother, so now he beats his fatherland and motherland, and places his mercenaries over them. Such men in their early days live with flatterers, and they themselves
- 576 flatter others, in order to gain their ends ; but they soon discard their followers when they have no longer any need of them ; they are always either masters or servants,—the joys of friendship are unknown to them. And they are utterly treacherous and unjust, if the nature of justice be at all understood by us. They realize our dream ; and he who is the most of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life of a tyrant for the longest time, will be the worst of them, and being the worst of them, will also be the most miserable.

Like man, like State,—the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which is the extreme opposite of the royal State ; for one is the best and the other the worst. But which is the happier ? Great and terrible as the tyrant may appear enthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid to go in

and ask ; and the answer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, and the tyrannical the most miserable of States. And may we not ask the same question about the men 577 themselves, requesting some one to look into them who is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be panic-struck by the vain pomp of tyranny? I will suppose that he is one who has lived with him, and has seen him in family life, or perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger.

Assuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let us begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all, whether the State is likely to be free or enslaved—Will there not be a little freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad, and the slavery of the good ; and this applies to the man as well as to the State ; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the better part is enslaved to the worse. He cannot do what he would, and his mind is full of confusion ; he is the very reverse of a freeman. The State will be 578 poor and full of misery and sorrow ; and the man's soul will also be poor and full of sorrows, and he will be the most miserable of men. No, not the most miserable, for there is yet a more miserable. 'Who is that?' The tyrannical man who has the misfortune also to become a public tyrant. 'There I suspect that you are right.' Say rather, 'I am sure ;' conjecture is out of place in an inquiry of this nature. He is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has more of them than any private individual. You will say, 'The owners of slaves are not generally in any fear of them.' But why? Because the whole city is in a league which protects the individual. Suppose however that one of these owners and his household is carried off by a god into a wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of terror?—will he not be compelled to flatter his slaves and to promise them many things sore against his will? 579 And suppose the same god who carried him off were to surround him with neighbours who declare that no man ought to have slaves, and that the owners of them should be

punished with death. 'Still worse and worse! He will be in the midst of his enemies.' And is not our tyrant such a captive soul, who is tormented by a swarm of passions which he cannot indulge; living indoors always like a woman, and jealous of those who can go out and see the world?

Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more miserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of himself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest of slaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and never able to satisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, 580 like the State of which he is the representative. His jealous, hateful, faithless temper grows worse with command; he is more and more faithless, envious, unrighteous,—the most wretched of men, a misery to himself and to others. And so let us have a final trial and proclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result? 'Make the proclamation yourself.' *The son of Ariston (the best) is of opinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust man is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I add further—'seen or unseen by gods or men.'*

This is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of pleasure, which answer to the three elements 581 of the soul—reason, passion, desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual appetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love of reputation. Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of truth, and careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the difference of men's natures, one of these three principles is in the ascendant, and they have their several pleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the three natures, and each one will be found praising his own pleasures and depreciating those of others. The money-maker will contrast the vanity of knowledge with the solid advantages of

wealth. The ambitious man will despise knowledge which brings no honour ; whereas the philosopher will regard only the fruition of truth, and will call other pleasures necessary rather than good. Now, how shall we decide between them? 582 Is there any better criterion than experience and knowledge? And which of the three has the truest knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of youth makes the philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the avaricious and the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom. Honour he has equally with them ; they are ' judged of him ', but he is ' not judged of them ', for they never attain to the knowledge of true being. And his instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth and honour ; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. And so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of the soul, and a life passed in such pleasure is the pleasantest. He who has a 583 right to judge judges thus. Next comes the life of ambition, and, in the third place, that of money-making.

Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust—once more, as in an Olympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him try a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are true and pure ; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this : Is not pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither? When a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than health. But this he never found out while he was well. In pain he desires only to cease from pain ; on the other hand, when he is in an ecstasy of pleasure, rest is painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is both pleasure and pain. But can that which is neither become both? Again, pleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest ; but if so, how can the absence of either of them be the other? 584 Thus we are led to infer that the contradiction is an appearance only, and witchery of the senses. And these are not the only pleasures, for there are others which have no preceding pains. Pure pleasure then is not the absence of

pain, nor pure pain the absence of pleasure ; although most of the pleasures which reach the mind through the body are reliefs of pain, and have not only their reactions when they depart, but their anticipations before they come. They can be best described in a simile. There is in nature an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who passes from the lower to the middle imagines that he is going up and is already in the upper world ; and if he were taken back again would think, and truly think, that he was descending. All this arises out of his ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions. And a like confusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other things. The
585 man who compares grey with black, calls grey white ; and the man who compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain pleasure. Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance and folly of the soul ; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge of the other. Now which is the purer satisfaction—that of eating and drinking, or that of knowledge ? Consider the matter thus : The satisfaction of that which has more existence is truer than of that which has less. The invariable and immortal has a more real existence than the variable and mortal, and has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. The soul, again, has more existence and truth and knowledge
586 than the body, and is therefore more really satisfied and has a more natural pleasure. Those who feast only on earthly food, are always going at random up to the middle and down again ; but they never pass into the true upper world, or have a taste of true pleasure. They are like fatted beasts, full of gluttony and sensuality, and ready to kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust ; for they are not filled with true being, and their vessel is leaky (cp. Gorgias, 243 A, foll.). Their pleasures are mere shadows of pleasures, mixed with pain, coloured and intensified by contrast, and therefore intensely desired ; and men go fighting about them, as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy, because they know not the truth.

The same may be said of the passionate element :—the desires of the ambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction. Only when under the guidance of reason do either of the other principles do their own business or attain the pleasure which is natural to them. When not attaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to pursue a shadow of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they are from philosophy and reason, the more distant they will be from law and order, and the more illusive will be their pleasures. The desires of love and tyranny are the farthest from law, and those of the king are nearest to it. There is one genuine pleasure, and two spurious ones : the tyrant goes beyond even the latter ; he has run away altogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority be told, except in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed from the oligarch, and has therefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the shadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, again, is thrice removed from the king, and thus we get the formula 3×3 , which is the number of a surface, representing the shadow which is the tyrant's pleasure, and if you like to cube this ' number of the beast ', you will find that the measure of the difference amounts to 729 ; the king is 729 times more happy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number is *nearly* equal to the number of days and nights in a year ($365 \times 2 = 730$) ; and is therefore concerned with human life. This is the interval between a good and bad man in happiness only : what must be the difference between them in comeliness of life and virtue !

Perhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our discussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of justice. Now that we know the nature of justice and injustice, let us make an image of the soul, which will personify his words. First of all, fashion a multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of animals, tame and wild, and able to produce and change them at pleasure. Suppose now another form of a lion, and

another of a man ; the second smaller than the first, the third than the second ; join them together and cover them with a human skin, in which they are completely concealed. When this has been done, let us tell the sup-
589 porter of injustice that he is feeding up the beasts and starving the man. The maintainer of justice, on the other hand, is trying to strengthen the man ; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an alliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down the many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and with themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust wrong.

But now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God in man ; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast? And if so, who would receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the noblest part of himself under the worst?—who would sell his son or daughter into the hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money? And will he sell his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction to
590 the most godless and foul? Would he not be worse than Eriphyle, who sold her husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance is the letting loose of the multiform monster, and pride and sullenness are the growth and increase of the lion and serpent element, while luxury and effeminacy are caused by a too great relaxation of spirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when the spirited element is subjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to become a monkey. The real disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who are engaged in them have to flatter, instead of mastering their desires ; therefore we say that they should be placed under the control of the better principle in another because they have none in themselves ; not, as Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of the subjects, but for their good. And our intention in educating the young, is to give them

self-control; the law desires to nurse up in them a higher 591 principle, and when they have acquired this, they may go their ways.

‘What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world’ and become more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if the concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the brute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element liberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his soul—a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The man of understanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next place he will keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and strength, but in order to attain the most perfect harmony of body and soul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and harmony; he will not desire to heap up wealth without measure, but he will fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of his own soul. For the same reason he will only accept such honours as will 592 make him a better man; any others he will decline. ‘In that case,’ said he, ‘he will never be a politician.’ Yes, but he will, in his own city; though probably not in his native country, unless by some divine accident. ‘You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which has no place upon earth.’ But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern of such a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image. Whether such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act according to that pattern and no other. . . .

The most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:—(1) the account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.

1. Plato’s account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to all pleasure, but

rather desires that the several parts of the soul shall have their natural satisfaction ; he even agrees with the Epicureans in describing pleasure as something more than the absence of pain. This is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which have no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the *Philebus*), such as the pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation. In the previous book (pp. 558, 559) he had made the distinction between necessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now observes that there is a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures, corresponding to Aristotle's *θηριώτης*. He dwells upon the relative and unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to form a judgement of the lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the soul are incapable of judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is 'sawn up into quantities' by Aristotle ; the analysis which was originally made by him became in the next generation the foundation of further technical distinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the illusion under which the ancients fell of regarding the transience of pleasure as a proof of its unreality, and of confounding the permanence of the intellectual pleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from which they are derived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of knowledge, though more elevating, are not more lasting than other pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily state (cp. *Intro.* to *Philebus*).

2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant, and royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9, which Plato characteristically designates as a number concerned with human life, because *nearly* equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year. He is

desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is immeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. Those who spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring (Prot. 357 A), saw no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the figure of a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the pleasures of the king by the numerical interval of 729. And in modern times we sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a philosophical formula. 'It is not easy to estimate the loss of the tyrant, except perhaps in this way,' says Plato. So we might say, that although the life of a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad man, yet you may measure the difference between them by valuing one minute of the one at an hour of the other ('One day in thy courts is better than a thousand'), or you might say that 'there is an infinite difference'. But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase, 'They are a thousand miles asunder.' And accordingly Plato finds the natural vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this arithmetical formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here and in the number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth of his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure; just as persons in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is verified when it has been only thrown into an abstract form. In speaking of the number 729 as proper to human life, he probably intended to intimate that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life.

The simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is effected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the mathematical groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some difficulty in explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained; the oligarch is removed in the third degree from the royal and aristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the oligarchical; but we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square and to count the oligarch twice over, thus reckoning

them not as = 5 but as = 9. The square of 9 is passed lightly over as only a step towards the cube.

3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more convinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of the 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and substance at his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant kingdom is also the rule of man's life (Bk. vii. 540 E). ('Say not lo! here, or lo! there, for the kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note is struck which prepares for the revelation of a future life in the following Book. But the future life is present still; the ideal of politics is to be realized in the individual.

eph. Book X. Many things pleased me in the order of our
595 State, but there was nothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The division of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I do not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage on the understanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge which heals error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even now he appears to me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much as I love the man, I love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and first of all, will you explain what is imitation, for really I do not understand? 'How likely then that I should understand!'
596 'That might very well be, for the duller often sees better than the keener eye. 'True, but in your presence I can hardly venture to say what I think.' Then suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with the doctrine of universals. Let us assume the existence of beds and tables. There is one idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his mind when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables, but he made beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a maker of the works of all workmen, who makes not only vessels but plants and animals,

himself, the earth and heaven, and things in heaven and under the earth? He makes the Gods also. 'He must be a wizard indeed!' But do you not see that there is a sense in which you could do the same? You have only to take a mirror, and catch the reflection of the sun, and the earth, or anything else—there now you have made them. 'Yes, but only in appearance.' Exactly so; and the painter is such a creator as you are with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than the carpenter; although neither the carpenter nor any other artist can be supposed to make the absolute bed. 'Not if philosophers may be believed.' Nor need we ⁵⁹⁷ wonder that his bed has but an imperfect relation to the truth. Reflect:—Here are three beds; one in nature, which is made by God; another, which is made by the carpenter; and the third, by the painter. God only made one, nor could he have made more than one; for if there had been two, there would always have been a third—more absolute and abstract than either, under which they would have been included. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural maker of the bed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker; but the painter is rather the imitator of what the other two make; he has to do with a creation which is thrice removed from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, like every other imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth. The painter imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the ⁵⁹⁸ carpenter. And this, without being really different, appears to be different, and has many points of view, of which only one is caught by the painter, who represents everything because he represents a piece of everything, and that piece an image. And he can paint any other artist, although he knows nothing of their arts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or simple people. Suppose now that somebody came to us and told us, how he had met a man who knew all that everybody knows, and better than anybody:—should we not infer him to be a simpleton who, having no discernment of truth and falsehood, had met

599 with a wizard or enchanter, whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons saying that Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the virtues, must we not infer that they are under a similar delusion? they do not see that the poets are imitators, and that their creations are only imitations. 'Very true.' But if a person could create as well as imitate, he would rather leave some permanent work and not an imitation only; he would rather be the receiver than the giver of praise? 'Yes, for then he would have more honour and advantage.'

Let us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him, I am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems incidentally refer, but about their main subjects—war, military tactics, politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth—not an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have ever done to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, 600 Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your counsels? or is any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and Anacharsis? Or is there any Homeric way of life, such as the Pythagorean was, in which you instructed men, and which is called after you? 'No, indeed; and Crcophylus [Flesh-child] was even more unfortunate in his breeding than he was in his name, if, as tradition says, Homer in his lifetime was allowed by him and his other friends to starve.' Yes, but could this ever have happened if Homer had really been the educator of Hellas? Would he not have had many devoted followers? If Protagoras and Prodicus can persuade their contemporaries that no one can manage house or State without them, is it likely that Homer and Hesiod would have been allowed to go about as beggars—I mean if they had really been able to do the world any good?—would not men have compelled them to stay where they were, or have followed them about in order to get education? But they did not; and therefore we

may infer that Homer and all the poets are only imitators, who do but imitate the appearances of things. For as a 601
 painter by a knowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in cobbling, so the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and give harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know how mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face which has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once more, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter paints, and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands the use of them—the knowledge of this is confined to the horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of invention, a third of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to the two others. The flute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the maker will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor have faith—neither science nor true opinion can be ascribed 602
 to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of knowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest degree.

And now let us inquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to imitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen when in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a distance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to impose upon us. And the art of measuring and weighing and calculating comes in to save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance; for, as we were saying, two contrary opinions 603
 of the same about the same and at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is true is determined by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the better faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. And the same holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well as painting. The imitation is of actions voluntary or involuntary, in which there is an expectation of a good or bad result, and present experience of pleasure

and pain. But is a man in harmony with himself when he is the subject of these conflicting influences? Is there not rather a contradiction in him? Let me further ask, whether
604 he is more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when he is in company. 'In the latter case.' Feeling would lead him to indulge his sorrow, but reason and law control him and enjoin patience; since he cannot know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing is of any great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good counsel. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make an uproar; we should take the measures which reason prescribes, not raising a lament, but finding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow reason, while the irrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at the recollection of our troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter furnishes the chief materials of the imitative arts. Whereas reason is ever in repose and cannot easily be displayed, especially to a mixed multitude who have no experience of her.
605 Thus the poet is like the painter in two ways: first he paints an inferior degree of truth, and secondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He indulges the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow him to have authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater and less, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth.

But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment—the power which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear some passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious length, you know that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and yet in our own sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and unmanly (cp. *Ion*, 535 E). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing another do what he hates and abominates in himself? Is he not giving way to a senti-
606 ment which in his own case he would control?—he is off his guard because the sorrow is another's; and he thinks that he may indulge his feelings without disgrace, and will be

the gainer by the pleasure. But the inevitable consequence is that he who begins by weeping at the sorrows of others, will end by weeping at his own. The same is true of comedy, —you may often laugh at buffoonery which you would be ashamed to utter, and the love of coarse merriment on the stage will at last turn you into a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires; she lets them rule instead of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of Homer affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, and that all life should be regulated by his pre- 607
cepts, we may allow the excellence of their intentions, and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and tragedian. But we shall continue to prohibit all poetry which goes beyond hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but law and reason shall rule in our State.

These are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind her that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which there are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the saying of 'the she-dog, yelping at her mistress', and 'the philosophers who are ready to circumvent Zeus', and 'the philosophers who are paupers.' Nevertheless we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow her to return upon condition that she makes a defence of herself in verse; and her supporters who are not poets may speak in prose. We confess her charms; but if she cannot show that she is useful as well as delightful, like rational lovers, we must renounce our love, though endeared to us by early associations. Having 608
come to years of discretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and that a man should be careful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which he himself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake—no less than the good or evil of a human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice and virtue for the attractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of honour or wealth. 'I agree with you.'

And yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have

described. 'And can we conceive things greater still?' Not, perhaps, in this brief span of life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity? 'I do not understand what you mean?' Do you not know that the soul is immortal? 'Surely you are not prepared to prove that?' Indeed I am. 'Then let me hear this argument, of which you make so light.'

- 609 You would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In all things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy them, nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles, which are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of these destroy the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. The soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not, by reason of them, brought any nearer to death. Nothing which was not destroyed from within ever perished by external
610 affection of evil. The body, which is one thing, cannot be destroyed by food, which is another, unless the badness of the food is communicated to the body. Neither can the soul, which is one thing, be corrupted by the body, which is another, unless she herself is infected. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul, neither can any bodily evil, whether disease or violence, or any other destroy the soul, unless it can be shown to render her unholy and unjust. But no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust when they die. If a person has the audacity to say the contrary, the answer is—Then why do criminals require the hand of the executioner, and not die of themselves? 'Truly,' he said, 'injustice would not be very terrible if it brought a cessation of evil; but I rather believe that the injustice which murders others may tend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.' You are quite right. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot destroy
611 the soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. But the soul which cannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be immortal and everlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist in the same number. They cannot

diminish, because they cannot be destroyed ; nor yet increase, for the increase of the immortal must come from something mortal, and so all would end in immortality. Neither is the soul variable and diverse ; for that which is immortal must be of the fairest and simplest composition. If we would conceive her truly, and so behold justice and injustice in their own nature, she must be viewed by the light of reason pure as at birth, or as she is reflected in philosophy when holding converse with the divine and immortal and eternal. In her present condition we see her only like the sea-god Glaucus, bruised and maimed in the sea which is the world, and covered with shells and stones 612 which are incrustated upon her from the entertainments of earth.

Thus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards and honours which the poets attribute to justice ; we have contented ourselves with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in herself, even if a man should put on a Gyges's ring and have the helmet of Hades too. And now you shall repay me what you borrowed ; and I will enumerate the rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted, for the sake of argument, as you will remember, that evil might perhaps escape the knowledge of Gods and men, although this was really impossible. And since I have shown that justice has reality, you must grant me also that she has the palm of appearance. In the first place, the just man is known to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will receive at their hands every good, 613 always excepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All things end in good to him, either in life or after death, even what appears to be evil ; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their likeness. And what shall we say of men ? Is not honesty the best policy ? The clever rogue makes a great start at first, but breaks down before he reaches the goal, and slinks away in dishonour ; whereas the true runner perseveres to the end, and receives the prize. And you must allow me to repeat all the blessings

which you attributed to the fortunate unjust—they bear rule in the city, they marry and give in marriage to whom they will; and the evils which you attributed to the unfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as you implied, their sufferings are better veiled in silence.

- 614 But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared with those which await good men after death. 'I should like to hear about them.' Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son of Armenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but ten days afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent home for burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre and there he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world below. He said that his soul went with a great company to a place, in which there were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two corresponding chasms in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting in the intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand, having the seal of their judgement set upon them before, while the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend by the way on the left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was to be their messenger to men from the world below. And he beheld and saw the souls departing after judgement at either chasm; some who came from earth, were worn and travel-stained; others, who came from heaven, were clean and bright. They seemed glad to meet and rest awhile in the meadow; here they discoursed with
- 615 one another of what they had seen in the other world. Those who came from earth wept at the remembrance of their sorrows, but the spirits from above spoke of glorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed they were punished tenfold—now the journey was of a thousand years' duration, because the life of man was reckoned as a hundred years—and the rewards of virtue were in the same proportion. He added something hardly worth

repeating about infants dying almost as soon as they were born. Of parricides and other murderers he had tortures still more terrible to narrate. He was present when one of the spirits asked—Where is Ardiaeus the Great? (This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had murdered his father, and his elder brother, a thousand years before.) Another spirit answered, 'He comes not hither, and will never come. And I myself,' he added, 'actually saw this terrible sight. At the entrance of the chasm, as we were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other sinners—most of whom had been tyrants, but not all—and just as they fancied that they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar, and then 616 wild, fiery-looking men who knew the meaning of the sound, seized him and several others, and bound them hand and foot and threw them down, and dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating them and carding them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by, that they were going to be cast into hell.' The greatest terror of the pilgrims ascending was lest they should hear the voice, and when there was silence one by one they passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were corresponding delights.

On the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of light, in colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought them to the place, and they saw that this was the column of light which binds together the whole universe. The ends of the column were fastened to heaven, and from them hung the distaff of Necessity, on which all the heavenly bodies turned—the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the whorl of a mixed substance. The whorl was in form like a number of boxes fitting into one another with their edges turned upwards, making together a single whorl which was pierced by the spindle. The outermost had the rim broadest, and the inner whorls were smaller and smaller, and had their rims narrower. The largest (the fixed stars) was spangled—the seventh (the sun) was brightest—the eighth (the moon)

shone by the light of the seventh—the second and fifth
617 (Saturn and Mercury) were most like one another and
yellower than the eighth—the third (Jupiter) had the
whitest light—the fourth (Mars) was red—the sixth (Venus)
was in whiteness second. The whole had one motion,
but while this was revolving in one direction the seven
inner circles were moving in the opposite, with various
degrees of swiftness and slowness. The spindle turned on
the knees of Necessity, and a Siren stood hymning upon each
circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, the daughters
of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal intervals, singing of
past, present, and future, responsive to the music of the
Sirens; Clotho from time to time guiding the outer circle
with a touch of her right hand; Atropos with her left hand
touching and guiding the inner circles; Lachesis in turn
putting forth her hand from time to time to guide both of
them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to Lachesis, and
there was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from
her knees lots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and
said: ‘Mortal souls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter
of Necessity. A new period of mortal life has begun, and
you may choose what divinity you please; the responsibility
618 of choosing is with you—God is blameless.’ After speaking
thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up the
lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground
before them the samples of lives, many more than the souls
present; and there were all sorts of lives, of men and of
animals. There were tyrannies ending in misery and exile,
and lives of men and women famous for their different
qualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and poverty,
sickness and health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of
human life, and therefore the whole of education should be
directed to the acquisition of such a knowledge as will teach
a man to refuse the evil and choose the good. He should
know all the combinations which occur in life—of beauty
with poverty or with wealth,—of knowledge with external
goods,—and at last choose with reference to the nature

of the soul, regarding that only as the better life which makes men better, and leaving the rest. And a man must 619 take with him an iron sense of truth and right into the world below, that there too he may remain undazzled by wealth or the allurements of evil, and be determined to avoid the extremes and choose the mean. For this, as the messenger reported the interpreter to have said, is the true happiness of man; and any one, as he proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding, have a good lot, even though he come last. 'Let not the first be careless in his choice, nor the last despair.' He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who had drawn the first lot chose a tyranny; he did not see that he was fated to devour his own children—and when he discovered his mistake, he wept and beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and anybody rather than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had only habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice, because he had no experience of life; whereas those who came from earth and had seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a man had followed philosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately fortunate in his lot, he might not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage both from and to this world would be smooth and heavenly. Nothing was more curious than the spectacle of the choice, at once sad and laughable and wonderful; most of the souls only seeking to avoid their own condition in a previous life. He saw the soul of Orpheus changing 620 into a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was Thamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing to be men; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the life of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which was done to him in the judgement of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like enmity to human nature, passing into an eagle. About the middle was the soul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an athlete, and next to her Epeus taking the

nature of a workwoman ; among the last was Thersites, who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither, the last of all, came Odysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which lay neglected and despised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and said that if he had been first instead of last, his choice would have been the same. Men, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame animals changing into one another.

When all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each of them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all brought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand ; from her they were carried to Atropos, who made the threads irreversible ; whence, without
621 turning round, they passed beneath the throne of Necessity ; and when they had all passed, they moved on in scorching heat to the plains of Forgetfulness and rested at evening by the river Unmindful, whose water could not be retained in any vessel ; of this they had all to drink a certain quantity—some of them drank more than was required, and he who drank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented from drinking. When they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were thunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers ways, shooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return to the body, he only knew that awaking suddenly in the morning he found himself lying on the pyre.

Thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way of Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of Forgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the millennial pilgrimage of the other. . . .

The Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions : first, resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the poets, who, now that the

nature of the soul has been analysed, are seen to be very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of the happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to him, and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument, as in the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias*, is supplemented by the vision of a future life.

Why Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and dramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially to the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be embodied in verse as well as in prose, and that there are some indefinable lights and shadows of human life which can only be expressed in poetry—some elements of imagination which always entwine with reason; why he should have supposed epic verse to be inseparably associated with the impurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why he should try Homer and Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of utility,—are questions which have always been debated amongst students of Plato. Though unable to give a complete answer to them, we may show—first, that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances of his age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as the error which is contained in them.

He is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own lifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the *Laws* (iii. 701 A), had taken the place of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase of the tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of tyrants, and the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; the new had not yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other branch of Greek literature, was falling under the power of rhetoric. There was no 'second or third' to Aeschylus and Sophocles in the generation which followed them. Aristophanes, in one of his later comedies (*Frogs*, 89 foll.), speaks of 'thousands of tragedy-making prattlers', whose attempts at poetry he compares to the chirping of swallows; 'their garrulity went far

beyond Euripides,'—'they appeared once upon the stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of genius who had a real appreciation of the godlike Aeschylus and the noble and gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their 'theology' (Rep. ii. 380), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible and intolerable. There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato than a sense of the decline and decay both in literature and in politics which marked his own age. Nor can he have been expected to look with favour on the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who had begun by satirizing Socrates in the *Clouds*, and in a similar spirit forty years afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths in his *Eccleziastusae*, or *Female Parliament* (cp. x. 606 C, and *Laws* ii. 658 ff. ; 817).

There were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The profession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human nature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts'; the characters which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to leave nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his life and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the master of it. Taking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic than of the epic poets, though he must have known that the Greek tragedians afforded noble lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer can be compared. But great dramatic or even great rhetorical power is hardly consistent with firmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is often incidentally associated with a weak or dissolute character.

In the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree removed from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure; they are only appearances. In modern times we should say that art is not merely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in forms of sense. Even adopting the humble image

of Plato, from which his argument derives a colour, we should maintain that the artist may ennoble the bed which he paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the feeling of home which he introduces; and there have been modern painters who have imparted such an ideal interest to a blacksmith's or a carpenter's shop. The eye or mind which feels as well as sees can give dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a straw-built shed [Rembrandt], to the hull of a vessel 'going to its last home' [Turner]. Still more would this apply to the greatest works of art, which seem to be the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only, would he not have been compelled to admit that something more was to be found in them than in the form of any mortal; and that the rule of proportion to which they conformed was 'higher far than any geometry or arithmetic could express?' (Statesman, 257 A.)

Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit Aristotle's theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to afford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we may sometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to them; and that they often gain strength when pent up within our own breast. It is not every indulgence of the feelings which is to be condemned. For there may be a gratification of the higher as well as of the lower—thoughts which are too deep or too sad to be expressed by ourselves, may find an utterance in the words of poets. Every one would acknowledge that there have been times when they were consoled and elevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of architecture or by the peacefulness of nature. Plato has himself admitted, in the earlier part of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of harmonizing as well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he regards them through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only

Why was Plato the enemy of the Poets? 95

'What good have they done?' and is not satisfied with the reply, that 'They have given innocent pleasure to mankind'.

He tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the inferior faculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to do with universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on a level with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; and he was well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of life by any process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them is in fact a denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the poets were not critics—as he says in the Apology, 'Any one was a better interpreter of their writings than they were themselves' (22 C). He himself ceased to be a poet when he became a disciple of Socrates; though, as he tells us of Solon, 'he might have been one of the greatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits' (Tim. 21 C). Thus from many points of view there is an antagonism between Plato and the poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. The poets, as he says in the Protagoras (316 E), were the Sophists of their day; and his dislike of the one class is reflected on the other. He regards them both as the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, though in the case of Euripides more with reference to his immoral sentiments about tyrants and the like. For Plato is the prophet who 'came into the world to convince men'—first of the fallibility of sense and opinion, and secondly of the reality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there may be in modern times in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us seem to have so many elements in common, the strangeness will disappear if we conceive of poetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent to thought and abstraction. Unfortunately the very word 'idea', which to Plato is expressive of the most real of all things, is associated in our minds with an element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how he differs from Aristotle, who declares poetry to be truer than

history, for the opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, not like history, with particulars (Poet. c. 9, 3).

The things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which are unseen—they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To him all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that this is an illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an individual man, horse, bed, &c., than in the class man, horse, bed, &c.; nor is the truth which is displayed in individual instances less certain than that which is conveyed through the medium of ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the real importance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them an essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be often false and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of the individual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; or had he been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity of the words *δόξα*, *φαίνεσθαι*, *εἰκός* and the like, tended to confuse, he would not have denied truth to the particulars of sense.

But the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in all departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians of the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets, lying spirits, enchanters of the world. There is another count put into the indictment against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the tyrant, and bask in the sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages has had an apparatus of false ideas and false teachers at its service—in the history of Modern Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no government of men depends solely upon force; without some corruption of literature and morals—some appeal to the imagination of the masses—some pretence to the favour of heaven—some element of good giving power to evil (cp. i. 352), tyranny, even for a short time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not insensible to the importance of awakening in their cause

a Pseudo-Hellenic feeling ; they were proud of successes at the Olympic games ; they were not devoid of the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first instance of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or Archelaus : and the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their prostitution of the Tragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his prophetic eye extends beyond them to the false teachers of other ages who are the creatures of the government under which they live. He compares the corruption of his contemporaries with the idea of a perfect society, and gathers up into one mass of evil the evils and errors of mankind ; to him they are personified in the rhetoricians, sophists, poets, rulers who deceive and govern the world.

A further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely to be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present thought in the form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of reason, to inspire even for a moment courage or resignation ; perhaps to suggest a sense of infinity and eternity in a way which mere language is incapable of attaining. True, the same power which in the purer age of art embodies gods and heroes only, may be made to express the voluptuous image of a Corinthian courtesan. But this only shows that art, like other outward things, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not more closely connected with the higher than with the lower part of the soul. All imitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore necessarily partakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal truth is sacrificed for the sake of the representation, and something in the exactness of the representation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works of art have a permanent element ; they idealize and detain the passing thought, and are the intermediates between sense and ideas.

In the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence of an age in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or transformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different place at different periods of the world's history. In the infancy of mankind, poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the whole of literature, and the only instrument of intellectual culture ; in modern times she is the shadow or echo of her former self, and appears to have a precarious existence. Milton in his day doubted whether an epic poem was any longer possible. At the same time we must remember, that what Plato would have called the charms of poetry have been partly transferred to prose ; he himself (*Statesman* 304) admits rhetoric to be the handmaiden of Politics, and proposes to find in the strain of law (*Laws* vii. 811) a substitute for the old poets. Among ourselves the creative power seems often to be growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering to the mind than formerly. The illusion of the feelings commonly called love, has hitherto been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and romance, and has exercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on the world. But may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some day exhausted? The modern English novel which is the most popular of all forms of reading is not more than a century or two old : will the tale of love a hundred years hence, after so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still received with unabated interest?

Art cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may often corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression, either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest forms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact that the Mahometans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use of pictures and images. The beginning of a great religion, whether Christian or Gentile, has not been

Why was Plato the enemy of the Poets? 99

'wood or stone', but a spirit moving in the hearts of men, The disciples have met in a large upper room or in 'holes and caves of the earth'; in the second or third generation, they have had mosques, temples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or reform of religions, like the first revelation of them, has come from within and has generally disregarded external ceremonies and accompaniments.

But poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the purest sentiment. Plato himself seems, to waver between two opposite views—when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought up amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book X, when he banishes the poets from his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us almost deify, have fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand that to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal as well as impossible. For nature too is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air or a single glance at the varying landscape would in an instant revive and reillumine the extinguished spark of poetry in the human breast. In the lower stages of civilization imagination more than reason distinguishes man from the animals; and to banish art would be to banish thought, to banish language, to banish the expression of all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of external forms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and images has a temple in which he worships the Most High, as solemn and beautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and thought are not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can execute. And the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized to us, are always tending to pass into the form of feeling.

Plato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. But he feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting against the degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest against the want of serious purpose in modern fiction, against the unseemliness or extravagance of some of our poets or novelists, against the time-serving of

preachers or public writers, against the regardlessness of truth which to the eye of the philosopher seems to characterize the greater part of the world. For we too have reason to complain that our poets and novelists 'paint inferior truth' and 'are concerned with the inferior part of the soul'; that the readers of them become what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we look in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks,—'the beauty which meets the sense like a breeze and imperceptibly draws the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.'

For there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine perfection, the harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which should renew the youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which the poet was man's only teacher and best friend,—which would find materials in the living present as well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue to the fairest forms of speech and verse the intractable materials of modern civilization,—which might elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato would have called them, the essential forms, of truth and justice out of the variety of opinion and the complexity of modern society,—which would preserve all the good of each generation and leave the bad unsung,—which should be based not on vain longings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into the nature of man. Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man; and feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and many types of manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems (*Laws* vii. 817 B), be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have been heard among men in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and serious approval,—in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages of other English poets,—first and above all

Why was Plato the enemy of the Poets? 101

in the Hebrew prophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should speak and act ; he has drawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth ; he has ennobled the human mind. but, like Homer (*Rep.* x. 599 foll.), he ' has left no way of life '. The next greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is concerned with ' a lower degree of truth ' ; he paints the world as a stage on which ' all the men and women are merely players ' ; he cultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of truth and action. The poet may rebel against any attempt to set limits to his fancy ; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry. Possibly, like Mephistopheles in *Faust*, he may retaliate on his adversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking ' How may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind ? '

Returning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and error appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity of mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer ; just as in the *Phaedrus* he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon rational principles ; both these were the modern tendencies of his own age, which he deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument that Homer, if he had been able to teach mankind anything worth knowing, would not have been allowed by them to go about begging as a rhapsodist, is both false and contrary to the spirit of Plato (*cp.* *Rep.* vi. 489 A foll.). It may be compared with those other paradoxes of the *Gorgias*, that ' No statesman was ever unjustly put to death by the city of which he was the head ' ; and that ' No Sophist was ever defrauded by his pupils ' (*Gorg.* 519 foll.). . . .

The argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of soul and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force which is able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil ; and if she cannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. Yet Plato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the incrustations of earth as to lose her original form ; and in the

Timaeus he recognizes more strongly than in the *Republic* the influence which the body has over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, on the ground that they proceed from physical states (*Tim.* 86, 87). In the *Republic*, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul which has to be restored, and the character which is developed by training and education. . . .

The vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who is said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has certainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages of the soul in the *Zend Avesta* (cp. Haug, *Avesta*, p. 197). But no trace of acquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, and there is no reason for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian. The philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, and still less the myths of Plato.

The local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo*. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology; the great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder or box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the fixed stars; this is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on the knees of Necessity; the revolutions of the seven orbits contained in the cylinder are guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion produces the music of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is the moon, is passed the spindle; but it is doubtful whether this is the continuation of the column of light, from which the pilgrims contemplate the heavens; the words of Plato imply that they are connected, but not the same. The column itself is clearly not of adamant. The spindle (which is of adamant) is fastened to the ends of the chains which extend to the middle of the column of light—this column is said to hold together the heaven; but whether it hangs from the spindle, or is at right angles to it, is not explained. The cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a symbol as the figure

of Necessity turning the spindle ;—for the outermost rim is the sphere of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the intervals of space which divide the paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is both a picture and an orrery, and therefore is necessarily inconsistent with itself. The column of light is not the Milky Way—which is neither straight, nor like a rainbow—but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is compared to the rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to the undergirders of a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow to stern in which the undergirders meet.

The orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in its mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the other in the Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets, and they move in orbits without them, although in an opposite direction : in the Republic as in the Timaeus (40 B) they are all moving round the axis of the world. But we are not certain that in the former they are moving round the earth. No distinct mention is made in the Republic of the circles of the same and other ; although both in the Timaeus and in the Republic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed to coincide with the motion of the whole. The relative thickness of the rims is perhaps designed to express the relative distances of the planets. Plato probably intended to represent the earth, from which Er and his companions are viewing the heavens, as stationary in place ; but whether or not herself revolving, unless this is implied in the revolution of the axis, is uncertain (cp. Timaeus). The spectator may be supposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either from above or below. The earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the Phaedrus, on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a peep at the stars and is borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction between the equator and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that the planets have an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to account for their appearances in the heavens. In the descrip-

tion of the meadow, and the retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of Homer.

The description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as forming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions of the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving of the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, and the making of them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates—Lachesis, Clotho, Atropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of chance in human life is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance, however adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom of man, if he knows how to choose aright; there is a worse enemy to man than chance; this enemy is himself. He who was moderately fortunate in the number of the lot—even the very last comer—might have a good life if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an assertion which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few sentences afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue which is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man to choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly when placed in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and good habits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, ‘Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,’ so Plato would have said, ‘Habit is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.’

The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is distinctly asserted. ‘Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her.’ The life of man is ‘rounded’ by necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him (cp. *Pol.* 273 B). But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in which he is his own master, and can study for himself the effects which the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul, and act accordingly. All men cannot have the first choice in everything. But the lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely and will live diligently.

The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years, by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed to have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the column of light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite character among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank more than was necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself was hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er returned to the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to their birth,—add greatly to the probability of the narrative. They are such touches of nature as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he wished to win credibility for marvels and apparitions.

There still remain to be considered some points which have been intentionally reserved to the end: (I) the Janus-like character of the Republic, which presents two faces—one an Hellenic state, the other a kingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are (II) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by Morgenstern: (a) the community of property; (β) of families; (γ) the rule of philosophers; (δ) the analogy of the individual and the State, which, like some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far. We may then proceed to consider (III) the subject of education as conceived by Plato, bringing together in a general view the education of youth and the education of after-life; (IV) we may note further some essential differences between ancient and modern politics which are suggested by the Republic; (V) we may compare the Politicus and the Laws; (VI) we may observe the influence

exercised by Plato on his imitators ; and (VII) take occasion to consider the nature and value of political, and (VIII) of religious ideals.

I. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State (Book v. 470 E). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan ; such as the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the military training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women. The life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws ii. 666 E), enforced even more rigidly in time of peace than in war ; the citizens of Sparta, like Plato's, were forbidden to trade—they were to be soldiers and not shopkeepers. Nowhere else in Greece was the individual so completely subjected to the State ; the time when he was to marry, the education of his children, the clothes which he was to wear, the food which he was to eat, were all prescribed by law. Some of the best enactments in the Republic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents and elders, and some of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children, are borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships between men and youths, or of men with one another, as affording incentives to bravery, is also Spartan ; in Sparta too a nearer approach was made than in any other Greek State to equality of the sexes, and to community of property ; and while there was probably less of licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was regarded more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The 'suprema lex' was the preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The coarse strength of a military government was not favourable to purity and refinement ; and the excessive strictness of some regulations seems to have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most accessible to bribery ; several of the greatest of them might be described in the words of Plato as having a 'fierce secret longing after gold and silver'. Though not in the strict sense communists, the principle of communism was maintained among them in their division of lands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and in the free use of one another's

goods. Marriage was a public institution : and the women were educated by the State, and sang and danced in public with the men.

Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry ; as in the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns to the Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted into the ideal State, were the only kind which was permitted at Sparta. The Spartans, though an unpoetical race, were nevertheless lovers of poetry ; they had been stirred by the Elegiac strains of Tyrtacus, they had crowded around Hippias to hear his recitals of Homer ; but in this they resembled the citizens of the timocratic rather than of the ideal State (548 E). The council of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan *gerousia* ; and the freedom with which they are permitted to judge about matters of detail agrees with what we are told of that institution. Once more, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or offering arms at the temples ; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies ; the importance attached to the physical well-being of the citizens ; the use of warfare for the sake of defence rather than of aggression—are features probably suggested by the spirit and practice of Sparta.

To the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline ; and the character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen. The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was shared by many undistinguished Athenians ; there they seemed to find a principle which was wanting in their own democracy. The *εὐκοσμία* of the Spartans attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness of their laws, but the spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed. Fascinated by the idea, citizens of Athens would imitate the Lacedaemonians in their dress and manners ; they were known to the contemporaries of Plato as ‘ the persons who had their ears bruised ’, like the Round-heads of the Commonwealth. The love of another church or country when seen at a distance only, the longing for an

imaginary simplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a past which never has been, or of a future which never will be,—these are aspirations of the human mind which are often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet with a response in the Republic of Plato.

But there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, the literary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty of life, which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his citizens a taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian discipline. His individual genius is purely Athenian, although in theory he is a lover of Sparta ; and he is something more than either—he has also a true Hellenic feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes against one another ; he acknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand hereditary interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and the whole State is to have an external beauty which is the reflex of the harmony within. But he has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards enunciated in the Laws (i. 628 D)—that he was a better legislator who made men to be of one mind, than he who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other Hellenic States, democratic as well as aristocratic, are really an upper class ; for, although no mention is made of slaves, the lower classes are allowed to fade away into the distance, and are represented in the individual by the passions. Plato has no idea either of a social State in which all classes are harmonized, or of a federation of Hellas or the world in which different nations or States have a place. His city is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem to be justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of the earth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, and the allusion to the four ages of the world is also sanctioned by the authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that the Republic is partly founded on the ideal of the old Greek *polis*, partly on the actual circumstances of Hellas in that age. Plato, like the old painters, retains the tradi-

tional form, and like them he has also a vision of a city in the clouds.

There is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the work; for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean league. The 'way of life' which was connected with the name of Pythagoras, like the Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an individual might exercise over his contemporaries, and may have naturally suggested to Plato the possibility of reviving such 'mediaeval institutions'. The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a moral and intellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to us seems exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it is not to be regarded as representing the real influence of music in the Greek world. More nearly than any other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean league of three hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For once in the history of mankind the philosophy of order or *κόσμος*, expressing and consequently enlisting on its side the combined endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management of public affairs and held possession of it for a considerable time (until about B. C. 500). Probably only in States prepared by Dorian institutions would such a league have been possible. The rulers, like Plato's *φίλακες*, were required to submit to a severe training in order to prepare the way for the education of the other members of the community. Long after the dissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as Archytas of Tarentum, retained their political influence over the cities of Magna Græcia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred spirit of Plato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the 'way of life of Pythagoras' (Rep. x. 600 B) and his followers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism are to be found in the mystical number of the State, in the number which expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine of transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great though secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education.

But as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far beyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which is to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, analogous to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream of Christendom, the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with the kingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles Plato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such a State is possible. This he repeats again and again; e.g. in the *Republic* (ix. *sub fin.*), or in the *Laws* (Book v. 739), where, casting a glance back on the *Republic*, he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy was impossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a pattern. The same doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues in the *Republic* (v. 472 D) that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be realized in fact, and in the chorus of laughter, which like a breaking wave will, as he anticipates, greet the mention of his proposals; though like other writers of fiction, he uses all his art to give reality to his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he answers ironically, 'When one son of a king becomes a philosopher;' he designates the fiction of the earth-born men as 'a noble lie'; and when the structure is finally complete, he fairly tells you that his *Republic* is a vision only, which in some sense may have reality, but not in the vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been said that Plato flies as well as walks, but this falls short of the truth; for he flies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm ground in successive instants.

Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in this place—Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to Athenian institutions?—he can hardly be said to be the friend of democracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of government; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (*Laws* viii. 832 C); none attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary

The paradoxes of the perfect State 111

subjects, which seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other; and the worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant for a particular age and country, but for all time and all mankind. The decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which led Plato to frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as reflecting the departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St. Augustine, whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar motive, for not being loyal to the Roman Empire. Even a nearer parallel might be afforded by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged with being bad citizens, because, though 'subject to the higher powers', they were looking forward to a city which is in heaven.

II. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age have been said to become the commonplaces of the next; but the paradoxes of Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his contemporaries. The modern world has either sneered at them as absurd, or denounced them as unnatural and immoral; men have been pleased to find in Aristotle's criticisms of them the anticipation of their own good sense. The wealthy and cultivated classes have disliked and also dreaded them; they have pointed with satisfaction to the failure of efforts to realize them in practice. Yet since they are the thoughts of one of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who has done most to elevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment at our hands. We may have to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and assure them that we mean no harm to existing institutions. There are serious errors which have a side of truth and which therefore may fairly demand a careful consideration: there are truths mixed with error of which we may indeed say, 'The half is better than the whole.' Yet 'the half'

may be an important contribution to the study of human nature.

(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle observes, is confined to the guardians ; at least no mention is made of the other classes. But the omission is not of any real significance, and probably arises out of the plan of the work, which prevents the writer from entering into details.

Aristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of modern political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away with the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of property is a notion far more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The world has grown older, and is therefore more conservative. Primitive society offered many examples of land held in common, either by a tribe or by a township, and such may probably have been the original form of landed tenure. Ancient legislators had invented various modes of dividing and preserving the divisions of land among the citizens ; according to Aristotle there were nations who held the land in common and divided the produce, and there were others who divided the land and stored the produce in common. The evils of debt and the inequality of property were far greater in ancient than in modern times, and the accidents to which property was subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other legislative interference, were also greater. All these circumstances gave property a less fixed and sacred character. The early Christians are believed to have held their property in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of Christ himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in almost all ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of modern enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism ; in every age of religious excite-

ment notions like Wycliffe's 'inheritance of grace' have tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, has appeared in politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel of peace' soon becomes the red flag of Republicanism.

We can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his own contemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an exaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would acknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency, and may be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any other mode of vesting property which was found to be more advantageous, would in time acquire the same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in Plato's words, 'would be the most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages would have spoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant by such language to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any invasion of the rights of individuals and of the Church.

When we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application to practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure that the received notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of wealth which is customary in civilized countries the most favourable that can be conceived for the education and development of the mass of mankind? Can 'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite convinced that one or two thousand years hence, great changes will not have taken place in the rights of property, or even that the very notion of property, beyond what is necessary for personal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This was a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at among ourselves. Such a change would not be greater than some other changes through which the world has passed in the transition from ancient to modern society, for example, the emancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the abolition of slavery in America and the West Indies; and not so great as the difference which separates the Eastern village community from the Western

world. To accomplish such a revolution in the course of a few centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid than has actually taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom of Japan underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in five or six hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away; and the most untenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most moderate. Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society can be final in which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or character of a single person. And many will indulge the hope that our present condition may, after all, be only transitional, and may conduct to a higher, in which property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the few, may also furnish the means of the highest culture to all, and will be a greater benefit to the public generally, and also more under the control of public authority. There may come a time when the saying, 'Have I not a right to do what I will with my own?' will appear to be a barbarous relic of individualism;—when the possession of a part may be a greater blessing to each and all than the possession of the whole is now to any one.

Such reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman, but they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can imagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of some individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as deep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as private property is to ourselves. He knows that this latter institution is not more than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert to the beginning? In our own age even Utopias affect the spirit of legislation, and an abstract idea may exercise a great influence on practical politics.

The objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community of property, are the old ones of Aristotle,

that motives for exertion would be taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was dependent upon all. Every man would produce as little and consume as much as he liked. The experience of civilized nations has hitherto been adverse to Socialism. The effort is too great for human nature ; men try to live in common, but the personal feeling is always breaking in. On the other hand it may be doubted whether our present notions of property are not conventional, for they differ in different countries and in different states of society. We boast of an individualism which is not freedom, but rather an artificial result of the industrial state of modern Europe. The individual is nominally free, but he is also powerless in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic necessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become disinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of organization which fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces which have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may effect a similar change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. And if we suppose the influence of some good as well as neutral motives working in the community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that the mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the higher possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is attainable for all than is at present the possession of a favoured few, may pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency which mankind have hitherto never seen.

Now that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held fast under the tyranny of custom and ignorance ; now that criticism has pierced the veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the present,—the progress of civilization may be expected to be far greater and swifter than heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point at which we may arrive in two or three generations is beyond the power of imagination to foresee. There are forces in the world which work, not in an arithmetical, but in a geometrical ratio of increase. Education,

to use the expression of Plato, moves like a wheel with an ever-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we say how great may be its influence, when it becomes universal,—when it has been inherited by many generations,—when it is freed from the trammels of superstition and rightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different classes of men and women. Neither do we know how much more the co-operation of minds or of hands may be capable of accomplishing, whether in labour or in study. The resources of the natural sciences are not half-developed as yet ; the soil of the earth, instead of growing more barren, may become many times more fertile than hitherto ; the uses of machinery far greater, and also more minute than at present. New secrets of physiology may be revealed, deeply affecting human nature in its innermost recesses. The standard of health may be raised and the lives of men prolonged by sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace, there may be leisure, there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds. The ever-increasing power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth. There may be mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only at great crises of history. The East and the West may meet together, and all nations may contribute their thoughts and their experience to the common stock of humanity. Many other elements enter into a speculation of this kind. But it is better to make an end of them. For such reflections appear to the majority far-fetched, and to men of science, commonplace.

(β) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of community of property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to be the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the community of wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another proposal, that the occupations of men and women shall be the same, and that to this end they shall have a common training and education. Male and female animals have the same pursuits—why not also the two sexes of man?

But have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we

The community of wives and children 117

were saying that different natures should have different pursuits. How then can men and women have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion of the division of labour?—These objections are no sooner raised than answered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between men and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and women bear children. Following the analogy of the other animals, he contends that all natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among both sexes, though there may be a superiority of degree on the part of the men. The objection on the score of decency to their taking part in the same gymnastic exercises, is met by Plato's assertion that the existing feeling is a matter of habit. .

That Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own country and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence of mind. He is conscious that women are half the human race, in some respects the more important half (*Laws* vi. 781 B); and for the sake both of men and women he desires to raise the woman to a higher level of existence. He brings, not sentiment, but philosophy to bear upon a question which both in ancient and modern times has been chiefly regarded in the light of custom or feeling. The Greeks had noble conceptions of womanhood in the goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in the heroines Antigone and Andromache. But these ideals had no counterpart in actual life. The Athenian woman was in no way the equal of her husband; she was not the entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only his housekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in military or political matters; nor is there any instance in the later ages of Greece of a woman becoming famous in literature. 'Hers is the greatest glory who has the least renown among men,' is the historian's conception of feminine excellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up by Plato to the world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to share with him in the toils of war and in the cares of government. She is to be similarly trained both in bodily and mental

exercises. She is to lose as far as possible the incidents of maternity and the characteristics of the female sex.

The modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the differences between men and women are not confined to the single point urged by Plato ; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities of women, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked for in men. And the criticism is just : the differences affect the whole nature, and are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But neither can we say how far these differences are due to education and the opinions of mankind, or physically inherited from the habits and opinions of former generations. Women have been always taught, not exactly that they are slaves, but that they are in an inferior position, which is also supposed to have compensating advantages ; and to this position they have conformed. It is also true that the physical form may easily change in the course of generations through the mode of life ; and the weakness or delicacy, which was once a matter of opinion, may become a physical fact. The characteristics of sex vary greatly in different countries and ranks of society, and at different ages in the same individuals. Plato may have been right in denying that there was any ultimate difference in the sexes of man other than that which exists in animals, because all other differences may be conceived to disappear in other states of society, or under different circumstances of life and training.

The first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second—community of wives and children ‘Is it possible? Is it desirable?’ For, as Glaucon intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, ‘Great doubts may be entertained about both these points.’ Any free discussion of the question is impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing the ultimate bases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely inquire into the things which nature hides, any more than we can dissect our own bodies. Still, the manner in which Plato arrived at his conclusions should be considered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, is a wonderful thing,

that one of the wisest and best of men should have entertained ideas of morality which are wholly at variance with our own. And if we would do Plato justice, we must examine carefully the character of his proposals. First, we may observe that the relations of the sexes supposed by him are the reverse of licentious : he seems rather to aim at an impossible strictness. Secondly, he conceives the family to be the natural enemy of the state ; and he entertains the serious hope that a universal brotherhood may take the place of private interests—an aspiration which, although not justified by experience, has possessed many noble minds. On the other hand, there is no sentiment or imagination in the connexions which men and women are supposed by him to form ; human beings return to the level of the animals, neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the natural instincts. All that world of poetry and fancy which the passion of love has called forth in modern literature and romance would have been banished by Plato. The arrangements of marriage in the Republic are directed to one object—the improvement of the race. In successive generations a great development both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The analogy of animals tends to show that mankind can within certain limits receive a change of nature. And as in animals we should commonly choose the best for breeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made of the human beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved.

We start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, that the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out ; secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we should be poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human beings—the infant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot, truly seems to us one of the noblest results of Christianity. We have learned, though as yet imperfectly, that the individual man has an endless value in the sight of God, and that we honour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured

image of Him (cp. Laws xi 931 A). This is the lesson which Christ taught in a parable when He said, 'Their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.' Such lessons are only partially realized in any age; they were foreign to the age of Plato, as they have very different degrees of strength in different countries or ages of the Christian world. To the Greek the family was a religious and customary institution binding the members together by a tie inferior in strength to that of friendship, and having a less solemn and sacred sound than that of country. The relationship which existed on the lower level of custom, Plato imagined that he was raising to the higher level of nature and reason; while from the modern and Christian point of view we regard him as sanctioning murder and destroying the first principles of morality.

The great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier (v. 459 A), or at best of a slave-owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder of animals aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at courage or temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the great desideratum. But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for their superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts. Neither does the improvement of the human race consist merely in the increase of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of the mind. Hence there must be 'a marriage of true minds' as well as of bodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men and women without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet Plato takes away these qualities and puts nothing in their place, not even the desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know their own children. The most important transaction of social life, he who is the idealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to have no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their children are not theirs, but the State's; nor

is any tie of affection to unite them. Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved Plato from a gigantic error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own illustration' (ii. 375 D). For the 'nobler sort of birds and beasts' (v. 459 A) nourish and protect their offspring and are faithful to one another.

An eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life on a physical basis'. But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon the physical? The higher comes first, then the lower; first the human and rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; and in times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they seem to be only different aspects of a common human nature which includes them both. Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, but the expansion and enlargement of it,—the highest form which the physical is capable of receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not take care of the body, and still less of the mind, but the mind takes care of both. In all human action not that which is common to man and the animals is the characteristic element, but that which distinguishes him from them. Even if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all virtue into health of body—'*la façon que notre sang circule,*' still on merely physical grounds we must come back to ideas. Mind and reason and duty and conscience, under these or other names, are always reappearing. There cannot be health of body without health of mind; nor health of mind without the sense of duty and the love of truth (cp. Charm. 156 D, E).

That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations about marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato should have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are revolting, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he appears to have thought out a subject about which he had better have followed the

enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old poets, and in later time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for the family, on which much of their religion was based. But the example of Sparta, and perhaps in some degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have misled him. He will make one family out of all the families of the state. He will select the finest specimens of men and women and breed from these only.

Yet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy as well as of poetry), and also because any departure from established morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be unsettling, it may be worth while to draw out a little more at length the objections to the Platonic marriage. In the first place, history shows that wherever polygamy has been largely allowed the race has deteriorated. One man to one woman is the law of God and nature. Nearly all the civilized peoples of the world at some period before the age of written records, have become monogamists; and the step when once taken has never been retraced. The exceptions occurring among Brahmins or Mahometans or the ancient Persians, are of that sort which may be said to prove the rule. The connexions formed between superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a noble offspring, because they are licentious; and because the children in such cases usually despise the mother and are neglected by the father who is ashamed of them. Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die out; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other countries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies which have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and degenerated in stature; 'mariages de convenance' leave their enfeebling stamp on the offspring of them (cp. *King Lear*, Act i. Sc. 2). The marriage of near relations, or the marrying in and in of the same family tends constantly to weakness or idiocy in

the children, sometimes assuming the form as they grow older of passionate licentiousness. The common prostitute rarely has any offspring. By such unmistakable evidence is the authority of morality asserted in the relations of the sexes : and so many more elements enter into this ' mystery ' than are dreamed of by Plato and some other philosophers.

Recent inquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among primitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and that the captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any man was permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such customs among some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar ceremonies in the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to furnish a proof of similar institutions having been once universal. There can be no question that the study of anthropology has considerably changed our views respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. We know more about the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our increasing knowledge shows above all things how little we know. With all the helps which written monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the condition of man two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his condition was when removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the majority of mankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing upon the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (*Laws* iii. 676 foll.) and Aristotle (*Metaph.* xi. 8, §§ 19, 20) may have been more right than we imagine in supposing that some forms of civilization were discovered and lost several times over. If we cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization, neither can we set any limits to the depth of degradation to which the human race may sink through war, disease, or isolation. And if we are to draw inferences about the origin of marriage from the practice of barbarous nations, we should also consider the remoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals, especially the carnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of offspring which seems to be natural is inconsistent

with the primitive theory of marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which men were almost animals and the companions of them, we have as much right to argue from what is animal to what is human as from the barbarous to the civilized man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary,—the connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied ; the record of social life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit that our first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the stages by which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization of China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly unknown to us.

Such speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show that an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of marriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after many wars and contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of barbarians. We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive nakedness. We are compelled to accept, not the highest, but the lowest account of the origin of human society. But on the other hand we may truly say that every step in human progress has been in the same direction, and that in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of the family has been more and more defined and consecrated. The civilized East is immeasurably in advance of any savage tribes ; the Greeks and Romans have improved upon the East ; the Christian nations have been stricter in their views of the marriage relation than any of the ancients. In this as in so many other things, instead of looking back with regret to the past, we should look forward with hope to the future. We must consecrate that which we believe to be the most holy, and that ' which is the most holy will be the most useful '. There is more reason for maintaining the sacredness of the marriage tie, when we see the benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague religious horror about the violation of it. But in all times of transition, when established beliefs are

being undermined, there is a danger that in the passage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral principle, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in the uncertainty of knowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion. And there are many persons in our own day who, enlightened by the study of anthropology, and fascinated by what is new and strange, some using the language of fear, others of hope, are inclined to believe that a time will come when through the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious spirit of children, by the analysis of human relations, or by the force of outward circumstances, the ties of family life may be broken or greatly relaxed. They point to societies in America and elsewhere which tend to show that the destruction of the family need not necessarily involve the overthrow of all morality. Whatever we may think of such speculations, we can hardly deny that they have been more rife in this generation than in any other; and whither they are tending, who can predict?

To the doubts and queries raised by these *social reformers* respecting the relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a sufficient answer, if any is needed. The difference between them and us is really one of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him to be, but we are speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal part of his nature; we regard him as a creature having many sides or aspects, moving between good and evil, striving to rise above himself and to become 'a little lower than the angels'. We also, to use a Platonic formula, are not ignorant of the dissatisfactions and incompatibilities of family life, of the meannesses of trade, of the flatteries of one class of society by another, of the impediments which the family throws in the way of lofty aims and aspirations. But we are conscious that there are evils and dangers in the background greater still, which are not appreciated, because they are either concealed or suppressed. What a condition of man would that be, in which human passions were controlled by no authority, divine or human, in which there was no shame or decency, no higher

affection overcoming or sanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a rule of health ! Is it for this that we are asked to throw away the civilization which is the growth of ages ?

For strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired ; there are the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We know how human nature may be degraded ; we do not know how by artificial means any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem is a complex one, for if we go back only four steps (and these at least enter into the composition of a child), there are commonly thirty progenitors to be taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting of proof, are told us respecting the inheritance of disease or character from a remote ancestor. We can trace the physical resemblances of parents and children in the same family—

Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat ;

but scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both from their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental peculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the animals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a difficulty in distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or other qualities, and what is mere imitation or the result of similar circumstances. Great men and great women have rarely had great fathers and mothers. Nothing that we know of in the circumstances of their birth or lineage will explain their appearance. Of the English poets of the last and two preceding centuries scarcely a descendant remains,—none have ever been distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so ridiculous is the fancy which has been entertained by some that we might in time by suitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would have said, ‘by an ingenious system of lots,’ produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even supposing that we could breed men having the tenacity of bulldogs, or, like the Spartans, ‘lacking the wit to run away in battle,’ would the world be any the better ? Many of the noblest specimens of

the human race have been among the weakest physically. Tyrtæus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have been exposed at Sparta ; and some of the fairest and strongest men and women have been among the wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of uniting the strong and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of sentiment and morality, nor yet by his other device of combining dissimilar natures (Statesman 310 A), have mankind gradually passed from the brutality and licentiousness of primitive marriage to marriage Christian and civilized.

Few persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of mental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through them from some remoter ancestor, secondly from our race, thirdly from the general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is commoner than the remark, that ' So and so is like his father or his uncle ' ; and an aged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a youth to a long-forgotten ancestor, observing that ' Nature sometimes skips a generation '. It may be true also, that if we knew more about our ancestors, these similarities would be even more striking to us. Admitting the facts which are thus described in a popular way, we may however remark that there is no method of difference by which they can be defined or estimated, and that they constitute only a small part of each individual. The doctrine of heredity may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of our own lives, but it is the idea, not the fact, which is really terrible to us. For what we have received from our ancestors is only a fraction of what we are, or may become. The knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has been prevalent in a family may be the best safeguard against their recurrence in a future generation. The parent will be most awake to the vices or diseases in his child of which he is most sensible within himself. The whole of life may be directed to their prevention or cure. The traces of consumption may become fainter, or be wholly effaced : the inherent tendency to vice or crime may be eradicated. And so heredity, from

being a curse, may become a blessing. We acknowledge that in the matter of our birth, as in our nature generally, there are previous circumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of circumstances or within this wall of necessity, we have still the power of creating a life for ourselves by the informing energy of the human will.

There is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a stranger. All the children born in his State are foundlings. It never occurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal experience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in families. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child which cannot be supplied by other mothers, or by 'strong nurses one or more' (Laws vii. 789 E). If Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Crèches of Paris, or the foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children would have perished. There would have been no need to expose or put out of the way the weaklier children, for they would have died of themselves. So emphatically does nature protest against the destruction of the family.

What Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken way to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the Spartan men and women were superior in form and strength to the other Greeks; and this superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and customs relating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble offspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their physical superiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs, but to their temperance and training. He did not reflect that Sparta was great, not in consequence of the relaxation of morality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a political principle stronger far than existed in any other Grecian State. Least of all did he observe that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens of the Greek race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the love of liberty—all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were wanting among the

Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus, or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not allowed to appear above the State; the laws were fixed, and he had no business to alter or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities and nations arisen, if not from remarkable individuals, coming into the world we know not how, and from causes over which we have no control? Something too much may have been said in modern times of the value of individuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a system which, instead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and character, tends to smother and extinguish them.

Still, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither Christianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto been able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that the side from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away. Population is the most untameable force in the political and social world. Do we not find, especially in large cities, that the greatest hindrance to the amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in marriage?—a small fault truly, if not involving endless consequences. There are whole countries too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland, in which a right solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the foundation of the happiness of the community. There are too many people on a given space, or they marry too early and bring into the world a sickly and half-developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions of their existence, they become emaciated and hand on a similar life to their descendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence to the 'mightiest passions of mankind' (Laws viii. 835 C), especially when they have been licensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of education, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in these matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard whispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments of mankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the

principle of utility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the most need of it. The influences which we can bring to bear upon this question are chiefly indirect. In a generation or two, education, emigration, improvements in agriculture and manufactures, may have provided the solution. The state physician hardly likes to probe the wound : it is beyond his art ; a matter which he cannot safely let alone, but which he dare not touch :

We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.

When again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day twenty-five or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, amid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined hands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not opposing physical considerations to moral, but moral to physical ; we are seeking to make the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the extravagance of sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, because he knew that he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who deserved to be called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulses of affection : he died unmarried in a lunatic asylum. These two little facts suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done under like circumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such marriages without any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought ; and the prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a 'horror naturalis' similar to that which, in all civilized

ages and countries, has prevented the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would have been the happier, if some things which are now allowed had from the beginning been denied to them ; if the sanction of religion could have prohibited practices inimical to health ; if sanitary principles could in early ages have been invested with a superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on in the world's history, we are no longer able to stamp at once with the impress of religion a new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his fancies regulated by law ; and the execution of the law would be rendered impossible, owing to the uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Who can weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or moral and mental qualities against bodily? Who can measure probabilities against certainties? There has been some good as well as evil in the discipline of suffering ; and there are diseases, such as consumption, which have exercised a refining and softening influence on the character. Youth is too inexperienced to balance such nice considerations ; parents do not often think of them, or think of them too late. They are at a distance and may probably be averted ; change of place, a new state of life, the interests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason when their minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably linked together. Nor is there any ground for supposing that marriages are to any great extent influenced by reflections of this sort, which seem unable to make any head against the irresistible impulse of individual attachment.

Lastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole mind and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which is given to them by the imagination, without feeling that there is something unsatisfactory in our method of treating them. That the most important influence on human life should be wholly left to chance or shrouded in mystery, and instead of being disciplined or understood, should be required to conform only to an ex-

ternal standard of propriety—cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or satisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have the charge of youth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the manliness and innocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by general admonitions which every one can apply for himself, to mitigate this terrible evil which eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts the moral sentiments of nations. In no duty towards others is there more need of reticence and self-restraint. So great is the danger lest he who would be the counsellor of another should reveal the secret prematurely, lest he should get another too much into his power, or fix the passing impression of evil by demanding the confession of it.

Nor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere with higher aims. If there have been some who 'to party gave up what was meant for mankind', there have certainly been others who to family gave up what was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the necessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich by the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the tendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the heroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we prefer to look at the gentle influences of home, the development of the affections, the amenities of society, the devotion of one member of a family for the good of the others, which form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel with him, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, for having presented to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on grounds of morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world which has not unnaturally led him into error.

We hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to be built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which family

and social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of mind the family is only a disturbing influence which, instead of filling up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of the State. No organization is needed except a political, which, regarded from another point of view, is a military one. The State is all-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like the idea of the Church in later ages, absorbs all other desires and affections. In time of war the thousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against the world or the Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war and their duties to the State, which are also their duties to one another, take up their whole life and time. The only other interest which is allowed to them besides that of war, is the interest of philosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to retire from active life and to have a second novitiate of study and contemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in Plato's communism. If he could have done without children, he might have converted his Republic into a religious order. Neither in the Laws (v. 739 B), when the daylight of common sense breaks in upon him, does he retract his error. In the State of which he would be the founder, there is no marrying or giving in marriage: but because of the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow the law of nature to prevail.

(γ) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill.' And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are capable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the attainment of this higher knowledge the second education is directed. Through a process of training which has already made them good citizens they are now to be made good legislators. We find with some surprise (not unlike the feeling which Aristotle in a well-known passage describes the hearers of Plato's lectures as experiencing, when they went to a discourse on the idea of good, expecting to be

instructed in moral truths, and received instead of them arithmetical and mathematical formulae) that Plato does not propose for his future legislators any study of finance or law or military tactics, but only of abstract mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract conception of good. We ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man knowing the idea of good, if he does not know what is good for this individual, this state, this condition of society? We cannot understand how Plato's legislators or guardians are to be fitted for their work of statesmen by the study of the five mathematical sciences. We vainly search in Plato's own writings for any explanation of this seeming absurdity.

The discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the mind with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of estimating its value. No metaphysical inquirer has ever fairly criticized his own speculations; in his own judgement they have been above criticism; nor has he understood that what to him seemed to be absolute truth may reappear in the next generation as a form of logic or an instrument of thought. And posterity have also sometimes equally misapprehended the real value of his speculations. They appear to them to have contributed nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The *idea* of good is apt to be regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction is waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions of knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to law, the introduction of the mere conception of law or design or final cause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great steps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things leads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect their conception of human life and of politics, and also their own conduct and character (Tim. 90 A). We can imagine how a great mind like that of Pericles might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras (Phaedr. 270 A). To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable conception

is a more favourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied in a narrow portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which have sometimes been the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of at a later period. How rarely can we say of any modern inquirer in the magnificent language of Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and of all existence !'

Nor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast metaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first enthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply them in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the experience of ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the intermediate axioms'. Plato himself seems to have imagined that the truths of psychology, like those of astronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by a process of deduction, and that the method which he has pursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring them from experience and the use of language, was imperfect and only provisional. But when, after having arrived at the idea of good, which is the end of the science of dialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are the divisions of the science? he refuses to answer, as if intending by the refusal to intimate that the state of knowledge which then existed was not such as would allow the philosopher to enter into his final rest. The previous sciences must first be studied, and will, we may add, continue to be studied till the end of time, although in a sense different from any which Plato could have conceived. But we may observe, that while he is aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the contemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that faith in God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek philosopher imagined that contemplation of the good would make a legislator. There is as much to be filled up in the one case as in the other, and the one mode of conception is to the Israelite what the other is to the Greek. Both find a repose in a divine per-

fection, which, whether in a more personal or impersonal form, exists without them and independently of them, as well as within them.

There is no mention of the idea of good in the *Timaeus*, nor of the divine Creator of the world in the *Republic*; and we are naturally led to ask in what relation they stand to one another. Is God above or below the idea of good? Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? The latter appears to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection and unity of God was a far higher conception than his personality, which he hardly found a word to express, and which to him would have seemed to be borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on the other hand, or to the modern thinker in general, it is difficult, if not impossible, to attach reality to what he terms mere abstraction; while to Plato this very abstraction is the truest and most real of all things. Hence, from a difference in forms of thought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation of his own mind only. But if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of good by the words 'intelligent principle of law and order in the universe, embracing equally man and nature', we begin to find a meeting-point between him and ourselves.

The question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is one that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has truly united the power of command with the power of thought and reflection, as there have been also many false combinations of these qualities. Some kind of speculative power is necessary both in practical and political life; like the rhetorician in the *Phaedrus*, men require to have a conception of the varieties of human character, and to be raised on great occasions above the commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea of the philosopher-statesman has never been popular with the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot take the world into his confidence or make them understand the motives from which he acts; and also

because they are jealous of a power which they do not understand. The revolution which human nature desires to effect step by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him in a single year or life. They are afraid that in the pursuit of his greater aims he may disregard the common feelings of humanity. He is too apt to be looking into the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to see actions or events which, to use an expression of Plato's, 'are tumbling out at his feet.' Besides, as Plato would say, there are other corruptions of these philosophical statesmen. Either 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought', and at the moment when action above all things is required he is undecided, or general principles are enunciated by him in order to cover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the world has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or in some cases he has been converted into a courtier, who enjoys the luxury of holding liberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal action. No wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of this class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be allowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, 'they have seen bad imitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man in whom the power of thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, reaching forward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a constitutional State, 'they have never seen.'

But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, so the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When the face of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the distance, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times; instead of looking forward he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets nothing; with 'wise saws and modern instances' he would stem the rising tide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle of his own party, as the world

without him becomes stronger. This seems to be the reason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure when confronted with the new, why churches can never reform, why most political changes are made blindly and convulsively. The great crises in the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesiastical positiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of principles which have lost their hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be compared to madness; they grow upon him, and he becomes possessed by them; no judgement of others is ever admitted by him to be weighed in the balance against his own.

(δ) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have been a confusion of ideas, assimilates the State to the individual, and fails to distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of a State which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the greatest uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy is partly fallacious, and that the will or character of a State or nation is really the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which are limited by the condition of having to act in common. The movement of a body of men can never have the pliancy or facility of a single man; the freedom of the individual, which is always limited, becomes still more straitened when transferred to a nation. The powers of action and feeling are necessarily weaker and more balanced when they are diffused through a community; whence arises the often discussed question, 'Can a nation, like an individual, have a conscience?' We hesitate to say that the characters of nations are nothing more than the sum of the characters of the individuals who compose them; because there may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one another. A whole nation may be wiser than any one man in it; or may be animated by some common opinion or feeling which could not equally have affected the mind of a single person, or may have been inspired by a leader of genius to perform acts more than human. Plato does not appear to have

analysed the complications which arise out of the collective action of mankind. Neither is he capable of seeing that analogies, though specious as arguments, may often have no foundation in fact, or of distinguishing between what is intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and what is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively seldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot disentangle the arts from the virtues—at least he is always arguing from one to the other. His notion of music is transferred from harmony of sounds to harmony of life : in this he is assisted by the ambiguities of language as well as by the prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And having once assimilated the State to the individual, he imagines that he will find the succession of States paralleled in the lives of individuals.

Still, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is attained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the arts ; for virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an inward principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the harmonies of the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a splendid illustration which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. In the same way the identification of ethics with politics has a tendency to give definiteness to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble men's notions of the aims of government and of the duties of citizens ; for ethics from one point of view may be conceived as an idealized law and politics ; and politics, as ethics reduced to the conditions of human society. There have been evils which have arisen out of the attempt to identify them, and this has led to the separation or antagonism of them, which has been introduced by modern political writers. But we may likewise feel that something has been lost in their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who estimated the moral and intellectual well-being of mankind first, and the wealth of nations and individuals second, may have a salutary in-

fluence on the speculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a reaction against an opposite error; and when the errors against which they were directed have passed away, they in turn become errors.

III. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; like the rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning with the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending to after-life. Plato is the first writer who distinctly says that education is to comprehend the whole of life, and to be a preparation for another in which education begins again (vi. 498 D). This is the continuous thread which runs through the Republic, and which more than any other of his ideas admits of an application to modern life.

He has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is disposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one and not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into his scheme of truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the involuntariness of vice, which is maintained by him in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws (cp. Protag. 345 foll., 352, 355; Apol. 25 E; Gorg. 468, 509 E). Nor do the so-called Platonic ideas recovered from a former state of existence affect his theory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of the old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from within, and is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense. Education, as he says, will implant a principle of intelligence which is better than ten thousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one, and the kindred notion that all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely renounced; the first is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the rest; the second in the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the intellectual, and to centre all goodness in the contemplation of the idea of good. The world of sense is still depreciated and identified with opinion, though admitted to be a shadow of the true. In the Republic he is evidently

impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly from ignorance and may be cured by education; the multitude are hardly to be deemed responsible for what they do (v. 499 E). A faint allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book (621 A); but Plato's views of education have no more real connexion with a previous state of existence than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind that which is there already. Education is represented by him, not as the filling of a vessel, but as the turning the eye of the soul towards the light.

He treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and false, and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he takes no notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the nursing of children and the management of the mothers, and would have an education which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins with the age at which the child is capable of receiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in language which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, that he must be taught the false before he can learn the true. The modern and ancient philosophical world are not agreed about truth and falsehood; the one identifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the other with ideas. This is the difference between ourselves and Plato, which is, however, partly a difference of words (cp. vol. i, p. 44). For we too should admit that a child must receive many lessons which he imperfectly understands; he must be taught some things in a figure only, some too which he can hardly be expected to believe when he grows older; but we should limit the use of fiction by the necessity of the case. Plato would draw the line differently; according to him the aim of early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a matter of principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious truths, and then simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of good manners and good taste. He would make an entire reformation of the old mythology; like Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is sensible of the deep chasm

which separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests with an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts and treacheries of the gods are to be banished ; the terrors of the world below are to be dispelled ; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a model for youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer which may teach our youth endurance ; and something may be learnt in medicine from the simple practice of the Homeric age. The principles on which religion is to be based are two only : first, that God is true ; secondly, that He is good. Modern and Christian writers have often fallen short of these ; they can hardly be said to have gone beyond them.

The young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of sights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They are to live in an atmosphere of health ; the breeze is always to be wafting to them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be realized, or if our modern religious education could be bound up with truth and virtue and good manners and good taste, that would be the best hope of human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is looking forward to changes in the moral and religious world, and is preparing for them. He recognizes the danger of unsettling young men's minds by sudden changes of laws and principles, by destroying the sacredness of one set of ideas when there is nothing else to take their place. He is afraid too of the influence of the drama, on the ground that it encourages false sentiment, and therefore he would not have his children taken to the theatre ; he thinks that the effect on the spectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of education is that of harmonious growth, in which are insensibly learnt the lessons of temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develop in equal proportions. The first principle which runs through all art and nature is simplicity ; this also is to be the rule of human life.

The second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers

to the period of muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in music is extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the body may be inconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily exercise may be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt to give men a headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on philosophy, and this they attribute not to the true cause, but to the nature of the subject. Two points are noticeable in Plato's treatment of gymnastic:—First, that the time of training is entirely separated from the time of literary education. He seems to have thought that two things of an opposite and different nature could not be learnt at the same time. Here we can hardly agree with him; and, if we may judge by experience, the effect of spending three years between the ages of fourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be far from improving to the intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and gymnastic are not, as common opinion is apt to imagine, intended, the one for the cultivation of the mind and the other of the body, but that they are both equally designed for the improvement of the mind. The body, in his view, is the servant of the mind; the subjection of the lower to the higher is for the advantage of both. And doubtless the mind may exercise a very great and paramount influence over the body, if exerted not at particular moments and by fits and starts, but continuously, in making preparation for the whole of life. Other Greek writers saw the mischievous tendency of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol. viii. 4, § 1 foll.; Thuc. ii. 37, 39). But only Plato recognized the fundamental error on which the practice was based.

The subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine, which he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief in medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to a demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they often make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by their treatment of them (Rep. iv. 426 A). In two thousand

years their art has made but slender progress ; what they have gained in the analysis of the parts is in a great degree lost by their feeble conception of the human frame as a whole. They have attended more to the cure of diseases than to the conditions of health ; and the improvements in medicine have been more than counterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until lately they have hardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was well understood by the ancients ; as Aristotle remarks, ' Air and water, being the elements which we most use, have the greatest effect upon health ' (Polit. vii. 11, § 4). For ages physicians have been under the dominion of prejudices which have only recently given way ; and now there are as many opinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal degree of scepticism and some want of toleration about both. Plato has several good notions about medicine ; according to him, ' the eye cannot be cured without the rest of the body, nor the body without the mind ' (Charm. 156 E). No man of sense, he says in the *Timæus*, would take physic ; and we heartily sympathize with him in the *Laws* when he declares that ' the limbs of the rustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from warm baths than from the prescriptions of a not over wise doctor ' (vi. 761 C). But we can hardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer, he depreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would get rid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not seem to have considered that the ' bridle of Theages ' might be accompanied by qualities which were of far more value to the State than the health or strength of the citizens ; or that the duty of taking care of the helpless might be an important element of education in a State. The physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should not be a man in robust health ; he should have, in modern phraseology, a nervous temperament ; he should have experience of disease in his own person, in order that his powers of observation may be quickened in the case of others.

The perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law ; in which, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity. Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle of Delphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation of the citizens themselves. Plato is aware that *laissez faire* is an important element of government. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a hydra ; they multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is not extirpation but prevention. And the way to prevent them is to take care of education, and education will take care of all the rest. So in modern times men have often felt that the only political measure worth having—the only one which would produce any certain or lasting effect, was a measure of national education. And in our own more than in any previous age the necessity has been recognized of restoring the ever-increasing confusion of law to simplicity and common sense.

When the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the first stage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin again from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and Seventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence been led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For true knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, not with particulars or individuals, but with universals only ; not with the beauties of poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great aim of education is the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This is to be acquired through the study of the mathematical sciences. They alone are capable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing the dormant energies of thought.

Mathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that which is now included in them ; but they bore a much larger proportion to the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by which the chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule

and order. The faculty which they trained was naturally at war with the poetical or imaginative ; and hence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for abstractions and trying to get rid of the illusions of sense, nearly the whole of education is contained in them. They seemed to have an inexhaustible application, partly because their true limits were not yet understood. These Plato himself is beginning to investigate ; though not aware that number and figure are mere abstractions of sense, he recognizes that the forms used by geometry are borrowed from the sensible world (vi 510, 511). He seeks to find the ultimate ground of mathematical ideas in the idea of good, though he does not satisfactorily explain the connexion between them ; and in his conception of the relation of ideas to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness attributed to him by Aristotle (Met. i. 8, § 24 ; ix. 17). But if he fails to recognize the true limits of mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond them ; in his view, ideas of number become secondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The dialectician is as much above the mathematician as the mathematician is above the ordinary man (cp. vii. 526 D, 531 E). The one, the self-proving, the good which is the higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which all things ascend, and in which they finally repose.

This self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no distinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in Greek philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals are comprehended, a whole which has no parts (cf. Arist., Nic. Eth., i. 4). The vacancy of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato. Nor did he recognize that in the dialectical process are included two or more methods of investigation which are at variance with each other. He did not see that whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no advance could be made in this way. And yet such visions often have an immense effect ; for although the method of science cannot anticipate science, the idea of science, not as it is, but as it will be in

the future, is a great and inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge we are always pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false conception of knowledge, for example the scholastic philosophy, may lead men astray during many ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may draw all their thoughts in a right direction. It makes a great difference whether the general expectation of knowledge, as this indefinite feeling may be termed, is based upon a sound judgement. For mankind may often entertain a true conception of what knowledge ought to be when they have but a slender experience of facts. The correlation of the sciences, the consciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of classification, the sense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop short of certainty or to confound probability with truth, are important principles of the higher education. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew that he could tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised an influence on the human mind which even at the present day is not exhausted; and political and social questions may yet arise in which the thoughts of Plato may be read anew and receive a fresh meaning.

The Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces of it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and from this point of view may be compared with the creator of the *Timaeus*, who out of his goodness created all things. It corresponds to a certain extent with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a final cause, or of both in one, and in this regard may be connected with the measure and symmetry of the *Philebus*. It is represented in the *Symposium* under the aspect of beauty, and is supposed to be attained there by stages of initiation, as here by regular gradations of knowledge. Viewed subjectively, it is the process or science of dialectic. This is the science which, according to the *Phaedrus*, is the true basis of rhetoric, which alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes of men and things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites the scattered parts into

a natural or organized whole; which defines the abstract essences or universal ideas of all things, and connects them; which pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first principle of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of good. This ideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be described as the soul conversing with herself or holding communion with eternal truth and beauty, and in another form is the everlasting question and answer—the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of Plato are themselves examples of the nature and method of dialectic. Viewed objectively, the idea of good is a power or cause which makes the world without us correspond with the world within. Yet this world without us is still a world of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is another department of knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only probable conclusions (cp. *Timaeus*, 44 D).

If we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half explains to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that in his mind the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more than the subjective and objective aspects of the world and of man, which German philosophy has revealed to us. Nor has he determined whether his science of dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned with the contemplation of absolute being, or with a process of development and evolution. Modern metaphysics may be described as the science of abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of thought; modern logic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be defined as the science of method. The germ of both of them is contained in the Platonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have something in common with the ideas of Plato; all logicians have derived something from the method of Plato. The nearest approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to be found in the Hegelian ‘succession of moments in the unity of the idea’. Plato and Hegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the correlation

Defects in Plato's Theory of Education 149

of abstractions ; and not impossibly they would have understood one another better than any of their commentators understand them (cp. Swift's *Voyage to Laputa*, c. 8¹). There is, however, a difference between them : for whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which develops the stages of the idea in different countries or at different times in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only as an order of thought or ideas ; the history of the human mind had not yet dawned upon him.

Many criticisms may be made on Plato's theory of education. While in some respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is in advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which prevailed in his own time ; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new ones. He does not see that education is relative to the characters of individuals ; he only desires to impress the same form of the State on the minds of all. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature on the formation of the mind, and greatly exaggerates that of mathematics. His

¹ 'Having a desire to see those ancients who were most renowned for wit and learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I proposed that Homer and Aristotle might appear at the head of all their commentators ; but these were so numerous that some hundreds were forced to attend in the court and outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and could distinguish these two heroes, at first sight, not only from the crowd, but from each other. Homer was the taller and comelier person of the two, walked very erect for one of his age, and his eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever beheld. Aristotle stooped much, and made use of a staff. His visage was meagre, his hair lank and thin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered that both of them were perfect strangers to the rest of the company, and had never seen or heard of them before. And I had a whisper from a ghost, who shall be nameless, "That these commentators always kept in the most distant quarters from their principals, in the lower world, through a consciousness of shame and guilt, because they had so horribly misrepresented the meaning of these authors to posterity." I introduced Didymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed on him to treat them better than perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they wanted a genius to enter into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all patience with the account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented them to him ; and he asked them "whether the rest of the tribe were as great dunces as themselves?"'

aim is above all things to train the reasoning faculties ; to implant in the mind the spirit and power of abstraction ; to explain and define general notions, and, if possible, to connect them. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual knowledge his followers, and at times even he himself, should have fallen away from the doctrine of ideas, and have returned to that branch of knowledge in which alone the relation of the one and many can be truly seen—the science of number. In his views both of teaching and training he might be styled, in modern language, a doctrinaire ; after the Spartan fashion he would have his citizens cast in one mould ; he does not seem to consider that some degree of freedom, ‘a little wholesome neglect,’ is necessary to strengthen and develop the character and to give play to the individual nature. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge which in the vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from their experience of evil.

On the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and theologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life and will begin again in another. He would never allow education of some kind to cease ; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of Solon, ‘I grow old learning many things,’ cannot be applied literally. Himself ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in solid geometry (*Rep.* vii 528), he has no difficulty in imagining that a lifetime might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know how many more men of business there are in the world than real students or thinkers, are not equally sanguine. The education which he proposes for his citizens is really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of genius, interrupted, but only for a time, by practical duties,—a life not for the many, but for the few.

Yet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to our own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, it may have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and raising them above

the routine of their ordinary occupation or profession. It is the best form under which we can conceive the whole of life. Nevertheless the idea of Plato is not easily put into practice. For the education of after life is necessarily the education which each one gives himself. Men and women cannot be brought together in schools or colleges at forty or fifty years of age ; and if they could the result would be disappointing. The destination of most men is what Plato would call 'the Den' for the whole of life, and with that they are content. Neither have they teachers or advisers with whom they can take counsel in riper years. There is no 'schoolmaster abroad' who will tell them of their faults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty, or with the ambition of a true success in life ; no Socrates who will convict them of ignorance ; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them of sin. Hence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of improvement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir them ; they rather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who have come across great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and morality, have received a second life from them, and have lighted a candle from the fire of their genius.

The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not know the way. They 'never try an experiment', or look up a point of interest for themselves ; they make no sacrifices for the sake of knowledge ; their minds, like their bodies, at a certain age become fixed. Genius has been defined as 'the power of taking pains' ; but hardly any one keeps up his interest in knowledge throughout a whole life. The troubles of a family, the business of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the mind. The waxen tablet of the memory which was once capable of receiving 'true thoughts and clear impressions' becomes hard and crowded ; there is not room for the accumulations of a long life (Theaet.

194 ff.). The student, as years advance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his stores. There is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or History or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is enough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to any one who asks how he is to improve. For self-education consists in a thousand things, commonplace in themselves,—in adding to what we are by nature something of what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as others see us; in judging, not by opinion, but by the evidence of facts; in seeking out the society of superior minds; in a study of the lives and writings of great men; in observation of the world and character; in receiving kindly the natural influence of different times of life; in any act or thought which is raised above the practice of opinions of mankind; in the pursuit of some new or original inquiry; in any effort of mind which calls forth some latent power.

If any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education of after-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to him:—That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind most distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, either one which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, perhaps, furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the speculative side the profession or business in which he is practically engaged. He may make Homer, Dante, Shakspeare, Plato, Bacon the friends and companions of his life. He may find opportunities of hearing the living voice of a great teacher. He may select for inquiry some point of history or some unexplained phenomenon of nature. An hour a day passed in such scientific or literary pursuits will furnish as many facts as the memory can retain, and will give him ‘a pleasure not to be repented of’ (Timæus, 59 D). Only let him beware of being the slave of crotchets, or of running after a Will o’ the Wisp in his ignorance, or in his vanity of attributing to himself the gifts of a poet or assuming the air of a philoso-

pher. He should know the limits of his own powers. Better to build up the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly from one thing to another, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests in knowledge, than to form vast schemes which are never destined to be realized. But perhaps, as Plato would say, 'This is part of another subject' (*Tim.* 87 B); though we may also defend our digression by his example (*Theaet.* 72, 77).

IV. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or the natural growth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political philosophy seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato and Aristotle. The ancients were familiar with the mutability of human affairs; they could moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of empires (cp. Plato, *Statesman* 301, 302, and Sulpicius' Letter to Cicero, *Ad Fam.* iv. 5); by them fate and chance were deemed to be real powers, almost persons, and to have had a great share in political events. The wiser of them like Thucydides believed that 'what had been would be again', and that a tolerable idea of the future could be gathered from the past. Also they had dreams of a Golden Age which existed once upon a time and might still exist in some unknown land, or might return again in the remote future. But the regular growth of a State enlightened by experience, progressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, of which the citizens were educated by the fulfilment of political duties, appears never to have come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. Such a State had never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by them. Their experience (cp. *Aristot. Metaph.* xi. 21; Plato, *Laws* iii. 676-9) led them to conclude that there had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had been discovered and lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown and rebuilt again and again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural convulsions had altered the face of the earth. Tradition told them of many destructions of mankind and of the preservation of

a remnant. The world began again after a deluge and was reconstructed out of the fragments of itself. Also they were acquainted with empires of unknown antiquity, like the Egyptian or Assyrian; but they had never seen them grow, and could not imagine, any more than we can, the state of man which preceded them. They were puzzled and awe-stricken by the Egyptian monuments, of which the forms, as Plato says, not in a figure, but literally, were ten thousand years old (*Laws* ii. 656 E), and they contrasted the antiquity of Egypt with their own short memories.

The early legends of Hellas have no real connexion with the later history: they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is concealed from view; there is no road or path which leads from one to the other. At the beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the temple, is seen standing first of all the figure of the legislator, himself the interpreter and servant of the God. The fundamental laws which he gives are not supposed to change with time and circumstances. The salvation of the State is held rather to depend on the inviolable maintenance of them. They were sanctioned by the authority of heaven, and it was deemed impiety to alter them. The desire to maintain them unaltered seems to be the origin of what at first sight is very surprising to us—the intolerant zeal of Plato against innovators in religion or politics (cp. *Laws* x 907-9); although with a happy inconsistency he is also willing that the laws of other countries should be studied and improvements in legislation privately communicated to the Nocturnal Council (*Laws* xii. 951, 2). The additions which were made to them in later ages in order to meet the increasing complexity of affairs were still ascribed by a fiction to the original legislator; and the words of such enactments at Athens were disputed over as if they had been the words of Solon himself. Plato hopes to preserve in a later generation the mind of the legislator; he would have his citizens remain within the lines which he has laid down for them. He would not harass them with minute regulations, and he would have allowed some changes

in the laws : but not changes which would affect the fundamental institutions of the State, such for example as would convert an aristocracy into a timocracy, or a timocracy into a popular form of government.

Passing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been the exception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are not surprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than of ancient date ; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is not more than a century or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the impression left on the human mind by the growth of the Roman Empire and of the Christian Church, and to be due to the political and social improvements which they introduced into the world ; and still more in our own century to the idealism of the first French Revolution and the triumph of American Independence ; and in a yet greater degree to the vast material prosperity and growth of population in England and her colonies and in America. It is also to be ascribed in a measure to the greater study of the philosophy of history. The optimist temperament of some great writers has assisted the creation of it, while the opposite character has led a few to regard the future of the world as dark. The ‘spectator of all time and of all existence’ sees more of ‘the increasing purpose which through the ages ran’ than formerly : but to the inhabitant of a small State of Hellas the vision was necessarily limited like the valley in which he dwelt. There was no remote past on which his eye could rest, nor any future from which the veil was partly lifted up by the analogy of history. The narrowness of view, which to ourselves appears so singular, was to him natural, if not unavoidable.

V. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, the two other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the Introductions to the two latter ; a few general points of comparison may be touched upon in this place.

And first of the *Laws*. (1) The *Republic*, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking generally and judging by the indications of thought and style, may be reasonably ascribed to the middle period of Plato's life: the *Laws* are certainly the work of his declining years, and some portions of them at any rate seem to have been written in extreme old age. (2) The *Republic* is full of hope and aspiration: the *Laws* bear the stamp of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which received the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly executed, and apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of youth: the other has lost the poetical form, but has more of the severity and knowledge of life which is characteristic of old age. (3) The most conspicuous defect of the *Laws* is the failure of dramatic power, whereas the *Republic* is full of striking contrasts of ideas and oppositions of character. (4) The *Laws* may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, the *Republic* of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more intellectual. (5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the government of the world by philosophers, are not found in the *Laws*; the immortality of the soul is first mentioned in *xii.* 959, 967; the person of Socrates has altogether disappeared. The community of women and children is renounced; the institution of common or public meals for women (*Laws vi.* 781) is for the first time introduced (*Ar. Pol. ii.* 6, § 5). (6) There remains in the *Laws* the old enmity to the poets (*vii.* 817), who are ironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are peremptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit their poems to the censorship of the magistrates (*cp. Rep. iii.* 398). (7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few passages in the *Laws*, such as *v.* 727 ff. (the honour due to the soul), *viii.* 835 ff. (the evils of licentious or unnatural love), the whole of *Book x* (religion), *xi.* 918 ff. (the dishonesty of retail trade), and 923 ff. (bequests), which come more home to us, and contain more of what may be termed

the modern element in Plato than almost anything in the Republic.

The relation of the two works to one another is very well given :

(i) by Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 6, §§ 1-5) from the side of the Laws :—

‘The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato’s later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only ; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the State. The population is divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors ; from this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the State. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artists are to have a share in the government, and whether they too are to carry arms and share in military service or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws ; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both States ; there is to be the same education ; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number about 5,000, but in the Republic only 1,000.’

(ii) by Plato in the Laws (Book v. 739 B-E), from the side of the Republic :—

‘The first and highest form of the State and of the govern-

ment and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that "Friends have all things in common". Whether there is now, or ever will be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a State more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a State, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the State, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The State which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.'

The comparatively short work called the *Statesman* or *Politicus* in its style and manner is more akin to the *Laws*, while in its idealism it rather resembles the *Republic*. As far as we can judge by various indications of language and thought, it must be later than the one and of course earlier than the other. In both the *Republic* and *Statesman* a close connexion is maintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the *Statesman*, inquiries into the principles of Method are interspersed with discussions about Politics. The comparative advantages of the rule of law and of a person are considered, and the decision given in favour of a person (*Arist. Pol. iii. 15, 16*). But much may be said on the other side, nor is the opposition necessary; for a person may rule by law, and law may be so applied as to be the living voice of the legislator. As in the *Republic*, there is a myth, describing, however, not a future, but a former existence of mankind. The question is asked, 'Whether the state

of innocence which is described in the myth, or a state like our own which possesses art and science and distinguishes good from evil, is the preferable condition of man.' To this question of the comparative happiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed in the last century and in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman, though less perfect in style than the Republic and of far less range, may justly be regarded as one of the greatest of Plato's dialogues.

VI. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the vehicle of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which went beyond their own age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly to the Republic of Plato is the '*De Republica*' of Cicero; but neither in this nor in any other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. The manners are clumsy and inferior; the hand of the rhetorician is apparent at every turn. Yet noble sentiments are constantly recurring: the true note of Roman patriotism — 'We Romans are a great people' — resounds through the whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero turns away from the phenomena of the heavens to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the 'two Suns' of which all Rome was talking, when he can converse about 'the two nations in one' which had divided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi. Like Socrates again, speaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest he should assume too much the character of a teacher, rather than of an equal who is discussing among friends the two sides of a question. He would confine the terms 'King' or 'State' to the rule of reason and justice, and he will not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But under the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul ruling over the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of government to any single one. The two portraits of the just and the unjust, which occur in the second book of the

Republic, are transferred to the State—Philus, one of the interlocutors, maintaining against his will the necessity of injustice as a principle of government, while the other, Laelius, supports the opposite thesis. His views of language and number are derived from Plato; like him he denounces the drama. He also declares that if his life were to be twice as long he would have no time to read the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is translated by him word for word, though he has hardly shown himself able to 'carry the jest' of Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the humorous fancy about the animals, who 'are so imbued with the spirit of democracy that they make the passers-by get out of their way' (i. 42). His description of the tyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far inferior. The second book is historical, and claims for the Roman constitution (which is to him the ideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato probably intended to have given to the Republic in the Critias. His most remarkable imitation of Plato is the adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into the 'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the myth of the Republic, adding an argument for the immortality of the soul taken from the Phaedrus, and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though a beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the 'Somnium Scipionis' is very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly allows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own creation. Whether his dialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, as he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which they bear many superficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he is not conversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould the intractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue. But if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to the Greek in matter; he nowhere in his philosophical writings leaves upon our minds the impression of an original thinker.

Plato's Republic has been said to be a church and not

a state; and such an ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian world, and is embodied in St. Augustine's '*De Civitate Dei*', which is suggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same manner in which we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been influenced by the decline of Greek politics in the writer's own age. The difference is that in the time of Plato the degeneracy, though certain, was gradual and insensible; whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths stirred like an earthquake the age of St. Augustine. Men were inclined to believe that the overthrow of the city was to be ascribed to the anger felt by the old Roman deities at the neglect of their worship. St. Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he argues that the destruction of the Roman Empire is due, not to the rise of Christianity, but to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman history, and over Greek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere crime, impiety and falsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile religions with the best elements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing of the spirit which led others of the early Christian Fathers to recognize in the writings of the Greek philosophers the power of the divine truth. He traces the parallel of the kingdom of God, that is, the history of the Jews, contained in their scriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, which are found in Gentile writers, and pursues them both into an ideal future. It need hardly be remarked that his use both of Greek and of Roman historians and of the sacred writings of the Jews is wholly uncritical. The heathen mythology, the Sybilline oracles, the myths of Plato, the dreams of Neo-Platonists are equally regarded by him as matter of fact. He must be acknowledged to be a strictly polemical or controversial writer who makes the best of everything on one side and the worst of everything on the other. He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life, nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise out of the ruins of the Roman Empire. He is not blind to the defects of the

Christian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan shall be alike brought before the judgement-seat, and the true City of God shall appear. . . . The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of antiquarian learning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian ethics, but showing little power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of the Greek literature and language. He was a great genius, and a noble character, yet hardly capable of feeling or understanding anything external to his own theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most attracted by Plato, though he is very slightly acquainted with his writings. He is inclined to believe that the idea of creation in the *Timæus* is derived from the narrative in *Genesis*; and he is strangely taken with the coincidence (?) of Plato's saying that 'the philosopher is the lover of God', and the words of the Book of *Exodus* in which God reveals Himself to Moses (*Exod.* iii. 14). He dwells at length on miracles performed in his own day, of which the evidence is regarded by him as irresistible. He speaks in a very interesting manner of the beauty and utility of nature and of the human frame, which he conceives to afford a foretaste of the heavenly state and of the resurrection of the body. The book is not really what to most persons the title of it would imply, and belongs to an age which has passed away. But it contains many fine passages and thoughts which are for all time.

The short treatise *de Monarchia* of Dante is by far the most remarkable of mediaeval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom Italy and the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of a Universal Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary government of the world, having a divine authority distinct from the Papacy, yet coextensive with it. It is not 'the ghost of the dead Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof', but the legitimate heir and successor of it, justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and the beneficence of their rule. Their right to be the governors of the world is also confirmed by the testimony of miracles, and acknow-

ledged by St. Paul when he appealed to Caesar, and even more emphatically by Christ Himself, who could not have made atonement for the sins of men if He had not been condemned by a divinely authorized tribunal. 'The necessity for the establishment of a Universal Empire is proved partly by *a priori* arguments such as the unity of God and the unity of the family or nation; partly by perversions of Scripture and history, by false analogies of nature, by misapplied quotations from the classics, and by odd scraps and commonplaces of logic, showing a familiar but by no means exact knowledge of Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But a more convincing argument still is the miserable state of the world, which he touchingly describes. He sees no hope of happiness or peace for mankind until all nations of the earth are comprehended in a single empire. The whole treatise shows how deeply the idea of the Roman Empire was fixed in the minds of his contemporaries. Not much argument was needed to maintain the truth of a theory which to his own contemporaries seemed so natural and congenial. He speaks, or rather preaches, from the point of view, not of the ecclesiastic, but of the layman, although, as a good Catholic, he is willing to acknowledge that in certain respects the Empire must submit to the Church. The beginning and end of all his noble reflections and of his arguments, good and bad, is the aspiration, 'that in this little plot of earth belonging to mortal man life may pass in freedom and peace.' So inextricably is his vision of the future bound up with the beliefs and circumstances of his own age.

The 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius, and shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book was written by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous sentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the miserable state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the Roses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is indignant at the corruption of the

Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of the company from a cold caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles from hearing. And 'the secret has perished' with him; to this day the place of Utopia remains unknown.

The words of Phaedrus (275 B), 'O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. Yet the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the originality of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of his age, and far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who believes not in the immortality of the soul to share in the administration of the State (cp. *Laws* x, 908 foll.), 'howbeit they put him to no punishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no man's power to believe what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed for reasoning in support of his own religion¹.' In the public services 'no prayers be used, but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving offence to any sect'. He says significantly (p. 143), 'There be that give worship to a man that was once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but also the chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part, rejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, far above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all the world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the Father of all. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the proceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things.

¹ 'One of our company in my presence was sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began, against our wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of Christ's religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not only prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn all other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and devilish, and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus long reasoned the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him into exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a raiser up of dissension among the people' (p. 145).

Neither give they any divine honours to any other than Him.' So far was More from sharing the popular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end he reminds us that he does not in all respects agree with the customs and opinions of the Utopians which he describes. And we should let him have the benefit of this saving clause, and not rudely withdraw the veil behind which he has been pleased to conceal himself.

Nor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral speculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he would set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in the same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and valiant beggars', that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a day. His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of offenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers¹; his remark that 'although every one may hear of ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find States that are well and wisely governed', are curiously at variance with the notions of his age and indeed with his own life. There are many points in which he shows a modern feeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he maintains that civilized States have a right to the soil of waste countries; he is inclined to the opinion which places happiness in virtuous pleasures, but herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those other philosophers who define virtue to be a life according to nature. He extends the idea of happiness so as to include the happiness of others; and he argues ingeniously, 'All men agree that we ought to make others happy; but if others, how much more ourselves!' And still he thinks that there may be a more excellent way, but to this no man's reason can attain unless heaven should inspire him with a higher truth. His ceremonies before marriage; his *humane* proposal that war should be carried on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be compared to some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy,

¹ Compare his satirical observation: 'They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, and therefore very few' (p. 150).

like the affinities of Greeks and barbarians in the *Timaeus*, that the Utopians learnt the language of the Greeks with the more readiness because they were originally of the same race with them. He is penetrated with the spirit of Plato, and quotes or adapts many thoughts both from the *Republic* and from the *Timaeus*. He prefers public duties to private, and is somewhat impatient of the importunity of relations. His citizens have no silver or gold of their own, but are ready enough to pay them to their mercenaries (cp. *Rep.* iv. 422, 423). There is nothing of which he is more contemptuous than the love of money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and diamonds and pearls for children's necklaces.¹

Like Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and princes; on the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his discourse (*Hythloday*) is very unwilling to become a minister of state, considering that he would lose his independence and his advice would never be heeded.² He ridicules the new logic of his time; the Utopians could never be made to understand the doctrine of Second Intentions.³ He is very severe on the sports of the gentry;

¹ When the ambassadors came arrayed in gold and peacocks' feathers 'to the eyes of all the Utopians except very few, which had been in other countries for some reasonable cause, all that gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful and reproachful. In so much that they most reverently saluted the vilest and most abject of them for lords—passing over the ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging them by their wearing of golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen children also, that had cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they saw the like sticking upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their mothers under the sides, saying thus to them—"Look, mother, how great a lubber doth yet wear pearls and precious stones, as though he were a little child still." But the mother; yea and that also in good earnest: "Peace, son," saith she, "I think he be some of the ambassadors' fools'" (p. 102).

² Cp. an exquisite passage at p. 35, of which the conclusion is as follows: 'And verily it is naturally given . . . suppressed and ended.'

³ 'For they have not devised one of all those rules of restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented in the small *Logicals*, which here our children in every place do learn. Furthermore, they were never yet able to find out the second intentions; insomuch that none of

the Utopians count 'hunting the lowest, the vilest, and the most abject part of butchery'. He quotes the words of the Republic in which the philosopher is described 'standing out of the way under a wall until the driving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,' which admit of a singular application to More's own fate; although, writing twenty years before (about the year 1514), he can hardly be supposed to have foreseen this. There is no touch of satire which strikes deeper than his quiet remark that the greater part of the precepts of Christ are more at variance with the lives of ordinary Christians than the discourse of Utopia.¹

The '*New Atlantis*' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the '*Utopia*'. The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy, and by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In some places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas More, as, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the governor of Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to Sir Thomas More such trappings appear simply ridiculous. Yet, after this programme of dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look as though he pitied men.' Several things are borrowed by him from the Timaeus; but he has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages which are taken from the Hebrew Scriptures.

The '*City of the Sun*', written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican friar, several years after the '*New Atlantis*' of Bacon, has many resemblances to the Republic

them all could ever see man himself in common, as they call him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant, yea, and pointed to of us even with our finger' (p. 105).

¹ 'And yet the most part of them is more dissident from the manners of the world now a days, than my communication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil-willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule, they have wrested and wried his doctrine, and, like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's manners, that by some means at the least way, they might agree together' (p. 66).

of Plato. The citizens have wives and children in common ; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and are arranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not, however, adopt his system of lots, but bring together the best natures, male and female, ' according to philosophical rules.' The infants until two years of age are brought up by their mothers in public temples ; and since individuals for the most part educate their children badly, at the beginning of their third year they are committed to the care of the State, and are taught at first, not out of books, but from paintings of all kinds, which are emblazoned on the walls of the city. The city has six interior circuits of walls, and an outer wall which is the seventh. On this outer wall are painted the figures of legislators and philosophers, and on each of the interior walls the symbols or forms of some one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most part, trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises ; but they have two special occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the boys soothe and relieve the wounded warriors ; also they encourage them with embraces and pleasant words (cp. Plato, *Rep.* v. 468). Some elements of the Christian or Catholic religion are preserved among them. The life of the Apostles is greatly admired by this people because they had all things in common ; and the short prayer which Jesus Christ taught men is used in their worship. It is a duty of the chief magistrates to pardon sins, and therefore the whole people make secret confession of them to the magistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort of Rector Metaphysicus ; and by this means he is well informed of all that is going on in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted to the citizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There also exists among them a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by a succession of priests, who change every hour. Their religion is a worship of God in Trinity, that is, of Wisdom, Love and Power, but without any distinction of persons. They behold in the sun the reflection of His glory ;

mere graven images they reject, refusing to fall under the 'tyranny' of idolatry.

Many details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about their mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks forward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, and not of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste their time in the consideration of what he calls 'the dead signs of things'. He remarks that he who knows one science only, does not really know that one any more than the rest, and insists strongly on the necessity of a variety of knowledge. More scholars are turned out in the City of the Sun in one year than by contemporary methods in ten or fifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon, that henceforward natural science will play a great part in education, a hope which seems hardly to have been realized, either in our own or in any former age; at any rate the fulfilment of it has been long deferred.

There is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this work, and a most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no charm of style, and falls very far short of the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, and still more of the 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More. It is full of inconsistencies, and though borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial acquaintance with his writings. It is a work such as one might expect to have been written by a philosopher and man of genius who was also a friar, and who had spent twenty-seven years of his life in a prison of the Inquisition. The most interesting feature of the book, common to Plato and Sir Thomas More, is the deep feeling which is shown by the writer, of the misery and ignorance prevailing among the lower classes in his own time. Campanella takes note of Aristotle's answer to Plato's community of property, that in a society where all things are common, no individual would have any motive to work (Arist. Pol. ii. 5, § 6): he replies, that his citizens being happy and contented in themselves (they are required to work only four hours a day), will have greater regard for

their fellows than exists among men at present. He thinks, like Plato, that if he abolishes private feelings and interests, a great public feeling will take their place.

Other writings on ideal States, such as the 'Oceana' of Harrington, in which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, but as he ought to have been; or the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is an historical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth mentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic in style and thought, is Sir John Eliot's 'Monarchy of Man', in which the prisoner of the Tower, no longer able 'to be a politician in the land of his birth', turns away from politics to view 'that other city which is within him', and finds on the very threshold of the grave that the secret of human happiness is the mastery of self. The change of government in the time of the English Commonwealth set men thinking about first principles, and gave rise to many works of this class. . . . The great original genius of Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there any trace in the conversation or in the works of Dr. Johnson of any acquaintance with his writings. He probably would have refuted Plato without reading him, in the same fashion in which he supposed himself to have refuted Bishop Berkeley's theory of the non-existence of matter. If we except the so-called English Platonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, who never understood their master, and the writings of Coleridge, who was to some extent a kindred spirit, Plato has left no permanent impression on English literature.

VII. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that they are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the other are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue flowing from them which tends to raise individuals above the common routine of society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere interests of commerce or the necessities of self-defence. Like the ideals of art they are partly framed by the omission

of particulars; they require to be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to fade away if we attempt to approach them. They gain an imaginary distinctness when embodied in a State or in a system of philosophy, but they still remain the visions of 'a world unrealized'. More striking and obvious to the ordinary mind are the examples of great men, who have served their own generation and are remembered in another. Even in our own family circle there may have been some one, a woman, or even a child, in whose face has shone forth a goodness more than human. The ideal then approaches nearer to us, and we fondly cling to it. The ideal of the past, whether of our own past lives or of former states of society, has a singular fascination for the minds of many. Too late we learn that such ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of them may have a humanizing influence on other times. But the abstractions of philosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they give light without warmth; they are like the full moon in the heavens when there are no stars appearing. Men cannot live by thought alone; the world of sense is always breaking in upon them. They are for the most part confined to a corner of earth, and see but a little way beyond their own home or place of abode; they 'do not lift up their eyes to the hills'; they are not awake when the dawn appears. But in Plato we have reached a height from which a man may look into the distance (Rep. iv. 445 C) and behold the future of the world and of philosophy. The ideal of the State and of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an education continuing through life and extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of the unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in good and immortality—are the vacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking to fix the eye of mankind.

VIII. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek Philosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more clearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us nearer

to some great change ; the other almost in the same degree retiring from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still remaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the heart of man. The first ideal is the future of the human race in this world ; the second the future of the individual in another. The first is the more perfect realization of our own present life ; the second, the abnegation of it : the one, limited by experience, the other, transcending it. Both of them have been and are powerful motives of action ; there are a few in whom they have taken the place of all earthly interests. The hope of a future for the human race at first sight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of individual existence the more egotistical, of the two motives. But when men have learned to resolve their hope of a future either for themselves or for the world into the will of God—‘not my will but Thine,’ the difference between them falls away ; and they may be allowed to make either of them the basis of their lives, according to their own individual character or temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness to work for an unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it inconceivable that some rare nature may feel his duty to another generation, or to another century, almost as strongly as to his own, or that living always in the presence of God, he may realize another world as vividly as he does this.

The greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under similitudes derived from human qualities ; although sometimes, like the Jewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe the nature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a positive meaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher truths either of philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one form of expression for another, lest through the necessities of language we should become the slaves of mere words.

There is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a place in the home and heart of every believer in

the religion of Christ, and in which men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, the Divine man, the Son of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the first-born and head of the whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom the Divine and human, that which is without and that which is within the range of our earthly faculties, are indissolubly united. Neither is this divine form of goodness wholly separable from the ideal of the Christian Church, which is said, in the New Testament to be 'His body', or at variance with those other images of good which Plato sets before us. We see Him in a figure only, and of figures of speech we select but a few, and those the simplest, to be the expression of Him. We behold Him in a picture, but He is not there. We gather up the fragments of His discourses, but neither do they represent Him as He truly was. His dwelling is neither in heaven nor earth, but in the heart of man. This is that image which Plato saw dimly in the distance, which, when existing among men, he called, in the language of Homer, 'the likeness of God' (Rep. vi. 501 B), the likeness of a nature which in all ages men have felt to be greater and better than themselves, and which in endless forms, whether derived from Scripture or nature, from the witness of history or from the human heart, regarded as a person or not as a person, with or without parts or passions, existing in space or not in space, is and will always continue to be to mankind the Idea of Good.

BOOK VI

Steph. 484 AND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from B that of the unjust must consider.

And what is the next question? he asked.

Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?

And how can we rightly answer that question?

Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and C institutions of our State—let them be our guardians.

Very good.

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have

The qualities of the philosophic nature VI. 484 C

in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them—are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect.

Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.

By all means.

In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such a union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.

What do you mean?

Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.

Agreed.

And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more

485 B *The philosopher a lover of truth*

or less honourable, which they are willing to renounce ; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.

True.

And if they are to be what we were describing, is there
C not another quality which they should also possess?

What quality?

Truthfulness : they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.

Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

‘ May be,’ my friend, I replied, is not the word ; say rather, ‘ must be affirmed : ’ for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

Right, he said.

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?

Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of
D falsehood?

Never.

The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Assuredly.

But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others ; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

True.

He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and

The spectator of all time and all existence VI. 485 D

will hardly feel bodily pleasure—I mean. if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.

That is most certain.

Such a one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous ; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.

Very true.

Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be 486 considered.

What is that?

There should be no secret corner of illiberality ; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.

Most true, he replied.

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?

He cannot.

Or can such a one account death fearful?

B

No indeed.

Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Certainly not.

Or again : can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward—can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

Impossible.

Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable ; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.

486 B *The philosopher a lover of learning*

True.

- C There is another point which should be remarked.

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

That is certain.

Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?

Yes.

- D Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?

Certainly.

And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?

Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.

Certainly.

- E Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?

But is the philosopher really so perfect? VI. 487

They are absolutely necessary, he replied. 487

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,—noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?

The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.

And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these state-
ments, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk
in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your
hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at
each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill
in asking and answering questions; these little accumulate,
and at the end of the discussion they are found to have
sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions
appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players
of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adver-
saries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves
shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new
game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time
they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by
what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that
although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of
the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy,
when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of
education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most
of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and
that those who may be considered the best of them are made
useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

I cannot tell, he replied ; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Hear my answer ; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

E Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.

Yes, Socrates ; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion ; but now hear
488 the parable, and then you will be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination : for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it ; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is
B a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering—every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any
C one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain,

begging and praying him to commit the helm to them ; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores ; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan D and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing ; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not—the E possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling.¹ Now in vessels which are in a state of 489 mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?

Of course, said Adeimantus.

'Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State ; for you understand already.

¹ Or, applying ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει to the mutineers, 'But only understanding (ἐπαύρις) that he (the mutinous pilot) must rule in spite of other people, never considering that there is an art of command which may be practised in combination with the pilot's art.'

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities ; explain it to him and try to convince him that B their having honour would be far more extraordinary.

I will.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right ; but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature ; neither are ‘ the wise to go to the doors of the rich ’—the ingenious author of this saying told a lie—but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, C whether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him ; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp ; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-gazers.

Precisely so, he said.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed D by those of the opposite faction ; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless ; in which opinion I agreed.

The noble nature of the philosopher VI. 489 D

Yes.

And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?

True.

Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other? E

By all means.

And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you 490 will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.

Yes, that was said.

Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on—the B keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then,* and not till then, will he cease from his travail.

Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

C He will.

And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

Impossible.

Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Exactly.

And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of those who were said to be
491 useless but not wicked—and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak.

What are these corruptions? he said.

I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher, is a rare plant which B is seldom seen among men.

Rare indeed.

And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

What causes?

In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular, he replied.

Then there are all the ordinary goods of life—beauty, C wealth, strength, rank, and great connexions in the State—you understand the sort of things—these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether D vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

Certainly.

- E And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

There I think that you are right.

- 492 And our philosopher follows the same analogy—he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?

When is this accomplished? he said.

- When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the

praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.

D

And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

What is that?

The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.

Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.

Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

None, he replied.

E

No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character¹ which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion¹—I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.

493

I quite assent, he replied.

¹ Or, taking *παρά* in another sense, 'trained to virtue on their principles.'

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.

What are you going to say?

Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies ; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed
 B by him—he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated ; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accord-
 C ance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes ; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such a one be a rare educator?

Indeed he would.

And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is
 D the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics,

differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges¹ when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomedes will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No, nor am I likely to hear.

E

You recognize the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute 494 in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Certainly not

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible.

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

They must.

And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

That is evident.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what B we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence—these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes.

¹ Putting a comma after τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

Will not such a one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Certainly, he said.

And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question.

- C Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which he will one day possess.

That often happens, he said.

- And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

To be sure he will.

Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

Far otherwise.

- And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to

prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

There can be no doubt of it. 495

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible.

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life?

We were quite right.

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.

That is most true, he said.

And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

That is certainly what people say.

Yes ; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles—like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy ; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts ? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose **E** natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable ?

Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune ; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate ?

496 A most exact parallel.

What will be the issue of such marriages ? Will they not be vile and bastard ?

There can be no question of it.

And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated ? ¹ Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear,¹ having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom ?

No doubt, he said.

¹ Or 'will they not deserve to be called sophisms,' . . .

Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant : perchance some noble and B well-educated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her ; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects ; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her ;—or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages's bridle ; for everything in the life C of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy ; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude ; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of D justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall ; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or E unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.

496 E *No existing State suited to Philosophy*

Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.

A great work—yes ; but not the greatest, unless he find
497 a State suitable to him ; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained : the injustice of the charges against her has been shown—is there anything more which
1 you wish to say?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied ; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

B Not any of them, I said ; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged ;—as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State
C that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human ;—and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that State is :

No, he said ; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question—whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects ; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of

How Philosophy is now studied VI. 497 D

the constitution which guided you when as legislator you D were laying down the laws.

That was said, he replied.

Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner ; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult ; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

What is there remaining?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State : all great attempts are attended with risk ; ‘hard is the good,’ as men say.

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry E will then be complete.

I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power : my zeal you may see for yourselves ; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

In what manner?

At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite 498 young ; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from money-making and house-keeping to such pursuits ; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by some one else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business : at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more

498 B *How Philosophy ought to be studied*

B truly than Heracleitus's sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.¹

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years : during this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy ; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul ; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and C military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates ! he said ; I am sure of that ; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced ; Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and D me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies ; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe ; for they have never seen that

¹ Heracleitus said that the sun was extinguished every evening and relighted every morning.

Philosophy, when understood, is loved VI.498 D

of which we are now speaking realized ; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue—such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one 499 nor many of them—do you think that they ever did?

No indeed.

No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments ; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, B that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them ;¹ or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either C or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm : if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Quite right.

¹ Reading *κατηκούσιν* or *κατηκόουσιν*.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is—yea, and will be whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this ; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.

My opinion agrees with yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude? .

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude : they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed—if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain.¹ Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind.

¹ Reading *ἦ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεωῦνται* without a question, and *ἀλλοίαν τοι* or, retaining the question and taking *ἀλλοίαν δόξαν* in a new sense : 'Do you mean to say really that, viewing him in this light, they will be of another mind from yours, and answer in another strain?'

The philosopher's conversation is in heaven VI. 500

I quite agree with you, he said.

And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling B which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; C his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one else, he will suffer from D detraction.

Of course.

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?

Anything but unskilful.

And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will E

they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?

They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But
501 how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking?

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator,—they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?

No doubt.

B And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards : I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy ; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man ; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put
C in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

The enemies of philosophy become gentle VI. 501 C

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such a one as we were praising ; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State ; and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard?

Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? D Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

They would not be so unreasonable.

Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?

Neither can they doubt this.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

Surely not.

E

Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very 502 shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of necessity be destroyed ; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us ; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape—who will venture to affirm this?

Who indeed !

But, said I, one is enough ; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?

C I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

Very good.

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed ;—how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of

women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment ; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, 503 and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face ; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen. B

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word ; but now let me dare to say—that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them ; for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together ; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean ? he said. C

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful

and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found?

Yes, indeed.

F Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, 504 or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them? ¹

¹ Cp. IV. 435 D.

To what do you refer?

We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted B to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear ; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the inquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner ; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in C any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure ; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Yes, I said ; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

True.

The guardian, then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, D or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order E

that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

A right noble thought;¹ but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be
505 troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge
B or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

How ridiculous!

C Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge

¹ Or, separating *καὶ μάλα* from *ἄξιον*, 'True, he said, and a noble thought': or *ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα* may be a gloss.

of it—for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term ‘good’—this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

D

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one.

Very true, he said.

Of this, then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is E such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other 506 things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things,—of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry

506 *The guardian must have knowledge of the good*

guardian of them ; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

B And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied ; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman ¹ like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates ; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty ; he has no right to do that : but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Very true.

And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal ; if you will only

¹ Reading ἀνὴρ καλός: or reading ἀνὴρ καλῶς, 'I quite well knew from the very first, that you,' &c.

give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you 507 receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest,¹ and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

What?

B

The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' is applied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is

¹ A play upon *τόκος*, which means both 'offspring' and 'interest'.

an absolute ; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

Very true.

The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

Exactly.

C And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?
The sight, he said.

And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

True.

But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

No, I never have, he said.

Then reflect : has the ear or voice need of any third or
D additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied ; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Certainly not.

But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

How do you mean?

Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see ; colour being also present in them, still
E unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied

True, he said.

Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and 508
visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference
of nature ; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble
thing?

Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say
was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which
makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

May not the relation of sight to this deity be described
as follows?

How?

Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun? B
No.

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the
sun?

By far the most like.

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence
which is dispensed from the sun?

Exactly.

Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is
recognized by sight?

True, he said.

And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the
good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in
relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in C
the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things
of mind :

Will you be a little more explicit ? he said.

Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind ; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them ?

Very true.

- D But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them ?

Certainly.

And the soul is like the eye : when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence ; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence ?

Just so.

- E Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science¹, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge ; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature
509 as more beautiful than either ; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good ; the good has a place of honour yet higher.

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is

¹ Reading *διανοού*.

the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty ; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good ?

God forbid, I replied ; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view ?

In what point of view ?

B

You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation ?

Certainly.

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness : By the light of C heaven, how amazing !

Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you ; for you made me utter my fancies.

And pray continue to utter them ; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best, I said ; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted.

I hope not, he said.

You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling D powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (*οὐρανός*,

ὁπαρός). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

I have.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal¹ parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth, and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

B Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus :—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in

¹ Reading *ἀνισα*.

the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images¹ as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

Then I will try again ; you will understand me better C when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science ; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others , but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, D and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the E absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

That is true.

511

And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses ; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of

¹ Reading ὡς περ ἐκείνο εἰκόνων.

which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

B I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole ; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.

I understand you, he replied ; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous ; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only : these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses : yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said ; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.

BOOK VII

Steph. AND now, I said. let me show in a figure how far our
514 nature is enlightened or unenlightened :—Behold ! human
beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth
open towards the light and reaching all along the den ;
here they have been from their childhood, and have their
legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and
B can only see before them, being prevented by the chains
from turning round their heads. Above and behind them
a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the
prisoners there is a raised way ; and you will see, if you
look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which
marionette players have in front of them, over which they
show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carry-
C ing all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals
515 made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear
over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange
prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied ; and they see only their own
shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire
throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said ; how could they see anything but the
B shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner
they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them? ¹

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

¹ Reading *παρόντα*.

515 E *The prisoner's return to the light*

E. And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be
516 pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the
B sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all
C things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,
and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very

considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes ; and that it was better not even to think of ascending ; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear B Glaucon, to the previous argument ; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen C only with an effort ; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual ; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs ; for their souls are ever hastening into the D upper world where they desire to dwell ; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from

'The light of the body is the eye' VII 517D

divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner ; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of E those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

Any one who has common sense will remember that the 518 bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye ; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh ; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state B of being, and he will pity the other ; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind C eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity

518 C *Duties of those who have seen the light*

of learning exists in the soul already ; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or
D in other words, of the good.

Very true.

And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner ; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.

And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not
E originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable ; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow
519 intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end ; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth ; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which,
B like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls

They will return to the cave VII. 519 B

upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

Yes, I said ; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be C able ministers of State ; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public ; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

Very true, he replied.

Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good ; but when they have ascended and seen enough we D must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean ?

I mean that they remain in the upper world : but this must not be allowed ; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

But is not this unjust ? he said ; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better ?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention E of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in

the State happy above the rest ; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, 520 and therefore benefactors of one another ; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others ; we shall explain to them that in other States, men B of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics : and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double C duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, D which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is

The qualifications of a good ruler VII. 520D

that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered ; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just ; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said ; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life ⁵²¹ than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State ; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be ; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the

521 B *How are the guardians to be produced?*

task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question.

Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

C And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,—as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell,¹ but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below,² which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Quite so.

And should we not inquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

¹ In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.

² Reading οὐραν ἐπάνωθεν.

The first and second education VII. 521D

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not? E

Just so.

There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?

True.

Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to 522 discover?

No.

But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now B seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?

Undoubtedly ; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects ; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal application.

What may that be?

- C A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education.

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three—in a word, number and calculation :—do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

- D Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy ; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

- E Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to 523 have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the inquiry with me, and say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further inquiry is imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer :

523 C *The companion of sensible objects.*

—here are three fingers—a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.

You may suppose that they are seen quite close : And here comes the point.

What is it?

Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference ; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses ; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What,

Thought is aroused by contradiction VII. 524

again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are B very curious and require to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they C could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the inquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is small?'

Exactly so.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

D

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse—those which are simul-

taneous with opposite impressions, invite thought ; those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer ; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then,
 E as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being ; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks ' What is absolute unity? ' This
 525 is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one ; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said ; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?

Yes.

B And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical ; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also,

because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe ; and we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn C arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only ; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself ; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is ! and in how many ways it D conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper !

How do you mean ?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any E one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply,¹ taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

¹ Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of fractions ; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units.

That is very true.

526 Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible,— what would they answer?

They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought.

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called
B necessary, necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been.

Very true, he said.

C And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we inquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of D geometry which relates to war ; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manœuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough ; the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry—whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the E vision of the idea of good ; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us ; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

Yes, that is what we assert.

527

Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians.

How so?

They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life ; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

B

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

- C Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind? he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.

Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Let us do so, he replied.

- D And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and

E

re-illuminated ; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons : one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation ; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will 528 naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement ; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves ; B whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates ; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons :—in the first place, no government patronizes them ; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult ; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very C conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would

be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honour to them ; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made ; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.

D Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry ; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy
529 before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

Every one but myself, I said ; to every one else this may be clear, but not to me.

And what then would you say?

I 'should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton : but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science ; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said : The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge ; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold ; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any
530 other proportion.

No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the
B stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation—that would be absurd ; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact
truth.

I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the
C natural gift of reason to be of any real use.

That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Yes, I said ; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation

is to be of any value But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only ; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours ; D and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named

And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes ; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions ; and these are sister sciences—as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?

Yes, he replied.

But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we E had better go and learn of them ; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the same 531 thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.

Yes, by heaven ! he said ; and 'tis as good as a play to

531 *Harmonics: empirical, Pythagorean, ideal*

hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them ; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbour's wall¹—one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement ; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same—either party setting
B their ears before their understanding.

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument : I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound ; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to inquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the
C astronomers ; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful ; that is, if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good ; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless.

Very true, he said.

Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-
D communion and connexion with one another, and come to

¹ Or, ' close alongside of their neighbour's instruments, as if to catch a sound from them.'

The revelation of dialectic VII. 531 D

be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects ; otherwise there is no profit in them.

I suspect so ; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean? I said ; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician? E

Assuredly not, he said ; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?

Neither can this be supposed.

And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the 532 hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate ; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic ; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at B the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their

532 B *The meaning of the ascent from the cave*

translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images¹ in the water [which are divine], and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which 'compared with the sun is only an image)—this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world—this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.

I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This however is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain,² and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

533 Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have

¹ Omitting *ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα*. The word *θεῖα* is bracketed by Stallbaum.

² A play upon the word *νόμος*, which means both 'law' and 'strain'.

Dialectic and the preliminary sciences VII. 533

been a reality^{*} I cannot venture to say ; but you would have seen something like reality ; of that I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other B method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature ; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions ; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long C as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure ; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is D by her gentle aid lifted upwards ; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but

they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science : and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider?

Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions ; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows, opinion
534 being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being ; and so to make a proportion :—

As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion.

And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of shadows.

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long inquiry, many times longer than this has been.

B As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Yes, he said ; how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good?

Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the
C idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals

to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good ; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science ;—dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus. D

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts¹, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Yes, he said, you and I together will make it. E

Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them ; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go? 535

I agree, he said.

But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.

Yes, clearly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible,

¹ γραμμάς, literally 'lines', probably the starting-point of a race-course.

B to the fairest ; and, having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

And what are these?

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition ; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics : the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.

Very true, he replied.

C Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line ; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

Certainly, he said ; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute : her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.

What do you mean?

D In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry—I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle : as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or listening or inquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is ex-

tremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities States and individuals unconsciously err; and the State makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.

That would not be creditable.

Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.

Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.

Why not?

E Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.

Very true.

Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but 537 let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.

That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things—labours, lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

The order of the higher education VII. 537 B

At what age?

B

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over : the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose ; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning ; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Certainly, he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honours, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Yes, I said ; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent : the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider ; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who D are most steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honour ; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being : And here, my friend, great caution is required.

Why great caution?

E Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?

What evil? he said.

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.

Quite true, he said.

Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?

In what way make allowance?

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he
538 is one of a great and numerous family, and has many flatterers.

When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth
B he will be likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter.

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after
C their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he

They undermine received opinions VII. 538 C

were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up; obeying and honouring them.

That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure D which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the E notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them as before?

Impossible.

And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be 539 expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably.

539 *Different pursuits at different ages*

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Yes, he said ; and, I may add, pitiable.

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.

Certainly.

B There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early ; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them ; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.

And when they have made many conquests and received C defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity ; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement ; and the greater moderation of his D character will increase instead of diminishing the honour of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly

The years of office, and after VII. 539 D

and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be enough?

Would you say six or four years? he asked. F

Say five years, I replied ; at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold : in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

And how long is this stage of their lives to last? 540

Fifteen years, I answered ; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation : the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good ; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives B . also ; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty ; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there ;

; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices
C and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods,
but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of
our governors faultless in beauty.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you
must not suppose that what I have been saying applies
to men only and not to women as far as their natures
can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them
to share in all things like the men.

D Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?)
that what has been said about the State and the govern-
ment is not a mere dream, and although difficult not im-
possible, but only possible in the way which has been
supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings
are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the
honours of this present world which they deem mean and
worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honour
F that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest
and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are,
and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set
in order their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the
541 inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and
will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected
by the habits of their parents; these they will train in their
own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have
given them: and in this way the State and constitution
of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily

attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.

Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image—there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty, he replied ; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

BOOK VIII

Steph. AND SO, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in
543 the perfect State wives and children are to be in common ;
and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are
also to be common, and the best philosophers and the
bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

B Yes, I said ; and we have further acknowledged that
the governors, when appointed themselves, will take their
soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing,
which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or
individual ; and about their property, you remember what
we agreed?

Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the
ordinary possessions of mankind ; they were to be warrior
C athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in
lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they
were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.

True, I said ; and now that this division of our task is
concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that
we may return into the old path.

There is no difficulty in returning ; you implied, then as
now, that you had finished the description of the State : you
said that such a State was good, and that the man was good
D who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had more
544 excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you
said further, that if this was the true form, then the others

were false ; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word ; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.

Your recollection, I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position ; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Yes, if I can, I will, I said.

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.

That question, I said, is easily answered : the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded ; what is termed oligarchy comes next ; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils : thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different : and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you ? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of

544 D *The corresponding natures of individuals*

government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.

Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them.

Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock', and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure
E turn the scale and draw other things after them?

/ Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?

Certainly.

Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly
545 call just and good, we have already described.

We have.

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The inquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or
B in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.

Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.

Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with

a view to clearness, of taking the State first, and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honour?—I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again C we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.

That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.

First, then, I said, let us inquire how timocracy (the government of honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in D divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Very true, he said.

In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us 'how discord first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, E to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?

How would they address us?

After this manner:—A city which is thus constituted can 546 hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution:—In plants that grow in the earth, as well

as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not
 B attain ; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number,¹ but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution [*or* squared and cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms
 C commensurable and agreeable to one another.² The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies ; the first a square which is a hundred times as great ($400 = 4 \times 100$),³ and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong⁴, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square

¹ i.e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or time represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.

² Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3^3 , 4^3 , 5^3 , which together = $6^3 = 216$.

³ Or the first a square which is $100 \times 100 = 10,000$. The whole number will then be 17,500 -- a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.

⁴ Reading *προμήκη δέ*.

The first step in the descent VIII. 546 C

(i.e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five ($7 \times 7 = 49 \times 100 = 4900$), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by ¹ two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five $= 50 + 50 = 100$); and a hundred cubes of three ($27 \times 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000$). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are D ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by undervaluing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver E and brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, 547 and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?

¹ Or, 'consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters,' &c. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see Introduction.

B And what do the Muses say next?

When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways : the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver ; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners ; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants ; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.

I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Very true.

Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

True, he said.

In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training—in all these respects this State will resemble the former.

True.

E But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because

they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements ; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace ; and in the value set by 548 them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars—this State will be for the most part peculiar.

Yes.

Yes, I said ; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies ; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them ; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom B they please.

That is most true, he said.

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize ; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father : they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honoured gymnastic more than music. C

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Why, there is a mixture, I said ; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen,—the spirit of contention and ambition ; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

Assuredly, he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only ; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust ; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour.

Very true, he replied.

Now what man answers to this form of government—how did he come into being, and what is he like?

I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterizes him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point ; but there are other respects in which he is very different.

In what respects?

He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a friend of culture ; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that ; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority ; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour ; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms ; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.

Such a one will despise riches only when he is young ; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in

him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Who was that? said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.

Good, he said.

Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Exactly.

C

His origin is as follows:—He is often the young son of a brave father, who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

And how does the son come into being?

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she D sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing. E

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.

And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are

549 E *The second stage in the decline*

supposed to be attached to the family, from time to time talk
 : privately in the same strain to the son ; and if they see any one
 who owes money to his father, or is wronging him in any
 way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that
 550 when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort,
 and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk
 abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing : those
 who do their own business in the city are called simpletons,
 and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured
 and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing
 and seeing all these things—hearing, too, the words of his
 father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and
 making comparisons of him and others—is drawn opposite
 B ways : while his father is watering and nourishing the
 rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging
 the passionate and appetitive ; and he being not originally
 of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last
 brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives
 up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle
 of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and
 ambitious.

You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

C 'Then we have now, I said, the second form of government
 and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,

Is set over against another State ;

or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

From timocracy to oligarchy VIII. 550 c

And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it. D

I understand, he replied.

Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other

How?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the law?

Yes, indeed.

And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival E him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Likely enough.

And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in 551 the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured.

Clearly.

And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is neglected.

That is obvious.

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men

become lovers of trade and money ; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.

They do so.

They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship ; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive ; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.

Very true.

And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.

Yes, he said ; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking? ¹

First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes ; and is not this true of the government of anything? ²

I should imagine so.

Except a city?—or would you include a city?

Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.

D This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

¹ Cp. *supra*, 544 C.

² Omitting *ἡ τιμος*.

The evils of oligarchy VIII. 551 D

Clearly.

And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

What defect?

The inevitable division : such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of rich men ; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.

That, surely, is at least as bad.

Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy ; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

How discreditable !

And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings—they are husbandmen, 552 tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well?

Anything but well.

There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.

What evil?

A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property ; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature.

Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State. B

The evil is certainly not prevented there ; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

True.

But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?

C As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so, Socrates.

And God has made the flying drones, Adcimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as D paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.

Most true, he said.

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighbourhood there are hidden away thieves and cut-purses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.

Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.

E And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have

The origin of the oligarchical man VIII. 552 E

stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Certainly, we may be so bold.

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?

True.

Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils.

Very likely.

Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the 553 rulers are elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

By all means.

Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?

How?

A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he B and all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him.

Nothing more likely.

And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne; humbled by C

poverty he takes to money-making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such a one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Most true, he replied.

- D And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.

- E And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

- 554 Very good.

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

Certainly.

Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.

True.

Qualities of the oligarchical man VIII. 554

He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself ; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a true image of B the State which he represents?

He appears to me to be so ; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.

I imagine not, he said ; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour.¹

Excellent ! I said. Yet consider : Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of pauper and rogue, which C are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

True.

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Where must I look?

You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.

Aye.

It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue ; not making them see that D they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure.

¹ Reading καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα. Εὖ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, according to Schneider's excellent emendation.

Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own.

Yes, and they will be strong in him too.

The man, then, will be at war with himself ; he will be two men, and not one ; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.

True.

For these reasons such a one will be more respectable than most people ; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him.

I should expect so.

555 And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition ; he will not spend his money in the contest for glory ; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle ; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

Very true.

Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to the oligarchical State?

There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy ; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us ; and then we will inquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.

That, he said, is our method.

Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy

into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise?—The good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?

What then?

The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their C wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?

To be sure.

There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded. D

That is tolerably clear.

And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Yes, often.

And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for revolution. E

That is true.

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting—that is, their money—into some one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into

a family of children : and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.

556 Yes, he said, there are plenty of them—that is certain.

The evil blazes up like a fire ; and they will not extinguish it, either by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy :

What other?

One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters :—Let
B there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

At present the governors, induced by the motives which
I have named, treat their subjects badly ; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness
· C both of body and mind ; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.

Very true.

They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.

Yes, quite as indifferent.

Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers or
D fellow-sailors ; aye and they may observe the behaviour of each other in the very moment of danger—for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the

rich—and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such a one puffing and at his wits' end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another, 'Our warriors are not good for E much'?

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.

And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within—in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external 557 cause.

Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of

B A government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.

Clearly, he said.

In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness—a man may say and do what he likes?

'Tis said so, he replied.

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Clearly.

C Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower.¹ And just as women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.

Yes.

D Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there—they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

¹ Omitting *τί μὲν*; *ἔφη*.

The characteristics of democracy VIII. 557 E

He will be sure to have patterns enough.

E

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or to go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed—there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely 558 delightful?

For the moment, yes.

And is not their humanity to the condemned¹ in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?

Yes, he replied, many and many a one.

See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the B
'don't care' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city—as when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study—how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend.

C

Yes, she is of a noble spirit.

¹ Or, 'the philosophical temper of the condemned.'

558 C *The origin of the democratic man*

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

We know her well.

Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.

Very good, he said.

Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Exactly.

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Obviously.

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

True.

559 We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—

Necessary and unnecessary pleasures VIII. 559

shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class? B

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways ; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary? C

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave

559 D *The growth of the democratical man*

D of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true.

Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.

What is the process?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may E imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?

Inevitably.

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?

Certainly.

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, 560 advising or rebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.

It must be so.

And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored.

The parable of the prodigal VIII. 560

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.

And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he B
their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce
and numerous.

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.

They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret
intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.

Very true.

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's
soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments
and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in
the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their
best guardians and sentinels.

None better.

False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards
and take their place.

They are certain to do so.

And so the young man returns into the country of the
lotus-eaters, and takes up his dwelling there in the face of
all men ; and if any help be sent by his friends to the
oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut
the gate of the king's fastness ; and they will neither allow
the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the
fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or
receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day, and D
then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously
thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nick-
name unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth ;
they persuade men that moderation and orderly expendi-
ture are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of

a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling
561 them by sweet names ; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.

After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones ; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of
R passion is over—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn ; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another ; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice ; if any one says to him that some

'Not one, but all mankind's epitome' VIII. 561C

pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, C and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said ; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour ; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute ; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin ; then he takes a turn at gymnastics ; sometimes D idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher ; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head ; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order ; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom ; and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality. E

Yes, I said ; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many ;—he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Just so.

Let him then be set over against democracy ; he may truly 562 be called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant ; these we have now to consider.

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?—that it has a democratic origin is evident.

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?

How?

The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth—am I not right?

Yes.

And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?

True.

And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?

What good?

Freedom, I replied ; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State—and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.

Yes ; the saying is in everybody's mouth.

I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls

them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.

Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.

Yes, I said ; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught ; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects : these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit? E

Certainly not.

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them How do you mean?

I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents ; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either. 563

Yes, he said, that is the way.

And these are not the only evils, I said—there are several lesser ones : In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors ; young and old are all alike ; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed ; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety ; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt B the manners of the young.

Quite true, he said.

The last extreme of popular liberty, is when the slave

bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser ; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

C Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

That is what I am doing, I replied ; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State : for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen ; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them : and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.

When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.

And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become ; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten ; they will have no one over them.

Yes, he said, I know it too well.

Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.

Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy ; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy—the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite

direction ; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.

True.

The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

Yes, the natural order.

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

As we might expect.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin ^B of both?

Just so, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spend-thrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

A very just comparison.

These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ^C ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in ; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Yes, by all means, he said.

Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into

D three classes ; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

That is true.

And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.

How so?

Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength ; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side ; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.

Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

565 That is pretty much the case, he said.

The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands ; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

True, he said ; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.

And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people ; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share. **B**

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

What else can they do?

And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?

True.

And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last **C** they are forced to become oligarchs in reality ; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.

Then come impeachments and judgements and trials of one another.

True.

The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.

Yes, that is their way.

This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs ; **D** when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Yes, that is quite clear.

565 D *The protector becomes a tyrant*

How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.

What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf? Did you never hear it?

Oh yes.

And the protector of the people is like him ; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen ; by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens ; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands : and after this, what \$66 will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf—that is, a tyrant?

Inevitably.

This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?

The same.

After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

That is clear.

B And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.

Yes, he said, that is their usual way.

Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is

The early days of his power VIII. 566 B

the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career—‘Let not the people’s friend,’ as they say, ‘be lost to them.’

Exactly.

The people readily assent ; all their fears are for him—they have none for themselves.

Very true.

C

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,

‘By pebbly Hermus’ shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward.’¹

And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.

But if he is caught he dies.

Of course.

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not D ‘larding the plain’ with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.

No doubt, he said.

And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated.

Yes, he said, let us consider that.

At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes every one whom he meets ;—he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in E private ! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to every one !

¹ Herod. i. 55.

Of course, he said.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.

To be sure.

567 Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?

Clearly.

And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.

He must.

B Now he begins to grow unpopular.

A necessary result.

Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.

Yes, that may be expected.

And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.

He cannot.

And therefore he must look about him and see who is
C valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek

The purgation of the State VIII. 567 C

occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.

Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.

Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body ; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse.

If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

What a blessed alternative, I said :—to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all !

Yes, that is the alternative.

And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Certainly.

And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.

By the dog ! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land. E

Yes, he said, there are.

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves ; he will then set them free and enrol them in his body-guard.

To be sure, he said ; and he will be able to trust them best of all.

What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be ; he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted friends. 568

Yes, he said ; they are quite of his sort.

Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.

Of course.

Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.

Why so?

Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,

B Tyrants are wise by living with the wise ;

and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.

Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike ; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

C Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.

Very true.

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour—the greatest honour, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies ; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.

The tyrant's ways and means VIII. 568 D

True.

But we are wandering from the subject : Let us therefore return and inquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his.

If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them ; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

And when these fail?

E

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.

You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions?

Yes, he said ; they cannot help themselves.

But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son ? The 569 father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions ; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom ; and, when he B

wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen C into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

True, he said.

Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Yes, quite enough, he said.

BOOK IX

LAST of all comes the tyrannical man ; about whom we Steph.
have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the demo- 57¹
cratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery? '

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which
remains unanswered.

What question?

I do not think that we have adequately determined the
nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accom-
plished the inquiry will always be confused. B

Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.

Very true, I said ; and observe the point which I want
to understand : Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and
appetites I conceive to be unlawful ; every one appears
to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the
laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them
—either they are wholly banished or they become few and
weak ; while in the case of others they are stronger, and
there are more of them. C

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and
human and ruling power is asleep ; then the wild beast
within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and having
shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires ; and there
is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest or any D
other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of for

bidden food—which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.

Most true, he said.

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, E collecting himself in meditation ; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments 572 and pains from interfering with the higher principle—which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future : when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against any one—I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least B likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.

I quite agree.

In saying this I have been running into a digression ; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.

Yes, I agree.

And now remember the character which we attributed C to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament ?

The picture of the democratical man IX. 572 C

True.

And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but D of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes, he said ; that was our view of him, and is so still.

And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles.

I can imagine him.

Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father :—he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is E termed perfect liberty ; and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on him, 573 they contrive to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts—a sort of monstrous winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him.

Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.

And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they

573 *The democratical man passes into the tyrannical*

implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of
B the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks
out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good
opinions or appetites in process of formation,¹ and there
is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better prin-
ciples he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has
purged away temperance and brought in madness to the
full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man
is generated.

And is not this the reason why of old love has been called
a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of
C a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged and not right
in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over
men, but also over the gods?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word
comes into being when, either under the influence of nature,
or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate?
O my friend, is not that so?

Assuredly.

Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how
does he live?

D Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.

I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there
will be feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans,

¹ Or, 'opinions or appetites such as are deemed to be good.'

The picture of the tyrannical man IX. 573 D

and all that sort of thing ; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.

That is certain.

Yes ; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.

Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property. E
Of course.

When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food ; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by Love himself, who 574 is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them ?

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

No doubt he will.

And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first B
of all to cheat and deceive them.

Very true.

And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what

then, my friend? Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?

Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.

But, O heavens ! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary
C connexion, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her ; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?

Yes, indeed, he said ; I believe that he would.

Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

D He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer ; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgement about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of love and share his empire. These
E in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only ; he will commit the foulest murder, or

eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, 575 and being himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Yes, indeed, he said.

And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.

What sort of mischief?

For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.

A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them C are few in number.

Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.

Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield, well and good ; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.

E Exactly.

When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character ; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools ; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them : they profess every sort of affection for them ; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.

Yes, truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody ; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.

Certainly not.

And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?

No question.

B Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?

Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.

Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man : he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Most true.

And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

The distance between king and tyrant IX. 576 B

That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized C longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Yes, he said, inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?

To be sure.

D

Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?

They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.

There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once inquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and E then we will give our opinion.

A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.

And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I should have a judge whose mind can 577

enter into and see through human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgement is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger—he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?

That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who will answer our inquiries.

By all means.

C Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?

What do you mean? he asked.

Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?

Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few; but the people, speaking generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.

D Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity

The misery of the tyrant IX. 577 D

—the best elements in him are enslaved ; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.

Inevitably.

And would you say that the soul of such a one is the soul of a freeman, or of a slave?

He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.

And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?

Utterly incapable.

And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires ; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Certainly.

And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable? 578

True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes, indeed.

Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Impossible.

Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

And I was right, he said.

578 B *The tyrant like the owner of slaves*

Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

- C He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said, I gather that you are right.

Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only ; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil is the greatest.

Very true, he said.

- D Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon this subject.

What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves : from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves ; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Yes, that is the difference.

You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?

The real tyrant the real slave IX. 578 D

Yes ; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.

Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.

The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter 579 divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will—he will have to cajole his own servants.

Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.

And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?

His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound—he who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.

Very true, he said.

And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own person—the tyrannical man, I mean—whom you

just now decided to be the most miserable of all—will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.

Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.

Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?

Certainly.

He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?

Very true, he said.

580 Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.

No man of any sense will dispute your words.

Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical

The first trial, and the second IX. 580 B

contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your B opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow : there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.

The decision will be easily given, he replied ; they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston [the best] has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most C royal man and king over himself ; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State ?

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.

And shall I add, ' whether seen or unseen by gods and men ' ?

Let the words be added.

Then this, I said, will be our first proof ; and there is another, which may also have some weight. D

What is that ?

The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul : seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.

Of what nature ?

It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond ; also three desires and governing powers.

How do you mean ? he said.

There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another with which he is angry ; the third, E having many forms, has no special name, but is denoted by the general term 'appetitive', from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it ; 581 also money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money.

That is true, he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion ; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

I agree with you.

Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

B True.

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious—would the term be suitable?

Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame.

Far less.

'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, C another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

and three kinds of pleasure IX. 581 C

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men—lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?

Very true.

Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others : the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of learning D if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

True, he said.

And the lover of honour—what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?

Very true.

And are we to suppose,¹ I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure E of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that, he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or

¹ Reading with Grasere and Hermann *τί οἰώμεθα*, and omitting *οὐδέν*, which is not found in the best MSS.

582 *The philosopher the only judge of pleasures*

582 less honourable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless—how shall we know who speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?

There cannot be a better, he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted—or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted—the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

C Yes, very great.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

D His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?

The philosopher's pleasure preferred IX. 582 D

Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly.

Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgement is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Yes.

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Certainly.

If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?

Assuredly.

Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgement of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?

Clearly.

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges—

The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.

And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, 583 and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

The third trial

And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour ; who is nearer to himself than the money-maker.

Last comes the lover of gain?

Very true, he said.

- B Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict ; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the saviour : a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only ; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Yes, the greatest ; but will you explain yourself?

- C I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.

Proceed.

Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?

True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

There is.

A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either—that is what you mean?

Yes.

You remember what people say when they are sick?

What do they say?

- That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until
D they were ill.

Yes, I know, he said.

And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must

The greater or less reality of pleasure IX. 583 D

have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

I have.

And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes, he said ; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.

Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation E will be painful?

Doubtless, he said.

Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem.

But can that which is neither become both?

I should say not.

And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?

Yes.

But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest 584 and not motion, and in a mean between them?

Yes.

How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Impossible.

This then is an appearance only and not a reality ; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant ; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition?

That is the inference.

- B Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them : take as an example the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains ; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

- C Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

No.

Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort—they are reliefs of pain.

That is true.

And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Yes.

- D Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Let me hear.

You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

I should.

And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up ; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

To be sure, he said ; how can he think otherwise?

But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and E truly imagine, that he was descending?

No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state ; so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain 585 which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure ; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white—can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed ; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.

Look at the matter thus :—Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?

B

Yes.

And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?

True.

And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?

Clearly, from that which has more.

What classes of things have a greater share of pure exist-

585B *The comparative reality of body and mind;*

ence in your judgement—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way :—Which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures ; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Necessarily.

D Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Far less.

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes.

What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which

and of their respective pleasures IX. 585 D

is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true E pleasure ; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

Unquestionably.

Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are 586 always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean ; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world ; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they B kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron ; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.

Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which exaggerates both C light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves ; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth.

Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.

And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?

True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

The pleasures of the king and the tyrant IX. 587

Yes.

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Clearly.

And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance? B

Yes.

And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Yes.

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?

Certainly.

But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?

Inevitably.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious : now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point C beyond the spurious ; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch ; the democrat was in the middle?

Yes.

And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?

587 c *The interval between king and tyrant*

He will.

And the oligarch is third from the royal ; since we count
D as one royal and aristocratical?

Yes, he is third.

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the
space of a number which is three times three?

Manifestly.

The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the
number of length will be a plane figure.

Certainly.

And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid,
there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by
which the tyrant is parted from the king.

Yes ; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

Or if some person begins at the other end and measures
E the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in
truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is
completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant
more painfully by this same interval.

What a wonderful calculation ! And how enormous is the
588 distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to
pleasure and pain !

Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly
concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with
days and nights and months and years.¹

Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure
to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater
in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?

Immeasurably greater.

¹ 729 nearly equals the number of days and nights in the year.

The beast, the lion and the man IX. 588 B

Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the B argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither : Was not some one saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Yes, that was said.

Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Of what sort?

C

An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

There are said to have been such unions.

Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.

You suppose marvellous powers in the artist ; but, as D language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.

Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

That, he said, is an easier task ; and I have made them as you say.

And now join them, and let the three grow into one.

That has been accomplished.

Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature.

I have done so, he said.

And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and 589 the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.

Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the B entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.

And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, C honour, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Shall the beast or the man be master? IX. 589 c

Yes, from every point of view.

Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or D rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying Yes—can he now?

Not if he has any regard for my opinion.

But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if F he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that 590 which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.'

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse—I will answer for him.

Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows B and gains strength?

Yes.

, And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax

and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and; for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

C True, he said.

And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.

Such appears to be the reason.

And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.

True, he said.

E And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by
591 cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts

a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.

Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.

From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized ; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.

Certainly, he said.

To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?

Clearly, he said.

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter ; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to temper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?

Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.

And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also observe ; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

Certainly not, he said.

E He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want ; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.

Very true.

And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy 592 such honours as he deems likely to make him a better man ; but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.

By the dog of Egypt, he will ! in the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine call.

I understand ; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only ; B for I do not believe that there is such a one anywhere on earth?

In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order.¹ But whether such a one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter ; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.

I think so, he said.

¹ Or, 'take up his abode there.'

BOOK X

OF the many excellences which I perceive in the order of Steph.
our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me 595
better than the rule about poetry.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought
not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that
the parts of the soul have been distinguished. B

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my
words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative
tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical
imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers,
and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only
antidote to them.

Explain the purport of your remark.

Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my
earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even
now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great
captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic C
company; but a man is not to be revered more than
the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not
know.

A likely thing, then, that I should know.

596 Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.

Very true, he said ; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you inquire yourself?

Well then, shall we begin the inquiry in our usual manner :
Whenever a number of individuals have a common name,
we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form :—
do you understand me?

I do.

Let us take any common instance ; there are beds and B tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not?

Yes.

But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea—that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves : how could he?

Impossible.

And there is another artist,—I should like to know what you would say of him.

C Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

What an extraordinary man !

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other

things—the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

He must be a wizard and no mistake.

D

Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?

What way?

An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.

Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only.

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another—a creator of appearances, is he not?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed.

And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying 597 that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence;

and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.

At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.

No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.

B No wonder.

Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we inquire who this imitator is?

If you please.

Well then, here are three beds : one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker?

No.

There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Yes.

And the work of the painter is a third?

Yes.

Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them : God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?

Yes, there are three of them.

C God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only ; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.

Why is that?

Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.

Very true, he said.

God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of D a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.

So we believe.

Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things.

And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the E imitator of that which the others make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Certainly, he said.

And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?

That appears to be so.

Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?—I would like to know whether he may be 598 thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

Now let me ask you another question : Which is the art of painting designed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

[Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example : A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts ; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.]

Certainly.

And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most true.

A question to be asked of Homer X. 598 D

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?

The question, he said, should by all means be considered.

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him? B

I should say not.

The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit.

Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only inci- C

dentally refer : we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand ; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest D and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. ' Friend Homer,' then we say to him, ' if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good E order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others ; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us ; but what city has anything to say about you ? ' Is there any city which he might name ?

I think not, said Glaucon ; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

600 Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive ?

There is not.

Or is there any invention ¹ of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him ?

¹ Omitting *els.*

There is absolutely nothing of the kind.

But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed down B to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he C was alive?

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries : ‘ You will never be able to manage either your own house D or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education ’—and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay

E at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.

Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? [The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures.]

Quite so.

In like manner the poet with his words and phrases¹ may be said to lay on the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony, and rhythm, he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.

Yes, he said.

They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly.

Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image

¹ Or, 'with his nouns and verbs.'

Using, making and imitating X. 601 B

knows nothing of true existence ; he knows appearances only. ¹

Am I not right? C

Yes.

Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Proceed.

Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

Yes.

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Certainly.

But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them ; only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form.

Most true.

And may we not say the same of all things?

What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all D things : one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

Yes.

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience : of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use ; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer ; he will tell him how he ought :

601 E *Imitation requires no knowledge*

E to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

Of course.

The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

True.

The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him
602 and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

True.

But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

I suppose not.

The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Nay, very much the reverse.

B And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

Just so.

Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

Very true.

And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Most true.

E And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

True.

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

Very true.

603 Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

No doubt.

This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

Exactly.

The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

Very true.

And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Probably the same would be true of poetry.

Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

By all means.

We may state the question thus :—Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

No, there is nothing else.

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

And we were right, he said.

Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied. E

What was the omission?

Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Yes.

But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?

The latter, he said, is the truer statement.

- 604 Tell me : will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?

It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?

True.

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?

True.

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

Certainly.

One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

How do you mean?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil ; and [nothing is gained by impatience ; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

What is most required? he asked.

That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best ; not, like children who have had

a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, D banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

Yes, I said ; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

Clearly.

And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?

Indeed, we may.

And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—E furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Certainly.

605

Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul ; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?

Clearly.

And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways : first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him ; and he is also like him in being con- B ,
cerned with an inferior part of the soul ; and therefore we

shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.¹

Exactly.

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Yes, of course I know.

But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

Very true, he said.

¹ Reading *εἰδωλοποιούντα . . . ἀφεστῶτα.*

Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view. 606

What point of view?

If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets ;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's ; and B the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles ; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

How very true !

C

And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness ;—the case of pity is repeated ;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained

by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

Quite true, he said.

D And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them, poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.

I cannot deny it.

E Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should
607 take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

That is most true, he said.

B And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry,

let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgement in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described ; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry ; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of ' the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one ' mighty in the vain talk of fools,' and ' the mob of sages circumvening Zeus,' and the ' subtle thinkers who are beggars after all ' ; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms ; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

D

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she makes a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly.

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf : let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit ; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.

If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education 608 of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest ; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains ; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware¹ that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth ; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the B city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whereas a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

Yes, he said ; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been.

C And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

¹ Or, if we accept Madvig's ingenious but unnecessary emendation *ῥόσμεθα*, 'At all events we will sing, that' &c.

The immortality of the soul X. 608 C

Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of threescore years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather 'nothing', he replied.

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole? D

Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it.

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.

Listen then.

I am attending.

'There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes, he replied.

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

Yes.

And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said.

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each ; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will ; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed.

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review : unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and there do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body : The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body ; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes.

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied.

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, E whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body ; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, 610 brought on by this ; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection—this we shall absolutely deny?

Very true.

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that.

Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other B disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body ; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is C not to be affirmed by any man.

And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the

souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take
D this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth,
E and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye, and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.

True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly be.

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether
611 inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will

they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.

Very true.

But this we cannot believe—reason will not allow us—any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be B full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

What do you mean? he said.

The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?

Certainly not.

Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs ; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion C with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity ; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image D can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.

Where then?

E At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine ; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up
612 around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are termed : then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.

True, he replied.

And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the
B argument ; ¹ we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod ; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which
C justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument ?

¹ Reading ἀπελυσάμεθα.

What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just : for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember? D

I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us¹; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.

The demand, he said, is just. E

In the first place, I said—and this is the first thing which you will have to give back—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.

Granted.

And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?

True.

And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive 613 from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Certainly.

Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even

¹ Reading ἡμῶν.

when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death : for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Yes, he said ; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by Him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?

Certainly.

Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?

That is my conviction.

And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal : they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears dragging on their shoulders, and without a crown ; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just ; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.

True.

And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be ; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will ; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I

The rewards in the life to come X. 613 D

say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen ; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term E them ; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?

Certainly, he said, what you say is true.

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are 614 bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.

Yes, he said ; and they are fair and lasting.

And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Speak, he said ; there are few things which I would more B gladly hear.

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale ; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er, the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told

them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great
C company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgement on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near,
D and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And
E arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously inquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrow-
615 ing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above

were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell ; but the sum was this :—He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold ; or once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers¹, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er : he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was : 'He comes not hither and will never come. And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants ; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals : they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the

¹ Reading *αὐτόχειρας*.

mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend ; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the
 616 sound, seized and carried them off ; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were^e their crimes, and that¹ they were being taken away to be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice ; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

B Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer ; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the
 C midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above : for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the undergirders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl

¹ Reading καὶ ὅτι.

The spindle and whorl of Necessity X. 616C

is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth ; and D the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another ; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This E is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth ; then comes the eighth ; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest ; the eighth [or moon] coloured by the reflected light of the seventh ; the 617 second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another, and yellower than the preceding ; the third [Venus] has the whitest light ; the fourth [Mars] is reddish ; the sixth [Jupiter] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion ; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth ; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together ; third in B swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth ; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity ; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony ; and round about, at equal

C intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other. .

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, E but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her, he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—God is justified.' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had 618 obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There

were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary ; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors ; B and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise ; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health ; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state ; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind C of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue ; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil conse- D quences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined ; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these

qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and
which is the worse ; and so he will choose, giving the name
F of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and
good to the life which will make his soul more just ; all else
he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is
619 the best choice both in life and after death. A man must
take with him into the world below an adamant faith in
truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the
desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming
upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable
wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself ; but let him
know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on
either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all
B that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger from the
other world this was what the prophet said at the time :
' Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live
diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable
existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and
let not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who
had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the
greatest tyranny ; his mind having been darkened by folly
and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter
before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he
C was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children.
But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the
lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice,
forgetting the proclamation of the prophet ; for, instead of
throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused
chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself.
Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in

a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And D it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number E of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous 620 life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyra choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth ¹ lot chose the life of a lion, B and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgement about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle

¹ Reading *είκοστήν*.

came the lot of Atalanta ; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation : and after her
C there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts ; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares ; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody
D else ; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian
E of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice : this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each ; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made
621 them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity ; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees

and verdure ; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold ; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary ; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the B night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say ; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word C spoken ; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we D receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

INDEX

Absolute beauty, 5. 476, 479;
6. 494 A, 501 B, 507 B;—good,
ib. 507 B; 7. 540 A;—justice, 5.
479; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E;—
swiftness and slowness, 7. 529
D;—temperance, 6. 501 B;—
unity, 7. 524 E, 525 E;—and
the many, 6. 507.

Achaean, 3. 389 E, 390 E,
393 A, D, 394 A.

Achilles, 3. 388 A, 390 E to
391 B.

Actors, cannot perform both
tragic and comic parts, 3.
395 A.

Ademantus, 1. 327 C; his
genius, 2. 368 A; distinguished
at the battle of Megara, *ibid.*;
takes up the discourse, *ib.* 362
D, 368 E, 376 D; 4. 419 A; 6.
487 A; 8. 548 E; urges So-
crates to speak in detail about
the community of women and
children, 5. 449.

Adrasteia, 5. 451 A.

Adultery, 5. 461 A.

Aeschylus quoted:—

S. c. T. 451, 8. 550 C;

„ 592, 2. 361 B, E;

„ 593, *ib.* 362 A;

Niobe, *fr.* 146, 3. 391 E;

„ *fr.* 151, 2. 380 A;

Xanthians, *fr.* 159, *ib.*
381 D;

Fab. *incert.* 266, *ib.* 383 B;

„ „ 326, 8. 563 C.

Affinity, degrees of, 5. 461.

Agamemnon, his dream, 2.
383 A; 3. 390 E; 392 E *fol.*;
7. 522 D; 10. 620 B.

Age, for active life, 7. 539,
540;—for marriage, 5. 460;—
for philosophy, 7. 539.

Agent and patient, 4. 437.

Ajax, reward of his bravery,
5. 468 D; his soul turns into
a lion, 10. 620 B.

Alcinous, 'tales of,' 10. 614 B.

Allegory, 2. 378 E.

Ambition, disgraceful, 1. 347
B (*cp.* 7. 520 D); characteristic
of the timocratic state and
man, 8. 545, 548, 550 B, 553 E;
passes into avarice, *ib.* 553 E;
assigned to the passionate
element of the soul, 9. 581 A;—
ambitious men, 5. 475 A; 6.
485 B.

Ameles, 10. 621 A, C.

Amusement, 4. 425 A; 7.
537 A.

Anacharsis, 600 A.

Analogy of the arts applied
to rulers, 1. 341; of the arts
and justice, *ib.* 349; of men
and animals, 2. 375; 5. 459.

Anapaestic rhythms, 3. 400 B.

Anarchy, begins in music, 4.
424 E; in democracies, 8. 562 D.

Anger, 4. 440.

Animals, liberty enjoyed by,
in a democracy, 8. 562 E, 563 C;

choose their destiny in the next world, 10. 620 D.

Aphroditè, 3. 390 C.

Apollo, 2. 383 A; 3. 391 A, 394 A, 399 E, 408 C; the God of Delphi, 4. 427 A.

Appetites. *See* Desire.

Appetitive element of the soul, 4. 439 [cp. Tim. 70 E]; must be subordinate to reason and passion, 4. 442 A; 9. 571 D; may be described as the love of gain, 9. 581 A.

Arcadia, 8. 565 D.

Archilochus, quoted, 2. 365 C.

Architecture. *See* Art.

Ardiaeus, 10. 615 C, E.

Ares and Aphroditè, 3. 390 C.

Argument, misleading nature of Socratic, 6. 487; youthful love of, 7. 539.

Arion, 5. 453 E.

Aristocracy (i.e. the ideal state or government of the best), 4. 445 C (cp. 8. 544 E, 545 D, and *see* State); mode of its decline, 8. 546;—the aristocratical man, 7. 541 B; 8. 544 E (*see* Guardians, Philosopher, Ruler):—(in the ordinary sense of the word), 1. 338 D. Cp. Constitution.

Arithmetic, must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 522-6; use of, in tactics, 522 D; in forming ideas, ib. 524 foll. (cp. 10. 602); spirit in which it should be pursued, 7. 525 D; common notions about, mistaken, ib. E; an excellent instrument of education, ib. 526. Cp. Mathematics.

Arms, throwing away of, disgraceful, 5. 468 A; arms of Hellenes not to be offered as trophies in the temples, ib. 470 A; and madman, 1. 331.

Army needed in a state, 2. 374.

Art, influence of, on character, 3. 400 foll.;—art of building, ib. 401 A; 4. 438 C; carpentry, 4. 428 C; calculation, 7. 524, 526 B; 10. 602; cookery, 1. 332 C; dyeing, 4. 429 D; embroidery, 3. 401 A; exchange, 2. 369 C; measurement, 10. 602; money-making, 1. 330; 8. 556; payment, 1. 346; tactics, 7. 522 E, 525 B; weaving, 3. 401 A; 5. 455 D; weighing, 10. 602 D;—the arts exercised for the good of their subject, 1. 342, 345-7; interested in their own perfection, 1. 342; differ according to their functions, ib. 346; full of grace, 3. 401 A; must be subject to a censorship, ib. B; causes of the deterioration of, 4. 421; employment of children in, 5. 467 A; ideals in, ib. 472 D; chiefly useful for practical purposes, 7. 533 A;—the arts and philosophy, 6. 495 E, 496 C (cp. 5. 475 D, 476 A);—the handicraft arts a reproach, 9. 590 C;—the lesser arts (*τεχνυδρια*), 5. 475 D; (*τεχνία*), 6. 495 D;—three arts concerned with all things, 10. 601. *See also* Analogy.

Artisans, necessary in the

state, 2. 370; have no time to be ill, 3. 406 D.

Artist, does not work for his own benefit, 1. 346, 347; must imitate the good only, 3. 401 C; the Great, 10. 596.

Asclepiadae, 3. 405 D, 408 B; 10. 599 C.

Asclepius, son of Apollo, 3. 406 A, D, 407 E, 408 B, C; 10. 599 C.

Astronomy, must be studied by the rulers, 7. 527-30; spirit in which it should be pursued, *ib.* 529, 530.

Atalanta, 10. 620 B.

Athené, 2. 379 E.

Athenian confectionery, 3. 404 E.

Athletes, pay excessive attention to diet, 3. 404 A; sleep away their lives, *ib.*; become brutalized, *ib.* 410, 411 (cp. 7. 535 D);—the guardians athletes of war, 3. 403 E, 404 B; 4. 422; 7. 521 E; 8. 543.

Atridae, 3. 393 A.

Atropos, 10. 617 C; *ib.* 620 E.

Autolycus, 1. 334 A.

Auxiliaries, the young warriors of the state, 3. 414; compared to dogs, 2. 376; 4. 440 D; 5. 451 D; have silver mingled in their veins, 3. 415 A. Cp. Guardians.

Avarice, disgraceful, 1. 347 B; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 390 E; falsely imputed to Achilles and Asclepius, *ib.* 391 B, 408 C; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 A, 553.

Barbarians, regard nakedness as improper, 5. 452; natural enemies of the Hellenes, *ib.* 469 D, 470 C; forms of government among, 8. 544 D.

Beast, the great, 6. 493; the many-headed, 9. 588, 589; 'the wild beast within us,' *ib.* 571, 572.

Beautiful, the, and the good are one, 5. 452;—the many beautiful contrasted with absolute beauty, 6. 507 B.

Beauty as a means of education, 3. 401 foll.; absolute beauty, 5. 476, 479; 6. 494 A, 501 B, 507 B.

Becoming, the passage from, to being, 7. 518 D, 521 D, 525 D.

Beds, the figure of the three, 10. 596.

Bee-masters, 8. 564 C.

Being and not being, 5. 477; true being the object of the philosopher's desire, 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581, 582 C (cp. 5. 475 E; 7. 520 B, 525); being invariable, 9. 585 C.

Bendidea, 1. 354 A (cp. 327 A, B).

Bendis, 1. 327 A.

Bias, 1. 335 E.

Birds, breeding of, 5. 459.

Blest, Islands of the, 7. 519 C, 540 B.

Body, the, not self-sufficing, 1. 341 E; excessive care of, inimical to virtue, 3. 407 (cp. 9. 591 D); has less truth and reality than the soul, 9. 585 D;

—harmony of body and soul, 3. 402 D.

Body, and members, comparison of the state to, 5. 462 D, 464 B.

Boxing, 4. 422.

Brass (and iron) mingled by the God in the husbandmen and craftsmen, 3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A).

Breeding of animals, 5. 459.

Building, art of, 3. 401 A; 4. 438 C.

Burial of the guardians, 3. 414 A; 5. 465 E, 469 A; 7. 540 B.

Calculation, art of. Cp. Arithmetic.

Captain, parable of the deaf, 6. 488.

Carpentry, 4. 428 C.

Causes, final, argument from, applied to justice, 1. 352; 6. 491 E, 495 B.

Cave, the image of the, 7. 514 foll., 532 (cp. 539 E).

Censorship of fiction, 2. 377; 3. 386-91, 401 A, 408 C; 10. 595 foll.; of the arts, 3. 401.

Cephalus, father of Polemarchus, 1. 327 B; offers sacrifice, ib. 328 B, 331 D; his views on old age, ib. 328 E; on wealth, ib. 330 A foll.

Cephalus, 1. 330 B.

Cerberus, 9. 588 C.

Chance, in war, 5. 467 E; blamed by men for their misfortunes, 10. 619 C.

Character, differences of, in men, 1. 329 D; in women,

5. 456;—affected by the imitation of unworthy objects, 3. 395;—national character, 4. 435; great characters may be ruined by bad education, 6. 491 E, 495 B; 7. 519:—faults of character, 6. 503.

Charmantides, 1. 328 B.

Charondas, 10. 599 E.

Cheiron, 3. 391 C.

Children have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441 A; why under authority, 9. 590 E;—in the state, 3. 415; 5. 450 E, 457 foll.; 8. 543; must not hear improper stories, 2. 377; 3. 391 C; must be reared amid fair sights and sounds, 3. 401; must receive education even in their play, 4. 425 A; 7. 537 A; must learn to ride, 5. 467; must go with their fathers and mothers into war, 5. 467; 7. 537 A:—transfer of children from one class to another, 3. 415; 4. 423 D:—exposure of children allowed, 5. 460 C, 461 C:—illegitimate children, ib. 461 A.

Chimaera, two natures in one, 9. 588 C.

Chryses, 3. 392 E foll.

Citizens, the, of the best state, compared to a garrison of mercenaries, 4. 419 (cp. 8. 543); will from one family, 5. 462 foll. See Guardians.

City, situation of the, 3. 415:—the 'city of pigs', 2. 372:—the heavenly city, 9. 592:—Cities, most, divided between rich and poor, 4.

422 E; 8. 551 E:—the game of cities, 4. 422 E. Cp. Constitution, State.

Classes, in the state, should be kept distinct, 2. 374; 3. 397 E, 415 A; 4. 421, 433 A, 434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A, and Laws 8. 846 E).

Cleitophon, 1. 328 B; interposes on behalf of Thrasy-machus, ib. 340 A.

Cleverness, no match for honesty, 3. 409 c (cp. 10. 613 c); not often united with a steady character, 6. 503; needs an ideal direction, 7. 519.

Clotho, 10. 617 c, 620 E.

Colours, comparison of, 9. 585 A; contrast of, ib. 586 c;—indelible colours, 4. 429:—‘colours’ of poetry, 10. 601 A.

Comedy, cannot be allowed in the state, 3. 394; accustoms the mind to vulgarity, 10. 606;—same actors cannot act both tragedy and comedy, 3. 395.

Common life in the state, 5. 458, 464 foll.;—common meals of the guardians, 3. 416; common meals for women, 5. 458 D;—common property among the guardians, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464; 8. 543.

Community of women and children, 3. 416; 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543 A; of property, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464; 8. 543;—of feeling, 5. 464.

Confiscation of property, 8. 565.

Constitution, the aristocratic, is the ideal state sketched in bk. iv (cp. 8. 544 E, 545 D);—defective forms of constitution, 4. 445 B; 8. 544; aristocracy (in the ordinary sense), 1. 338 D; timocracy, 8. 545 foll.; oligarchy, ib. 550 foll., 554 E; democracy, ib. 555 foll., 557 D; tyranny, ib. 544 c, 562. Cp. Government, State.

Contentiousness, 8. 548.

Contracts, 8. 556 A.

Contradiction, nature of, 4. 436; 10. 602 E; power of, 5. 454 A.

Convention, justice a matter of, 2. 359 A.

Conversation, 6. 500 B.

Conversion of the soul, 7. 518, 521, 525.

Cookery, 1. 332 c.

Corpses, not to be spoiled, 5. 469.

Correlative and relative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll.; how corrected, 7. 524.

Corruptio optimi pessima, 6. 491.

Corruption, the, of youth, 6. 492 A.

Courage, required in the guardians, 2. 375; 3. 386, 413 E, 416 E; 4. 429; 6. 503 E; inconsistent with the fear of death, 3. 386; 6. 486 A;=the preservation of a right opinion about objects of fear, 4. 429, 442 B (cp. 2. 376); distinguished from fearlessness, 4. 430 B; one of the philosopher's virtues, 6. 486 A, 490 E,

494 A :—the courageous temper averse to intellectual toil, *ib.* 503 D.

Courtesans, 3. 404 D.

Covetousness, not found in the philosopher, 6. 485 E; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548, 553; = the appetitive element of the soul, 9. 581 A.

Cowardice in war, to be punished, 5. 468 A; not found in the philosopher, 6. 486 B.

Creophylus, 10. 600 B.

Crete, government of, generally applauded, 8. 544 C; a timocracy, *ib.* 545 B;—Cretans, naked exercises among, 5. 452 C; call their country 'mother-land', 9. 575 E;—Cretic rhythm, 3. 400 B.

Crimes, differently estimated by mankind, 1. 344 (cp. 348 D); causes of, 6. 491 E, 495 B; 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A.

Croesus, 2. 359 C; 8. 566 C.

Cronos, 2. 377 E.

Cunning man, the, no match for the virtuous, 3. 409 D.

Cycles, recurrence of, in nature, 8. 546 A.

Dactylic metre, 3. 400 C.

Daedalus, 7. 529 E.

Damon, 3. 400 B (cp. 4. 424 C).

Dancing (in education), 3. 412 B.

Day-dreams, 5. 458 A, 476 C.

Dead (in battle) not to be stripped, 5. 469; judgement of the dead, 10. 615.

Death, the approach of, brings no terror to the aged, 1. 330 E; the guardians must have no fear of, 3. 386, 387 (cp. 6. 486 C); preferable to slavery, 3. 387 A.

Debts, abolition of, 8. 565 E, 566 E.

Delphi, religion left to the god at, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E, 469 A; 7. 540 B).

Denagogues, 8. 564, 565.

Democracy, 1. 338 D; under the parable of the captain and the mutinous crew, 6. 488; democracy and philosophy, *ib.* 494, 500; the third form of imperfect state, 8. 544; detailed account of, *ib.* 555 foll.; characterized by freedom, *ib.* 557 B, 561–3; a 'bazaar of constitutions', *ib.* 557 D; the humours of democracy, *ib.* 561 E; elements contained in, *ib.* 564 :—democracy in animals, *ib.* 563 :—the democratical man, *ib.* 558, 559 foll., 561, 562; 9. 572; his place in regard to pleasure, 9. 587.

Desire, has a relaxing effect on the soul, 4. 430 A; the conflict of desire and reason, 4. 440;—the desires divided into simple and qualified, 4. 437 foll.; into necessary and unnecessary, 8. 559.

Destiny, the, of man in his own power, 10. 617 E.

Dialectic, the most difficult branch of philosophy, 6. 498; objects of, *ib.* 511; 7. 537 D; proceeds by a double method,

6. 511; compared to sight, 7. 532 A; capable of attaining to the idea of good, *ibid.*; gives firmness to hypotheses, *ib.* 533; the coping stone of the sciences, *ib.* 534; must be studied by the rulers, *ib.* 537; dangers of the study, *ibid.*; years to be spent in, *ib.* 539; distinguished from eristic, *ib.* D (cp. 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A):—the dialectician has a conception of essence, 7. 534.

Dice (*κύβοι*), 2. 374 C; 10. 604 C.

Diet, 3. 404; 8. 559 C.

Differences, accidental and essential, 5. 454.

Diomede, 3. 389 E; 'necessity of,' (proverb), 6. 493 D.

Dionysiac festival, 5. 475 D.

Discord, causes of, 5. 462; 8. 547 A, 556 E; the ruin of states, 5. 462; distinguished from war, *ib.* 470.

Discourse, love of, 1. 328 A; 5. 450 B; increases in old age, 1. 328 D; pleasure of, in the other world, 6. 498 D.

Disease, origin of, 3. 404; the right treatment of, *ib.* 405 foll.; the physician must have experience of, in his own person, *ib.* 408; disease and vice compared, 4. 444; 10. 609 foll.; inherent in everything, 10. 609.

Dishonesty, thought more profitable than honesty, 2. 364 A.

Dithyrambic poetry, 3. 394 B.

Division of labour, 2. 370,

374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E, 433 A, 435 A, 441 E, 443, 453 B; a part of justice, 4. 433, 435 A, 441 E (cp. *supra* 1. 332, 349, '350);—of lands, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, 8. 565 E, 566 E.

Doctors. Cp. Physician.

Dog, Socrates' oath by the, 3. 399 E; 8. 567 E; 9. 592;—dogs are philosophers, 2. 376; guardians as watch-dogs of the state, *ibid.*; 4. 440 D; 5. 451 D; breeding of dogs, 5. 459.

Dorian harmony, 3. 399 A.

Draughts, 1. 333 A; 2. 374 C; 6. 487 C.

Dreams, 9. 571, 572, 574 E.

Drones, the, 8. 552, 554 C, 555 E, 559 C, 564 B, 567 E; 9. 573 A.

Drunkenness, in heaven, 2. 363 D; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 398 E, 403 E;—the drunken man apt to be tyrannical, 8. 573 C.

Dyeing, 4. 429 D.

Eating, pleasure of, 8. 559.

Education, divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the soul, 2. 376 E, 403 (*see* *Gymnastic and Music*); both really designed for the soul, 3. 410:—use of fiction in, 2, 377 foll.; 3. 391; the poets bad educators, 2. 377; 3. 391, 392, 408 B; 10. 600, 606 E, 607 B; must be simple, 3. 397, 404 E; melody in, *ib.* 398 foll.; mimetic art in, *ib.*

399; importance of good surroundings, *ib.* 401; influence of, on manners. 4. 424, 425; innovation in, dangerous, *ib.*; early, should be given through amusement, *ib.* 425 A; 7. 536 E; ought to be the same for men and women, 5. 451 foll., 466; dangerous when ill-directed, 6. 491; not a process of acquisition, but the use of powers already existing in us, 7. 518; not to be compulsory, *ib.* 537 A;—education of the guardians, 2. 376 foll.; 4. 429, 430; 7. 521 (cp. Guardians, Ruler);—the higher or philosophic education, 6. 498, 503 E, 504; 7. 514–37; age at which it should commence, 6. 498; 7. 537; ‘the longer way,’ 6. 504 (cp. 4. 435); ‘the prelude or preamble,’ 7. 532 E.

Egyptians, 4. 435 E.

Elder, the, to bear rule in state, 3. 412 B; to be over the the younger, 5. 465 A.

Embroidery, 3. 401 A.

Enchantments, used by mendicant prophets, 2. 364 B;—as tests for guardians, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A; 7. 539 E).

Ends, and excellences (*âperai*) of things, 1. 353;—of the soul, *ibid.*; things distinguished by their ends, 5. 478.

Endurance, must be inculcated on the young, 3. 390 c (cp. 10. 605 E).

Enemies, treatment of, 5. 469.

Epeus, 10. 620 c.

Epic poetry, a combination

of imitation and narration, 3. 394 B, 396 E;—epic poets, imitators in the highest degree, 10. 602 c.

Er, myth of, 10. 614 B foll.

Eriphyle, 9. 590 A.

Eristic, distinguished from dialectic, 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A; 7. 539 D.

Essence and the good, 6. 509; invariable, 9. 585;—essence of things, 6. 507 B; apprehended by the dialectician, 7. 534 B.

Eternity, 10. 608 D.

Eumolpus, 2. 363 D.

Eunuch, the riddle of the, 5. 479.

Euripides, a great tragedian, 8. 568 A; his maxims about tyrants, *ibid.*:—quoted, Troades, 1. 1169, *ibid.*

Eurypylus, 3. 405 E, 408 A.

Euthydemus, 1. 328 B.

Evil, God not the author of, 2. 364, 379, 380 A; 3. 391 E; the destructive element in the soul, 10. 609 foll. (cp. 4. 444):—justice exists even among the evil, 1. 351 foll.; their supposed prosperity, 2. 364; more numerous than the good, 3. 409 D. Cp. Injustice.

Excellence relative to use, 10. 601; excellences (*âperai*) and ends of things, 1. 353.

Exchange, 2. 369 c.

Existence, a participation in essence, 9. 585.

Experience, the criterion of true and false pleasures, 9. 582.

Expiation of guilt, 2. 364.

Eye of the soul, 7. 518 D, 527 E, 533 D, 540 A;—the soul like the eye, 6. 508; 7. 518:—Eyes, the, in relation to sight, 6. 507 (cp. Sight).

Fact and ideal, 5. 472, 473.

Faculties, how different, 5. 477;—faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E; 7. 533 E.

Faith [or Persuasion], one of the faculties of the soul, 6. 511 D; 7. 533 E.

Falsehood, alien to the nature of God, 2. 382; a medicine, only to be used by the state, *ibid.*; 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D; hateful to the philosopher, 6. 486, 490.

Family life in the state, 5. 449;—families in the state, *ib.* 461;—family and state, *ib.* 463;—cares of family life, *ib.* 465 C.

Fates, the, 10. 617, 620 E.

Fear, a solvent of the soul, 4. 430 A; fear and shame, 5. 465 A.

Fearlessness, distinguished from courage, 4. 430 B.

Feeling, community of, in the state, 5. 464.

Fiction in education, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391; censorship of, necessary, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 386–91, 401 A, 408 C; 10. 595 foll.; not to represent sorrow, 3. 387 foll. (cp. 10. 604); representing intemperance to be discarded, 3. 390;—stories about the gods, not to be received, 2. 378 foll.;

3. 388 foll., 408 C (cp. Hades, World below).

Final causes. *See* Causes.

Flattery, of the multitude, 4. 426 (cp. 9. 590 B).

Flute, the, to be rejected, 3. 399;—flute players and flute makers, *ib.* D; 10. 601.

Folly, an inanition (κένωσις) of the soul, 9. 585 A.

Food, the condition of life, 2. 369 C.

Forgetfulness, a mark of an unphilosophical nature, 6. 486 D, 490 E:—the plain of Forgetfulness (Lethe), 10. 621 A.

Freedom, the characteristic of democracy, 8. 557 B, 561–3.

Friend, the, must be as well as seem good, 1. 334, 335;—the friends of the tyrant, 8. 567 E; 9. 576.

Friendship, implies justice, 1. 351 foll.; in the state, 5. 462, 463.

Funeral of the guardians, 5. 465 E, 468 E; 7. 540 B;—corpses placed on the pyre on the twelfth day, 10. 614.

Future life, 3. 387; 10. 614 foll.; punishment of the wicked in, 2. 363; 10. 615. *See* Hades, World below.

Games, as a means of education, 4. 425 A (cp. 7. 537 A);—dice (κύβαι), 10. 604 C;—draughts (πτερεία), 1. 333 A; 2. 374 C; 6. 487 C;—city (πόλις), 4. 422 E:—glory gained by success in, 5. 465 D, 466 A; 10. 618 A (cp. 620 B).

General, the, ought to know arithmetic and geometry, 7. 522 D, 525 B, 526 D, 527 C.

Gentleness, characteristic of the philosopher, 2. 375, 376; 3. 410; 6. 486 C; usually inconsistent with spirit, 2. 375.

Geometry, must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 526 foll.; not for practical, *ib.* 527;—geometry of solids, *ib.* 528;—geometrical necessity, 5. 458 D;—geometrical notions apprehended by a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 C.

Giants, battles of the, 2. 378 B.

Gifts, given to victors, 3. 414; 5. 460, 468;—gifts of nature, 2. 370 A; 5. 455; 7. 535 A; may be perverted, 6. 491 E, 495 A; 7. 519.

Glaucus, 1. 327 A; 2. 368 A; takes up the discourse, 1. 347 A; 2. 372 C; 3. 398 B; 4. 417 D; 5. 450 A; 6. 506 D; 9. 576 B; anxious to contribute money for Socrates, 1. 337 E; the boldest of men, 2. 357 A; his genius, *ib.* 368 A; distinguished at the battle of Megara, *ibid.*; a musician, 3. 398 D; 7. 531 A; desirous that Socrates should discuss the subject of women and children, 5. 450 A; breeds dogs and birds, *ib.* 459 A; a lover, *ib.* 474 D (cp. 3. 402 E; 5. 458 E); not a dialectician, 7. 533; his contentiousness, 8. 548 E; not acquainted with the doctrine

of the immortality of the soul, 10. 608.

Glaucus, 10. 611 C.

Gluttony, 9. 586 A.

God, not the author of evil, 2. 364, 379, 380 A; 3. 391 E; never changes, 2. 380; will not lie, *ib.* 382; the maker of all things, 10. 598:—Gods, the, thought to favour the unjust, 2. 362 B, 364; supposed to accept the gifts of the wicked, *ib.* 365; believed to take no heed of human affairs, 2. 365; human ignorance of, 2. 365; disbelief in, 2. 365; stories of, not to be repeated, 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C; not to be represented grieving or laughing, 3. 388;—'gods who wander about at night in the disguise of strangers,' 2. 381 D;—the war of the gods and the giants, *ib.* 378 B.

Gold, mingled by the God in the auxiliaries, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E; 8. 547 A);—[and silver] not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E; 4. 419, 422 D; 5. 464 D (cp. 8. 543).

Good, the saving element, 10. 609:—the good = the beautiful, 5. 452; the good and pleasure, 6. 505, 509 A; the good superior to essence, *ib.* 509; the brightest and best of being, 7. 518 D;—absolute good, 6. 507 B; 7. 540 A;—the idea of good, 6. 505, 508; 7. 517, 534; is the highest knowledge, 6. 505; 7. 526 E; nature of, 6. 505, 506;—the child of the

good, *ib.* 506 E, 508:—good things least liable to change, 2. 381;—goods classified, *ib.* 357, 367 D;—the goods of life often a temptation, 6. 491 E, 495 A.

Good man, the, will disdain to imitate ignoble actions, 3. 396:—Good men, why they take office, 1. 347;=the wise, *ib.* 350; unfortunate, 2. 364; self-sufficient, 3. 387; will not give way to sorrow, *ibid.*; 10. 603 E; appear simple from their inexperience of evil, 3. 409 A; hate the tyrant, 8. 568 A; the friends of God and like Him, 10. 613.

Goods, community of. *See* Community.

Government, forms of, are they administered in the interest of the rulers? 1. 338 D, 343, 346; all based on a principle of justice, *ib.* 338 E; present forms in an evil condition, 6. 492 E, 496; no existing forms adapted to philosophy, *ib.* 497;—the four imperfect forms, 4. 445 B; 8. 544; succession of changes in states, 8. 545 foll.;—barbarian forms, *ib.* 544 D. Cp. Constitution, State.

Grace (*εὐσχημοσύνη*), the effect of good rhythm accompanying good style, 3. 400 D; all life and every art full of grace, *ib.* 401 A.

Greatness and smallness, 4. 438 B; 5. 479 B; 7. 523, 524; 9. 575 C; 10. 602 D, 605 C.

Grief. *See* Sorrow.

Guard, the tyrant's request for a, 8. 566 B, 567 E.

Guardians of the state, must be philosophers, 2. 376; 6. 484, 498, 501, 503 B; 7. 520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543: must be both spirited and gentle, 2. 375; 3. 410; 6. 503; must be tested by pleasures and pains, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A; 7. 539 E); have gold and silver mingled in their veins, 3. 415 A (cp. *ib.* 416 E; 8. 547 A); their happiness, 4. 419 foll.; 5. 465 E foll.; 6. 498 C; 7. 519 E; will be the class in the state which possesses wisdom, 4. 428; will form one family with the citizens, 5. 462–6; must preserve moderation, *ib.* 466 B; divided into auxiliaries and guardians proper, 3. 414 (cp. 8. 545 E; *and see* Auxiliaries, Rulers):—the guardians [*i.e.* the auxiliaries] must be courageous, 2. 375; 3. 386, 413 E, 416 E; 4. 429; 6. 503 E; must have no fear of death, 3. 386 (cp. 6. 486 C); not to weep, 3. 387 (cp. 10. 603 E); nor to be given to laughter, 3. 388; must be temperate, *ib.* 389 D; must not be avaricious, *ib.* 390 E; must only imitate noble characters and actions, *ib.* 395 foll., 402 E; must only learn the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies, and play lyre and harp, *ib.* 398, 399; must be sober, *ib.* 398 E, 403 E; must be reared amid

fair surroundings, *ib.* 401;
 athletes of war, *ib.* 403, 404 B;
 4. 422; 7. 521 E; 8. 543;
 must live according to rule,
 3. 404; will not go to law or
 have resort to medicine, *ib.*
 410 A; must have common
 meals and live a soldier's life, *ib.*
 416; will not require gold or
 silver or property of any kind,
ib. 417; 4. 419, 420 A, 422 D;
 5. 464 C; compared to a garri-
 son of mercenaries, 4. 419 (*cp.*
 8. 543); must go to war on
 horseback in their childhood,
 5. 467; 7. 537 A; regulations
 for their conduct in war, 5. 467-
 71 :—female guardians, *ib.* 456,
 458, 468; 7. 540 C (*cp.* *Women*).

Gyges, 2. 359 C; 10. 612 B.

Gymnastic, supposed to be
 only for the body, 2. 376 E;
 3. 403; 7. 521; really de-
 signed for the improvement of
 the soul, 3. 410; like music,
 should be continued throughout
 life, *ib.* 403 C; effect of exces-
 sive, *ib.* 404, 410; 7. 537 B;
 should be simple, 3. 404, 410 A;
 the ancient forms of, to be re-
 tained, 4. 424; must co-
 operate with music in creating
 a harmony of the soul, *ib.*
 441 E; suitable to women, 5.
 452-7; ought to be com-
 bined with intellectual pursuits,
 7. 535 D; time to be spent in,
ib. 537.

Habit and virtue, 7. 518 E;
 10. 619 D.

Hades, tales about the terrors

of, 1. 330 D; 2. 366 A; such
 tales not to be heeded, 3. 386 B;
 —the place of punishment, 2.
 363; 10. 614 foll.; Musaeus'
 account of the good and bad
 in, 2. 363;—the journey to, 10.
 614; helmet of, 10. 612 B. *Cp.*
World below.

Handicraft arts, a reproach,
 9. 590.

Happiness of the unjust, 1.
 354; 2. 364; 3. 392 B (*cp.* 8.
 545 A);—of the guardians, 4.
 419 foll.; 5. 465 E foll.; 6. 498
 C; 7. 519 E;—of Olympic vic-
 tors, 5. 465 D, 466 A; 10. 618
 A;—of the tyrant, 9. 576 foll.,
 587;—the greatest happiness
 awarded to the most just, *ib.*
 580 foll.

Harmonies, the more complex
 to be rejected, 3. 397 foll.;—
 the Lydian harmony, *ib.* 398;
 Ionian, *ib.* E; Dorian and
 Phrygian alone to be accepted,
ib. 399.

Harmony, akin to virtue, 3.
 401 A (*cp.* 7. 522 A);—science
 of, must be acquired by the
 rulers, 7. 531 (*cp.* *Music*);—
 harmony of soul and body, 3.
 402 D;—harmony of the soul,
 effected by temperance, 4. 430,
 441 E, 442 D, 443 (*cp.* 9. 591 D);
 harmony in the acquisition of
 wealth, 9. 591 E.

Harp, the, (*κιθάρα*), allowed,
 3. 399.

Health and justice compared,
 4. 444; pleasure of health, 9.
 583 C; secondary to virtue, *ib.*
 591 D.

Hearing, 5. 477 E; composed of two elements, and not requiring third, 6. 507 C.

Heaven, the, the fairest of visible things, 7. 529 D; the motions of, not eternal, *ib.* 530 A.

Heaviness, 5. 479; 7. 524 A.

Hector, 3. 391 B.

Helen, 9. 586 C.

Hellenes characterized by the love of knowledge, 4. 435 E; did not originally strip in the gymnasia, 5. 452 D; not to be enslaved by Hellenes, *ib.* 469 B, C; united by ties of blood, *ib.* 470 C; not to devastate Hellas, *ib.* 470 A foll., 471 A foll.; Hellenes and barbarians are strangers, *ib.* 469 D, 470 C.

Hellespont, 3. 404 C.

Hephaestus, 2. 378 D; 3. 389 A, 390 C.

Heracleitus, the 'sun of', 6. 498 B.

Herè, 2. 378 D, 381 D; 3. 390 B.

Hermes, 10. 617 A.

Herodicus, 3. 406 A foll.

Heroes, not to lament, 3. 387, 388; 10. 603-6; to be rewarded, 5. 468; after death, *ibid.*

Heroic rhythm, 3. 400 C.

Hesiod, his rewards of justice, 2. 363 B; 10. 612 A; his stories improper for youth, 2. 377 D; his classification of the races, 8. 547 A; a wandering rhapsode, 10. 600 D:—

Quoted:—

Theogony,

ll. 154, 459, 2. 377 E.

Works and Days,

l. 40, 5. 466 B.

l. 109, 8. 546 E.

l. 122, 5. 468 E.

l. 233, 2. 363 B.

l. 287, *ib.* 364 D.

Fragm. 117, 3. 390 E.

Hirelings, required in the state, 2. 371 E.

Homer, supports the theory that justice is a thief, 1. 334 B; his rewards of justice, 2. 363 B; 10. 612 A; his stories not approved for youth, 2. 377 D foll. (cp. 10. 595); his mode of narration, 3. 393 A foll.; feeds his heroes on campaigners' fare, *ib.* 404 C; Socrates' feeling of reverence for him, 10. 595 C, 607 (cp. 3. 391 A); the captain and teacher of the tragic poets, 10. 595 B, 598 D, E; not a legislator, *ib.* 599 E; or a general, *ib.* 600 A; or inventor, *ibid.*; or teacher, *ibid.*; no educator, *ib.* 600, 606 E, 607 B; not much esteemed in his lifetime, *ib.* 600 B foll.; went about as a rhapsode, *ibid.* Passages quoted or referred to:—

Iliad i.

l. 11 foll., 3. 392 E foll.

l. 131, 6. 501 B.

l. 225, 3. 389 E.

l. 590 foll., 2. 378 D.

l. 599 foll., 3. 389 A.

Iliad ii.

l. 623, 6. 501 C.

Iliad iii.

l. 8, 3. 389 E.

Iliad iv.

- l. 69 foll., 2. 379 E.
- l. 218, 3. 408 A.
- l. 412, ib. 389 E.
- l. 431, ibid.

Iliad v.

- l. 845, 10. 612 B.

Iliad vii.

- l. 321, 5. 468 D.

Iliad viii.

- l. 162, ibid.

Iliad ix.

- l. 497 foll., 2. 364 D.
- l. 513 foll., 3. 390 E.

Iliad xi.

- l. 576, ib. 405 E.
- l. 624, ibid.
- l. 844, ib. 408 A.

Iliad xii.

- l. 311, 5. 468 E.

Iliad xiv.

- l. 294 foll., 3. 390 C.

Iliad xvi.

- l. 433, ib. 388 C.
- l. 776, 8. 566 D.
- l. 856 foll., 3. 386 E.

Iliad xviii.

- l. 23 foll., ib. 388 A.
- l. 54, ib. B.

Iliad xix.

- l. 278 foll., ib. 390 E.

Iliad xx.

- l. 4 foll., 2. 379 E.
- l. 64 foll., 3. 386 C.

Iliad xxi.

- l. 222 foll., ib. 391 B.

Iliad xxii.

- ll. 15, 20, ib. A.
- l. 168 foll., ib. 388 C.
- l. 362 foll., ib. 386 E.
- l. 414, ib. 388 B.

Iliad xxiii.

- l. 100 foll., ib. 387 A.
- l. 103 foll., ib. 386 D.
- l. 151, ib. 391 B.
- l. 175, ibid.

Iliad xxiv.

- l. 10 foll., ib. 388 A.
- l. 527, 2. 379 D.

Odyssey i.

- l. 351 foll., 4. 424 D.

Odyssey viii.

- l. 266 foll., 3. 390 D.

Odyssey ix.

- l. 9 foll., ib. B.
- l. 91 foll., 8. 560 C.

Odyssey x.

- l. 495, 3. 386 E.

Odyssey xi.

- l. 489 foll., ib. C ; 7. 516 D.

Odyssey xii.

- l. 342, 2. 390 B.

Odyssey xvii.

- l. 383 foll., ib. 389 D.
- l. 485 foll., 2. 381 D.

Odyssey xix.

- l. 109 foll., ib. 363 B.
- l. 395, 1. 334 B.

Odyssey xx.

- l. 17, 3. 390 D ; 4. 441 B.

Odyssey xxiv.

- l. 6, 3. 387 A.
- l. 40, 8. 566 D.

Homer, allusions to, 1. 328 E ;

2. 381 D ; 3. 390 E ; 8. 544 D.

Homeridae, 10. 599 E.

Honest man, the, a match
for the rogue, 3. 409 C (cp. 10.
613 C).

Honesty, fostered by the
possession of wealth, 1. 331 A ;
thought unprofitable, 2. 364 A ;
3. 392 B.

Honour, pleasures enjoyed by the lover of, 9. 581 c, 586 E :—the 'government of honour', *see* Timocracy.

Hope, in old age (Pindar), 1. 331 A.

Household cares, 5. 465 c.

Human interests, unimportance of, 10. 604 B (cp. 6. 486 A); —life, full of evils, 2. 379 c; shortness of, 10. 608 D; —nature, incapable of doing many things well, 3. 395 B; —sacrifices, 8. 565 D.

Hunger, 4. 437 E, 439; 9. 585 A.

Hymns; to the gods, allowed in the State, 10. 607 A; —marriage hymns, 5. 459 E.

Hypothesis, in mathematics and in the intellectual world, 6. 510; in the sciences, 7. 533.

Iambic measure, 3. 400 c.

Idea of good, the source of truth, 6. 508 (cp. 505); a cause like the sun, *ib.* 508; 7. 516, 517; must be apprehended by the lover of knowledge, 7. 534; —ideas and phenomena, 5. 476; 6. 507; —ideas and hypotheses, 6. 510; —absolute ideas, 5. 476; origin of abstract ideas, 7. 523; nature of, 10. 596; singleness of, *ib.* 597.

Ideal state, is it possible? 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 (cp. 7. 520); how to be commenced, 6. 501; 7. 540 :—ideals, value of, 5. 472. *See* City, Constitution, Education, Guardians, Rulers, &c.

Ignorance, nature of, 5. 477, 478; 9. 585.

Iliad, the style of, illustrated, 3. 392 E foll.; mentioned, *ib.* 393 A. Cp. Homer, *Odyssey*.

Illegitimate children, 5. 461 A.

Illusions of sight, 7. 523; 10. 602.

Images (i.e. reflections of visible objects), 6. 510; 10. 596.

Imitation in style, 3. 393, 394; 10. 596 foll., 600 foll.; affects character, 3. 395; thrice removed from truth, 10. 596, 597, 598, 602 B; concerned with the weaker part of the soul, *ib.* 604.

Imitative poetry, 10. 595; arts, inferior, *ib.* 605.

Imitators, ignorant, 10. 602.

Immortality, proof of, 10. 608 foll. (cp. 6. 498 c, and *see* Soul).

Impatience, 10. 604 c.

Inanitions (*κενώσεις*) of body and soul, 9. 585 A.

Incantations used by mendicant prophets, 2. 364 B; in medicine, 4. 426 A.

Income Tax, 1. 343 D.

Individual, inferior types of the, 8. 545; individual and state, 2. 368; 4. 434, 441; 5. 462; 8. 544; 9. 577 B.

Infants have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441.

Informers, 9. 575 B.

Injustice, advantage of, 1. 343; defined by Thrasymachus as discretion, *ib.* 348 D; injustice and vice, *ibid.*; suicidal

to states and individuals, *ib.* 351 E; in perfection, 2. 360; eulogists of, *ib.* 361, 366, 367; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A; 9. 588); only blamed by those who have not the power to be unjust, 2. 366 C; in the state, 4. 434; = anarchy in the soul, *ib.* 444 B; brings no profit, 9. 589, 590; 10. 613.

Innovation in education dangerous, 4. 424. *See* Gymnastic, Music.

Intellect, objects of, classified, 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476); relation of the intellect and the good, 6. 508.

Intellectual world, divisions of, 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517; compared to the visible, 6. 508, 509; 7. 532 A.

Interest, sometimes irrecoverable by law, 8. 556 A.

Invalids, 3. 406, 407; 4. 425, 426.

Ionian harmony, 3. 399 A.

Iron. *See* Brass.

Ismenias, 1. 336 A.

Judge, the good, 3. 409.

Judgement, the final, 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades.

Just man, the, at a disadvantage compared with the unjust, 1. 343; is happy, *ib.* 354; attains harmony in his soul, 4. 443 E; proclaimed the happiest, 9. 580 foll.; — the friend of the gods, 10. 613; — just and unjust are at heart the same (Glaucón), 3. 360.

Justice, = to speak the truth

and pay one's debts, 1. 331 foll.; = the interest of the stronger, *ib.* 338; 2. 367; = honour among thieves, 1. 352; = the excellence of the soul, *ib.* 353: — the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies, *ib.* 332 foll., 336; is a thief, *ib.* 334; the proper virtue of man, *ib.* 335; 'sublime simplicity,' *ib.* 348; does not aim at excess, *ib.* 349; identical with wisdom and virtue, *ib.* 351; a principle of harmony, *ibid.* (cp. 9. 591 D); in the highest class of goods, 2. 357, 367 D; the union of wisdom, temperance, and courage, 4. 433; a division of labour, *ibid.* foll. (cp. 1. 332, 349, 350): — nature and origin of, 2. 358, 359; conventional, *ib.* 359 A; praised for its consequences only (Ademantus), *ib.* 362 E, 366; a matter of appearance, *ib.* 365: — useful alike in war and peace, 1. 333; can do no harm, *ib.* 335; more precious than gold, *ib.* 336; toilsome, 2. 364: — compared to health, 4. 444: — the poets on, 2. 363, 364, 365 E: — in perfection, *ib.* 361: — more profitable than injustice, 4. 445; 9. 589 foll.; superior to injustice, 9. 589; final triumph of, *ib.* 580; 10. 612, 613: — in the state, 2. 369; 4. 431; the same in the individual and the state, 4. 435 foll., 441 foll.: — absolute justice, 5. 479 E; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E.

King, the Great, 8. 553 D :—pleasure of the king and the tyrant compared, 9. 587 foll.;—kings and philosophers, 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E, 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540; 8. 543; 9. 592).

Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη, γνῶσκειν*), = knowledge of ideas, 6. 484;—nature of, 5. 477, 478; classed among faculties, *ib.* 477; 6. 511 E; 7. 533 E;—previous to birth, 7. 518 C;—how far given by sense, *ib.* 529;—should not be acquired under compulsion, *ib.* 536 E;—the foundation of courage, 4. 429;—knowledge and opinion, 5. 476–8; 6. 508, 510 A; 7. 534; knowledge and pleasure, 6. 505; knowledge and wisdom, 4. 428;—the highest knowledge, 6. 504; 7. 514 foll.;—unity of knowledge, 5. 479;—the best knowledge, 10. 618;—knowledge of shadows, 6. 511 D; 7. 534 A :—love of knowledge characteristic of the Hellenes, 4. 435 E; peculiar to the rational element of the soul, 9. 581 B.

Labour, division of, 2. 370, 374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E, 433 A, 435 A, 441 E, 443, 453 B.

Lacedaemon, owes its good order to Lycurgus, 10. 599 E;—constitution of, commonly extolled, 8. 544 D; a timocracy, *ib.* 545 B :—Lacedaemonians in the gymnasia, 5. 452 D.

Lachesis, 10. 617 C, D.

Lamentation, to be checked, 3. 387.

Lands, partition of, 8. 565 E, 566 E.

Language, pliability of, 9. 588 D.

Laughter not to be allowed in the guardians, 3. 388; nor represented in the gods, *ib.* 389.

Laws, may be given in error, 1. 339 E; supposed to arise from convention, 2. 359 A; cause of, 3. 405; on special subjects of little use, 4. 425, 426; treated with contempt in democracies, 8. 563 E; bring help to all, 9. 590.

Lawyers, 4. 405 A.

Learning, pleasure of, 6. 486 C (cp. 9. 581, 586).

Legislation. *See* Laws.

Leontius, story of, 4. 439 E.

Lethe, 10. 621.

Letters, image of the large and small, 2. 368; 3. 402 A.

Liberality, 6. 485 E.

Liberty, 8. 557 B, 561–3.

Licence, begins in music, 4. 424 E; in democracies, 8. 562 D.

Lie, a, hateful to the philosopher, 6. 490 C (cp. *supra* 486 E);—the true lie and the lie in words, 2. 382;—the royal lie (*γενναῖον ψεῦδος*), 3. 414;—rulers of the state may lie, 2. 382; 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D;—the gods not to be represented as lying, 2. 382;—lies of the poets, *ib.* 377 foll.; 3. 386, 408 B (cp. 10. 597 foll.).

Life in the early state, 2. 372;—loses its zest in old age, 1. 329 A; full of evils, 2. 379 C; intolerable without virtue, 4. 445; shortness of, compared to eternity, 10. 608 D;—the life of virtue toilsome, 2. 364 D;—the just or the unjust, which is the more advantageous? *ib.* 347 foll.;—three kinds of lives, 9. 581;—life of women ought to resemble that of men, 5. 451 foll.;—necessities of life, 2. 369, 373 A;—the prime of life, 5. 460 E.

Light, 6. 507 E. Cp. Sight, Vision.

Light and heavy, 5. 479; 7. 524.

Literature. *See* Music.

Litigation, love of, 3. 405.

Logic, method of residues, 4. 427;—accidents and essence distinguished, 5. 454;—nature of opposition, 4. 436;—categories, *πρὸς τι*, 4. 437; quality and relation, *ibid.*;—fallacies, 6. 487. For Plato's method of definitions, *see* Knowledge, Temperance; and *cp.* Dialectic, Metaphysic.

Lotophagi, 8. 560 C.

Lots, use of, 5. 460 A, 462 E; election by, 8. 557 A.

Love of the beautiful, 3. 402, 403; bodily love and true love, *ib.* 403; love and the love of knowledge, 5. 474 foll.; is of the whole, not of the part, *ib.* C, 475 B; 6. 485 B; a tyrant, 9. 573 B, 574 E (*cp.* 1. 329 B):—lovers' names, 5. 474:—

lovers of wine, *ib.* 475 A:—lovers of beautiful sights and sounds, *ib.* 476 B, 479 A, 480.

Luxury in the state, 2. 372, 373; a cause of disease, 3. 405 E; would not give happiness to the citizens, 4. 420, 421; makes men cowards, 9. 590 B.

Lycean Zeus, temple of, 8. 565 D.

Lycurgus, 10. 599 E.

Lydia, kingdom of, 2. 359 C.

Lydian harmonies rejected, 3. 398 E foll.

Lying, a privilege of the state, 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D.

Lyre, the, allowed in the best state, 3. 399 D.

Lysanias, 1. 330 B.

Lysias, 1. 328 B.

Madman, arms not to be returned to a, 1. 331; fancies of madmen, 8. 573 C.

Magic, 10. 602 D.

Magistrates, elected by lot, 8. 557 A.

Magnanimity, (*μεγαλοπρέπεια*), 6. 486 A, 490 E, 494 A.

Maker, the, not so good a judge as the user, 10. 601 C.

Man, 'the master of himself,' 4. 430 E; 'the form and likeness of God,' 6. 501 B; his unimportance, 10. 604 B (*cp.* 6. 486 A); has the power to choose his own destiny, 10. 617 E;—the one best man, 6. 502:—Men are not just of their own will, 2. 366 C; unite in the state in order to supply

each other's wants, *ib.* 369;—the nature of men and women, 5. 453-5;—analogy of men and animals, *ib.* 459;—three classes of, 9. 581.

Manners, influenced by education, 4. 424, 425; cannot be the subject of legislation, *ibid.*; in democracies, 8. 563 A.

'Many,' the term, as applied to the beautiful, the good, &c., 6. 507.

Many, the, flatter their leaders, 4. 426; wrong in their notions about the honourable and the good, 6. 493 E; would lose their harsh feeling towards philosophy if they could see the true philosopher, *ib.* 500; their pleasures and pains, 9. 586;—'the great beast,' 6. 493. Cp. Multitude.

Marionette players, 7. 514 B.

Marriage, holiness of, 5. 458 E, 459; age for, *ib.* 460; prayers and sacrifices at, *ibid.*;—marriage festivals, *ib.* 459, 460.

Marsyas, 3. 399 E.

Mathematics, 7. 522-32; use of hypotheses in, 6. 510;—mathematical notions perceived by a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 C:—the mathematician not usually a dialectician, 7. 531 E.

Mean, happiness of the, 10. 619 A.

Meanness, unknown to the philosopher, 6. 486 A; characteristic of the oligarchs, 8. 554.

Measurement, art of, 10. 602 D.

Medicine, cause of, 3. 405; not intended to preserve unhealthy and intemperate subjects, *ib.* 406 foll., 408 A; 4. 426 A; the two kinds of, 5. 459; use of incantations in, 4. 426 A;—analogy of, employed in the definition of justice, 1. 332 C.

Megara, battle of, 2. 368 A.

Melody, in education, 3. 398 foll.; its influence, 10. 601 B.

Memory, the philosopher should have a good, 6. 486 D, 490 E, 494 A; 7. 535 B.

Mendicant prophets, 2. 364 C.

Menelaus, 3. 408 A.

Menoetius, 3. 388 C.

Merchants, 2. 371.

Metaphysics; absolute ideas, 5. 476;—abstract and relative ideas, 7. 524;—analysis of knowledge, 6. 510;—qualifications of relative and correlative, 4. 437 foll.; 7. 524. Cp. Idea, Logic.

Metempsychosis, 10. 617. Cp. Soul.

Midas, 3. 408 B.

Might and right, 1. 338 foll.

Mimetic art. *See* Actors, Art, Imitation.

'Mine and thine,' 5. 462.

Miser, the, 8. 555 A (cp. 559 D).

Misfortune, to be borne with patience, 3. 387; 10. 603-6.

Moderation, necessity of, 5. 466 B.

Momus, 6. 487 A.

Monarchy, distinguished from aristocracy, 4. 445 C (cp.

9. 576 D); the happiest form of government, 9. 576 E (cp. 580 C, 587 B).

Money, needed in the state, 2. 371 B; not necessary for war, 4. 423;—love of, among the Egyptians and Phoenicians, *ib.* 435 E; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 A, 553, 562 A; referred to the appetitive element of the soul, 9. 580 E; despicable, *ib.* 589 E, 590 C (cp. 3. 390 E).

Money-lending, 8. 555, 556.

Money-making, art of, in Cephalus' family, 1. 330 B; evil of, 8. 556; pleasure of, 9. 581 C, 586 E.

Money-qualifications in oligarchies, 8. 550, 551.

Mothers in the state, 5. 460.

Motion and rest, 4. 436;—motion of the stars, 7. 529, 530; 10. 616 E.

Multitude, the, the great Sophist, 6. 492; their madness, *ib.* 496 C. Cp. Many.

Musaeus, 2. 363 D, E, 364 E.

Muses, the, 2. 364 E.

Music, to be taught before gymnastic, 2. 376 E (cp. 3. 403 C); includes literature (*λόγοι*), 2. 376 E;—in education, *ib.* 377 foll.; 3. 398 foll.; 7. 522 A (*see* Poetry, Poets); complexity in, to be rejected, 3. 397; the severe and the vulgar kind, *ibid.*; the end of, the love of beauty, *ib.* 403 C; like gymnastic, should be studied throughout life, *ibid.*; the simpler kinds of, foster

temperance in the soul, *ib.* 404 A, 410 A; effect of excessive, *ib.* 410, 411; ancient forms of, not to be altered, 4. 424; must be taught to women, 5. 452.

Musical amateurs, 5. 475;—education, 2. 377; 3. 398 foll.; 7. 522 A;—instruments, the more complex kinds of, rejected, 3. 399;—modes, *ib.* 397–9; changes in, involve changes in the laws, 4. 424 C.

Mysteries, 2. 365 A, 366 A, 378 A; 8. 560 E.

Mythology, misrepresentations of the gods in, 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C (cp. Gods); like poetry, has an imitative character, 3. 392 D foll.

Narration, styles of, 3. 392, 393, 396.

National qualities, 4. 435.

Natural gifts, 2. 370 A; 5. 455; 6. 491 E, 495 A; 7. 519, 535.

Nature, recurrent cycles in, 8. 546 A (cp. Cycles); divisions of, 9. 584.

Necessities, the, of life, 2. 368, 373 A.

Necessity, the mother of the Fates, 10. 616, 617, 621 A.

Nemesis, 5. 451 A.

Niceratus, 1. 327 C.

Nightingale, *Thamyras* changed into a, 10. 620.

Niobe, 2. 380 A.

νόμος, strain and law, 7. 532 E.

Not-being, 5. 477.

Novelties in music and gymnastic, 4. 424.

Number, invented by Palamedes, 7. 522 D;—the number of the state, 8. 546.

Objects and ideas to be distinguished, 5. 476; 6. 507.

Odysseus, *ib.* 620 D.

Odyssey, 3. 393 A. Cp. *Iliad*.

Office, not desired by the good ruler, 7. 520 A.

Old age, complaints against, 1. 329; Sophocles quoted in regard to, *ibid.*; wealth a comforter of age, *ibid.*;—old men think more of the future life, *ib.* 330; not students, 7. 536;—the older to bear rule in the state, 3. 412; to be over the younger, 5. 465 A.

Oligarchy, has many evils, 8. 544, 551, 552; origin of, *ib.* 550; nature of, *ibid.*; divided against itself, *ib.* 551 D, 554 E:—the oligarchical man, 8. 553; a miser, *ib.* 555; his place in regard to pleasure, 9. 587.

Olympic victors, 5. 465 D, 466 A (cp. 10. 618 A).

One, the, study of, 7. 525 A.

Opinion and knowledge, 5. 476-8; 6. 508 D, 510 A; 7. 534; the lovers of opinion, 5. 479, 480; a blind guide, 6. 506; objects of opinion and intellect classified, 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476);—true opinion and courage, 4. 429, 430 (cp. *Courage*).

Opposites, qualification of,

4. 436; in nature, 5. 454, 475 E. Cp. *Contradiction*.

Orpheus, 2. 364 E; 10. 620 A.

Pain, cessation of, causes pleasure, 9. 583 D; a motion of the soul, *ib.* E.

Painters, 10. 596, 597; are imitators, *ib.* 597; painters and poets, *ib.* 597, 603, 605:—‘the painter of constitutions,’ 6. 501.

Painting, in light and shade, 10. 602 C.

Palamedes, 7. 522 D.

Pandarus, 2. 379 E; 3. 408 A.

Panharmonic scale, the, 3. 399.

Pantomimic representations, not to be allowed, 3. 397.

Parents, the oldest and most indispensable of friends, 8. 574 C; parents and children in the state, 5. 461; their anxieties, 465 C.

Part and whole, in regard to the happiness of the state, 4. 420 D; 5. 466; 7. 519 E; in love, 5. 474 C, 475 B; 6. 485 B.

Passionate element of the soul, 4. 440; 6. 504 A; 8. 548 D; 9. 571 E, 580 A. *See Spirit*.

Passions, the, tyranny of, 1. 329 C; fostered by poetry, 10. 606.

Patient and agent, 4. 436.

Patroclus, 3. 391 B; *ib.* 406 A.

Pattern, the heavenly, 6. 500 E; 7. 540 A; 9. 592.

Payment, art of, 1. 346.

Peirithous, 3. 391 D.

Peleus, 3. 391 C.

Perception, 6. 508 foll.

Perdiccas, 1. 336 A.

Perfect state, difficulty of, 5. 472; 6. 502 E; possible, 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540; manner of its decline, 8. 546.

Periander, 1. 336 A.

Persuasion [or Faith], 6. 511 D; 7. 533 E.

Philosopher, the, has the quality of gentleness, 2. 375, 376; 3. 410; 6. 486 C; 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' 6. 486 A; should have a good memory, ib. D, 490 E, 494 A; 7. 535; has his mind fixed upon true being, 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C, 501 D; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581, 582 C (cp. 5. 475 E; 7. 520 B, 525); his qualifications and excellences, 6. 485 foll., 490 D, 491 B, 494 B; corruption of the philosopher, ib. 491 foll.; is apt to retire from the world, ib. 496; does not delight in personal conversation, ib. 500 B; must be an arithmetician, 7. 525 B; pleasures of the philosopher, 9. 581 E:—Philosophers are to be kings, 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E, 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540; 8. 543; 9. 592); are lovers of all knowledge, 5. 475; 6. 486 A, 490; true and false, 5. 475 foll.; 6. 484, 491, 494, 496 A, 500; 7. 535; to be

guardians, 2. 375 (*see* Guardians); why they are useless, 6. 487 foll.; few in number, ib. E, 496, 499 B, 503 B; will frame the state after the heavenly pattern, ib. 501; 7. 540 A; 9. 592; education of, 6. 503; philosophers and poets, 10. 607.

Philosophy, every headache ascribed to, 3. 407 C; =love of real knowledge, 6. 485 (cp. *supra* 5. 475 E); the corruption of, 6. 491; philosophy and the world, ib. 494; the desolation of, ib. 495; philosophy and the arts, ib. E, 496 C (cp. *supra* 5. 475 D, 476 A); true and false philosophy, 6. 496 E, 498 E; philosophy and governments, ib. 497; time set apart for, ib. 498; 7. 539; commonly neglected in after life, 6. 498; prejudice against, ib. 500, 501; why it is useless, 7. 517, 535, 539; the guardian and saviour of virtue, 8. 549 B; philosophy and poetry, 10. 607; aids a man to make a wise choice in the next world, ib. 618.

Phocylides, 3. 407 B.

Phoenician tale, the, 3. 414 C foll.

Phoenicians, 4. 436 A.

Phoenix, 3. 390 E.

Phrygian harmony, the, 3. 399.

Physician, the, not a mere money-maker, 1. 341 C, 342 D; the good physician, 3. 408; finds employment when luxury

increases, 2. 373 c; 3. 405 A.
Cp. Medicine.

Pilot, the, and the just man,
1. 332 (cp. 341); the true pilot,
6. 488 E.

Pindar, on the hope of the
righteous, 1. 331 A; on Ascle-
pius, 3. 408 B;—quoted, 2.
365 B.

Pipe, the (σύριγξ), 3. 399 D.
Piraeus, 1. 327 A, 328 c;
4. 439 E.

Pittacus, 1. 335 E.

Play should be a means of
instruction, 4. 425 A; 7. 537.

Pleasure, not akin to virtue,
3. 402, 403; pleasure and love,
ibid.; defined as knowledge
or good, 6. 505 B, 509 B; the
highest, 9. 583; caused by the
cessation of pain, ib. D; a
motion of the soul, ib. E;—real
pleasure unknown to the tyrant,
ib. 587;—pleasure of learning,
6. 486 c (cp. 9. 581, 586);—
sensual pleasure, 7. 519; 9.
586; a solvent of the soul, 4.
430 A; not desired by the
philosopher, 6. 485 E:—Plea-
sures, division of, into necessary
and unnecessary, 8. 558, 559,
561 A; 9. 572, 581 E; honour-
able and dishonourable, 8.
561 c; three classes of, 9. 581;
criterion of, ib. 582; classi-
fication of, ib. 583;—pleasures
of smell, ib. 584 B;—pleasures
of the many, 585; of the
passionate, ib. 586; of the
philosopher, ib. 586, 587.

Pluto, 8. 554 B.

Poetry, styles of, 3. 392-4,

398; in the state, ib. 392-4,
398; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll.,
605 A, 607 A; effect of, 10.
605; feeds the passions, ib.
606; poetry and philosophy,
ib. 607:—'colours' of poetry,
ib. 601 A.

Poets, the, love their poems
as their own creation, 1. 330 c;
speak in parables, ib. 332 B
(cp. 3. 413 B); on justice, 2.
363, 364, 365 E; bad teachers
of youth, ib. 377; 3. 391, 392,
408 c; must be restrained by
certain rules, 2. 379 foll.; 3.
398 A; banished from the
state, 3. 398 A; 8. 568 B; 10.
595 foll., 605 A, 607 A; poets
and tyrants, 8. 568; thrice
removed from the truth, 10.
596, 597, 598 E, 602 B, 605 c;
imitators only, ib. 600, 601
(cp. 3. 393); poets and painters,
10. 601, 603, 605;—'the poets
who were children and pro-
phets of the gods,' 2. 366 A.

Polemarchus, 1. 327 B; 'the
heir of the argument,' ib. 331;
intervenes in the discussion, ib.
340; wishes Socrates to speak
in detail about the community
of women and children, 5. 449.

Politicians, in democracies,
8. 564.

Polydamas, 1. 338 c.

Poor, the, have no time to
be ill, 3. 406 E; everywhere
hostile to the rich, 4. 423 A;
8. 551 E; very numerous in
oligarchies, 8. 552 D; not de-
spised by the rich in time of
danger, ib. 556 c.

Population, to be regulated, 5. 460.

Poverty, prejudicial to the arts, 4. 421; poverty and crime, 8. 552.

Power, the struggle for, 7. 520 c.

Priam, 3. 388 B.

Prisoners in war, 5. 468-70.

Private property, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464 C; 8. 543.

Prizes of valour, 5. 468.

Prodicus, 10. 600 c.

Property, to be common, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464 C; 8. 543; restrictions on the disposition of, 8. 556 A:—property qualifications in oligarchies, ib. 550, 551.

Prophets, mendicant, 2. 364 c.

Proportion, akin to truth, 6. 486 E.

Protagoras, 10. 600 c.

Proteus, 2. 381 D.

Proverbs: 'birds of a feather,' 1. 329 A; 'shave a lion,' ib. 341 C; 'let brother help brother,' 2. 362 D; 'wolf and flock,' 3. 415 D; 'one great thing,' 4. 423 E; 'hard is the good,' ib. 435 C; 'friends have all things in common,' 5. 449 C; 'the useful is the noble,' ib. 457 B; 'the wise must go to the doors of the rich,' 6. 489 B (cp. 2. 364 B); 'what is more than human,' 6. 492 E; 'the necessity of Diomedes,' ib. 493 D; 'the she-dog as good as her

mistress,' 8. 563 D; 'out of the smoke into the fire,' ib. 569 B; 'does not come within a thousand miles' (*οὐδ' ἵκταρ βάλλει*), 9. 575 D.

Public, the. *See* Many, Multitude.

Punishment, of the wicked, 2. 363; 10. 614. Cp. Hades, World below.

Purgation of the luxurious state, 3. 399 F;—of the city by the tyrant, 8. 567 D;—of the soul, by the tyrannical man, ib. 573 A.

Pythagoreans, the, authorities on the science of harmony, 7. 529, 530, 531; never reach the natural harmonies of number, ib. 531 C;—the Pythagorean way of life, 10. 600 A.

Pythian Oracle, the, 5. 461 E; 7. 540 C.

Quacks, 5. 459.

Quarrels, dishonourable, 2. 378; 3. 395 E; will be unknown in the best state, 2. 378 B; 5. 464 E;—quarrels of the gods and heroes, 2. 378.

Rational element of the soul, 4. 435-42; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 571, 580 E, 581; ought to bear rule, assisted by the spirited element, 4. 441 E, 442; characterized by the love of knowledge, 9. 581 B; the pleasures of, ib. 582; preserves the mind from illusions, 10. 602.

Rationalism among youth, 7. 538.

Reaction, 8. 564 A.

Reason, a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 D (cp. 7. 533 E); reason and appetite, 9. 571 (cp. 4. 439-42); should be the guide of pleasure, 9. 585-7.

Reflections, 6. 510 A.

Relative and correlative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll.; how corrected, 7. 524.

Relativity of things and individuals, 5. 479; fallacies caused by, 9. 584, 585; 10. 602, 605 c.

Religion, matters of, left to the god at Delphi, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E, 469 A; 7. 540 B).

Residues, method of, 4. 427 E.

Rest and motion, 4. 436.

Retail traders, 2. 371.

Reverence in the young, 5. 465 A.

Rhetoric, professors of, 2. 365 D.

Rhythm, 3. 400; goes with the subject, *ib.* 398 D, 400 B; its persuasive influence, *ib.* 401 E; 10. 601 B.

Riches. *See* Wealth.

Riddle, the, of the eunuch and the bat, 5. 479 c.

Ridicule, only to be directed against folly and vice, 5. 452 E; danger of, 10. 606 c.

Riding, to be taught, 5. 467; 7. 537 A.

Right and might, 1. 338 foll.

Ruler, the, in the strict and in the popular sense, 1. 341 B; the true ruler does not ask, but claims obedience, 6. 489 c; the

ideal ruler, *ib.* 502:—Rulers of states; do they study their own interests? 1. 338 D, 343, 346 (cp. 7. 520 c); are not infallible, 1. 339; how they are paid, *ib.* 347; good men do not desire office, *ibid.*; 7. 520 D; why they become rulers, 1. 347; present rulers dishonest, 6. 496 D:—[in the best state] must be tested by pleasures and pains, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A; 7. 539 E); have the sole privilege of lying, 2. 382; 3. 389 A, 414 c; 5. 459 D; must be taken from the older citizens, 3. 412 (cp. 6. 498 c); will be called friends and saviours, 5. 463; 6. 502 E; must be philosophers, 2. 376; 5. 473; 6. 484, 497 foll., 501, 503 B; 7. 520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543; the qualities which must be found in them, 6. 503 A; 7. 535; must attain to the knowledge of the good, 6. 506; 7. 519; will accept office as a necessity, 7. 520 E, 540 A; will be selected at twenty, and again at thirty, from the guardians, *ib.* 537; must learn arithmetic, *ib.* 522-6; geometry, *ib.* 526, 527; astronomy, *ib.* 527-30; harmony, *ib.* 531; at thirty must be initiated into philosophy, *ib.* 537-9; at thirty-five must enter on active life, *ib.* 539 E; after fifty may return to philosophy, *ib.* 540; when they die, will be buried by the state and paid divine honours,

3. 414 A; 5. 465 E, 469 A;
540 B. Cp. Guardians.

Sacrifices, private, 1. 328 B,
331 D;—in atonement, 2. 364;
—human, in Arcadia, 8. 565 D.

Sailors, necessary in the
state, 2. 371 B.

Sarpedon, 3. 388 C.

Scamander, 3. 391 B.

Scepticism, danger of, 7. 538,
539.

Science (*ἐπιστήμη*), a division
of the intellectual world, 7.
533 E (cp. 6. 511);—the sciences
distinguished by their object,
4. 438; not to be studied with
a view to utility only, 7. 527 A,
529, 530; their unity, ib. 531;
use hypotheses, ib. 533; correla-
tion of, ib. 537.

Sculpture, must only express
the good, 3. 401 B; painting of,
4. 420 D.

Scylla, 9. 588 C.

Scythian, Anacharsis the, 10.
600 A;—Scythians, the, 4. 435 E.

Self-indulgence in men and
states, 4. 425 E, 426;—self-
interest the natural guide of
men, 2. 359 B;—self-made men
bad company, 1. 330 C;—
self-mastery, 4. 430, 431.

Sense, objects of, twofold, 7.
523; knowledge given by, im-
perfect, ibid.; 10. 602; sense
and intellect, 7. 524:—Senses,
the, classed among faculties, 5.
477 C.

Seriphian, Themistocles and
the, 1. 329 E.

Servants, old family, 8.
549 E.

Sex in the world below, 10.
618 B;—sexes to follow the
same training, 5. 451, 466;
equality of, ib. 456, 457;
relation between, ib. 458 foll.;
freedom of intercourse between,
in a democracy, 8. 563 B. Cp.
Women.

Sexual desires, 5. 458 E.

Shadows, 6. 510 A;—know-
ledge of shadows (*εἰκασία*), 6.
511 E; 7. 533 E.

Shepherd, the analogy of,
with the ruler, 1. 343, 345 [cp.
Pol. 275].

Shopkeepers, 2. 371.

Short sight, 2. 368 D.

Sicilian cookery, 3. 404 D.

Sight, placed in the class of
faculties, 5. 477 C; requires
in addition to vision and colour,
a third element, light, 6. 507;
the most wonderful of the
senses, ibid.; compared to
mind, ib. 508; 7. 532 A;
illusions of, 7. 523; 10. 602,
603 D:—the world of sight,
7. 517.

Sign, the, of Socrates, 6.
496 C.

Silver, mingled by the God in
the auxiliaries, 3. 415 A (cp.
416 E; 8. 547 A);—[and gold]
not allowed to the guardians,
3. 416 E; 4. 419, 422 D; 5.
464 D (cp. 8. 543).

Simonides, 1. 331 D–335 E.

Simplicity, the first principle
of education, 3. 397 foll., 400 E,
404; the two kinds of, ib.

400 E; of the good man, *ib.* 409 A; in diet, 8. 559 C (cp. 3. 404 D).

Sin, punishment of, 2. 363; 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades, World below.

Sirens, 10. 617 B.

Slavery, more to be feared than death, 3. 387 A; of Hellenes condemned, 5. 469 B.

Slaves, the uneducated man harsh towards, 8. 549 A; enjoy great freedom in a democracy, *ib.* 563 B; always inclined to rise against their masters, 9. 578.

Smallness and greatness, 4. 438 B; 5. 479 B; 7. 523, 524; 9. 575 C; 10. 602 D, 605 C.

Smell, pleasures of, 9. 584 B.

Socrates, goes down to the Peiraeus to see the feast of Bendis, 1. 327; detained by Polemarchus and Glaucon, *ibid.*; converses with Cephalus, *ib.* 328-32; trembles before Thrasymachus, *ib.* 336 D; his irony, *ib.* 337 A; his poverty, *ib.* D; a sharper in argument, *ib.* 340 D; ignorant of what justice is, *ib.* 354 C; his powers of fascination, 2. 358 A; requested by Glaucon and Adeimantus to praise justice *per se*, *ib.* 367 B; cannot refuse to help justice, *ib.* 368 C; 4. 427 D; his oath 'by the dog', 3. 399 E; 8. 567 E; 9. 592 A; hoped to have evaded discussing the subject of women and children, 5. 449, 472, 473 (cp. 6. 502 E); his

love of truth, 5. 451 A; 6. 504; his power in argument, 6. 487 B; not unaccustomed to speak in parables, *ib.* E; his sign, *ib.* 496 C; his earnestness in behalf of philosophy, 7. 536 B; his reverence for Homer, 10. 595 C, 607 (cp. 3. 391 A).

Soldiers, must form a separate class, 2. 374; the diet suited for, 3. 404 D (cp. Guardians);—women to be soldiers, 5. 452, 466, 471 E;—punishment of soldiers for cowardice, *ib.* 468 A. Cp. Warrior.

Solon, 10. 599 E;—quoted, 7. 536 D.

Song, parts of, 3. 398 D.

Sophists, the, their view of justice, 1. 338 foll.; verbal quibbles of, *ib.* 340; the public the great Sophist, 6. 492; the Sophists compared to feeders of a beast, *ib.* 493.

Sophocles, 1. 329 B.

Sorrow, not to be indulged, 3. 387; 10. 603-6; has a relaxing effect on the soul, 4. 430 A; 10. 606.

Soul, the, has ends and excellences, 1. 353 D; beauty in the soul, 3. 401; the fair soul in the fair body, *ib.* 402 D; sympathy of soul and body, 5. 462 D, 464 B; conversion of the soul from darkness to light, 7. 518, 521, 525; requires the aid of calculation and intelligence in order to interpret the intimations of sense, *ib.* 523, 524; 10. 602; has more truth

and essence than the body, 9. 585 D;—better and worse principles in the soul, 4. 431; the soul divided into reason, spirit, appetite, *ib.* 435–42; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 571, 580 E, 581; faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E; 7. 533 E; oppositions in the soul, 10. 603 D;—the lame soul, 3. 404; 7. 535;—the soul marred by meanness, 6. 495 E;—immortality of the soul, 10. 608 foll. (cp. 6. 498 C);—number of souls does not increase, 10. 611 A;—the soul after death, *ib.* 614 foll.;—transmigration of souls, *ib.* 617;—the soul impure and disfigured while in the body, *ib.* 611;—compared to a many-headed monster, 9. 588; to the images of the sea-god Glaucus, 10. 611;—like the eye, 6. 508; 7. 518;—harmony of the soul, produced by temperance, 4. 430, 442, 443 (cp. 9. 591 D, and *Laws* 2. 653 B);—eye of the soul, 7. 518 D, 527 E, 533 D, 540 A;—five forms of the state and soul, 4. 445; 5. 449; 9. 577.

Sparta. *See* Lacedaemon.

Spectator, the, unconscious-ly influenced by what he sees and hears, 10. 605, 606;—the philosopher the spectator of all time and all existence, 6. 486 A.

Spendthrifts, 8. 564.

Spercheus, 3. 391 B.

Spirit, must be combined with gentleness in the guar-

dians, 2. 375; 3. 410; 6. 503; characteristics of northern nations, 4. 435 E; found in quite young children, *ib.* 441 A;—the spirited (or passionate) element in the soul, *ib.* 440 foll.; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 572 A, 580 E; must be subject to the rational part, 4. 441 E; predominant in the timocratic state and man, 8. 548, 550 B; characterized by ambition, 9. 581 B; its pleasures, *ib.* 586 D; the favourite object of the poet's imitation, 10. 604, 605.

Stars, motion of the, 7. 529, 530; 10. 616 E.

State, relation of, to the individual, 2. 368; 4. 434, 441; 5. 462; 8. 544; 9. 577 B; origin of, 2. 369 foll.; should be in unity, 4. 422; 5. 463; place of the virtues in, 4. 428 foll.; virtue of state and individual, *ib.* 441; 6. 498 E; family life in, 5. 449;—the luxurious state, 2. 372 D foll.:—[the best state], classes must be kept distinct, *ib.* 374; 3. 379 E, 415 A; 4. 421, 433 A, 434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A); the rulers must be philosophers, 2. 376; 5. 473; 6. 484, 497 foll., 501, 503 B; 7. 520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543 (cp. *Rulers*); the government must have the monopoly of lying, 2. 382; 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D; the poets to be banished, 3. 398 A; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll., 605 A, 607 A; the older must bear rule, the

younger obey, 3. 412; women, children, and goods to be common, *ib.* 416; 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543 A; must be happy as a whole, 4. 420 D; 5. 466 A; 7. 519 E; will easily master other states in war, 4. 422; must be of a size which is not inconsistent with unity, *ib.* 423; composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, *ib.* 441 A; may be either a monarchy or an aristocracy, *ib.* 445 C (cp. 9. 576 D); will form one family, 5. 463; will be free from quarrels and lawsuits, 2. 378; 5. 464, 465; —is it possible? 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 (cp. 7. 520); framed after the heavenly pattern, 6. 500 E; 7. 540 A; 9. 592; how to be commenced, 6. 501; 7. 540; manner of its decline, 8. 546; —the best state that in which the rulers least desire office, 7. 520, 521: —the four imperfect forms of states, 4. 445 B; 8. 544; succession of states, 8. 545 foll. (cp. Government, forms of): —existing states not one but many, 4. 423 A; nearly all corrupt, 6. 496; 7. 519, 520; 9. 592.

Statues, 2. 361 D; 4. 420 D.

Steadiness of character, 6.

503.

Stesichorus, 9. 586 C.

Stories. Cp. Children, Education.

Style of poetry, 3. 392; — styles, various, *ib.* 397.

Styx, 3. 387 B.

Sumptuary laws, 4. 423, 425.

Sun, the, compared with the idea of good, 6. 508; not sight, but the author of sight, *ib.* 509; —‘the sun of Heracleitus,’ *ib.* 498 A.

Supposititious son, parable of the, 7. 538.

Sympathy, of soul and body, 5. 462 D, 464 B; aroused by poetry, 10. 605 B.

Syracusan dinners, 3. 404 D.

Tactics, use of arithmetic in, 7. 522 E, 525 B.

Tartarus, 10. 616 A.

Taste, good, importance of, 3. 401, 402.

Taxes, imposed by the tyrant, 8. 567 A, 568 E.

Teiresias, 3. 386 E.

Telamon, 10. 620 B.

Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*), in the state, 3. 389; 4. 430 foll.; temperance and love, 3. 403 A; fostered by simple music, *ib.* 404 E, 410 A; a harmony of the soul, 4. 430, 441 E, 442 D, 443 (cp. 9. 591 D); one of the philosopher's virtues, 6. 485 E, 490 E, 491 B, 494 B.

Temple-robbing, 9. 574 D, 575 B.

Territory, unlimited, not required by the good state, 4. 423.

Thales, 10. 600 A.

Thamyras, 10. 620 A.

Theages, 6. 496 B.

Themis, 2. 379 E.

Themistocles, 1. 330 A.

Theology of Plato, 2. 379 foll. Cp. God.

Thersites, 10. 620 c.

Theseus, 3. 391 c.

Thetis, 2. 381 d, 383 a.

Thirst, 4. 437 e, 439; 9. 585 a.

Thracians, procession of, 1. 327 a; characterized by spirit or passion, 4. 435 e.

Thrasymachus, 1. 328 b; described, ib. 336 b; will be paid, ib. 337 d; defines justice, ib. 338 c foll.; his rudeness, ib. 343 a; his views of government, ibid. (cp. 9. 590 d); his encomium on injustice, 1. 343 a; his manner of speech, ib. 345 b; his paradox about justice and injustice, ib. 348 b foll.; he blushes, ib. 350 d; is pacified, and retires from the argument, ib. 354 (cp. 6. 498 c); would have Socrates discuss the subject of women and children, 5. 450.

Timocracy, 8. 545 foll.; origin of, ib. 547:—the timocratical man, described, 8. 549; his origin, ibid.

Tinker, the prosperous, 6. 495, 496.

Tops, 4. 436.

Torch race, an equestrian, 1. 328 a.

Touch, 7. 523 e.

Traders, 2. 371.

Traditions, 2. 382 c (cp. 3. 414 c).

Tragedy and comedy in the state, 3. 394.

Tragic poets, the, eulogizers

of tyranny, 8. 568 a; imitators, 10. 597, 598.

Training, dangers of, 3. 404 a; severity of, 6. 504 a (cp. 7. 535 b).

Transmigration of souls, 10. 617. See Soul.

Trochaic rhythms, 3. 400 b.

Troy, 3. 393 e; Helen never at, 9. 586 c:—Trojan War, 2. 380 a; treatment of the wounded in, 3. 405 e, 408 a; the army numbered by Palamedes, 7. 522 d.

Truth, is not lost by men of their own will, 3. 413 a; the aim of the philosopher, 6. 484, 485, 486 e, 490, 500 c, 501 d; 7. 521, 537 d; 9. 581, 582 c (cp. 5. 475 e; 7. 520, 525); akin to wisdom, 6. 485 d; to proportion, ib. 486 e; no partial measure of, sufficient, ib. 504; love of, essential in this world and the next, 10. 618;—truth and essence, 9. 585 d.

Tyranny, 1. 338 d;=injustice on the grand scale, ib. 344; the wretchedest form of government, 8. 544 c; 9. 576; origin of, 8. 562, 564:—the tyrannical man, 9. 571 foll.; life of, ib. 573; his treatment of his parents, ib. 574; most miserable, ib. 576, 578; has the soul of a slave, ib. 577.

Tyrant, the, origin of, 8. 565; happiness of, ib. 566 foll.; 9. 576 foll.; his rise to power, 8. 566; his taxes, ib. 567 a, 568 e; his army, ib. 567 a,

569; his purgation of the city, *ib.* 567 B; misery of, 9. 579; has no real pleasure, *ib.* 587; how far distant from pleasure, *ibid.* :—Tyrants and poets, 8. 568; have no friends, *ibid.*; 9. 576; punishment of, in the world below, 10. 615.

Understanding, a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 D; = science, 7. 533 E.

Unity of the state, 4. 422, 423; 5. 462, 463; — absolute unity, 7. 524 E, 525 E; unity and plurality, *ibid.*

Unjust man, the, happy (Thrasymachus), 1. 343, 344; his unhappiness finally proved, 9. 580; 10. 613 :—injustice = private profit, 1. 344 (*see* Injustice).

Uranus, 2. 377 E.

User, the, a better judge than the maker, 10. 601 C.

Usury. *See* Interest.

Valetudinarianism, 3. 406; 4. 426 A.

Valour, prizes of, 5. 468.

Vice, the disease of the soul, 4. 444; 10. 609 foll.; is many, 4. 445; the proper object of ridicule, 5. 452 E; — fine names for the vices, 8. 560 E. *Cp.* Injustice.

Virtue and justice, 1. 350; thought toilsome, 2. 364 A; virtue and harmony, 3. 401 A (*cp.* 7. 522 A); virtue and pleasure, 3. 402 E (*cp.* Pleasure); not promoted by excessive care

of the body, *ib.* 407 (*cp.* 9. 591 D); makes men wise, 3. 409 E; divided into parts, 4. 428 foll., 433; in the individual and the state, *ib.* 435 foll., 441 (*cp.* Justice); the health of the soul, *ib.* 444 (*cp.* 10. 609 foll., and *Soph.* 228; *Pol.* 296 D); is one, *ib.* 445; may be a matter of habit, 7. 518 E; 10. 619 D; impeded by wealth, 8. 550 E; — virtues of the philosopher, 6. 485 foll., 490 D, 491 B, 494 B (*cp.* Philosopher); place of the several virtues in the state, 4. 427 foll.

Visible world, divisions of, 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517; compared to the intellectual, 6. 508, 509; 7. 532 A.

Vision, 5. 477; 6. 508; 7. 517. *See* Sight.

War, causes of, 2. 373; 4. 422 foll.; 8. 547 A; an art, 2. 374 A (*cp.* 4. 422); men, women, and children to go to, 5. 452 foll., 467, 471 E; 7. 537 A; regulations concerning, 5. 467–71; a matter of chance, *ib.* 467 E; distinction between internal and external, *ib.* 470 A; the guilt of, always confined to a few persons, *ib.* 471 B; love of, characteristic of timocracy, 8. 547 E; not easily waged by an oligarchy, *ib.* 551 E; rich and poor in war, *ib.* 556 C; a favourite resource of the tyrant, *ib.* 567 A.

Warrior, the brave, rewards

of, 5. 468; his burial, *ib.* E; the warrior must know how to count, 7. 522 E, 525; must be a geometrician, *ib.* 526.

Waves, the three, 5. 457 C, 472 A, 473 C.

Weak, the, by nature subject to the strong, 1. 338; not capable of much, either for good or evil, 6. 491 E, 495 B.

Wealth, the advantage of, in old age, 1. 329, 330; the greatest blessing of, *ib.* 330, 331; the destruction of the arts, 4. 421; influence of, on the state, *ib.* 422 A; the 'sinews of war', *ibid.*; all-powerful in oligarchies and timocracies, 8. 548 A, 551 B, 553, 562 A; an impediment to virtue, *ib.* 550 E; should only be acquired to a moderate amount, 9. 591 E:—the blind god of wealth (Pluto), 8. 554 B:—Wealthy, the, everywhere hostile to the poor, 4. 423 A; 8. 551 E; flattered by them, 5. 465 C; the wealthy and the wise, 6. 489 B; plundered by the multitude in democracies, 8. 564, 565.

Weaving, 3. 401 A; 5. 455 D.

Weighing, art of, 10. 602 D.

Whole, the, in regard to the happiness of the state, 4. 420 D; 5. 466 A; 7. 519 E; in love, 5. 474 C, 475 B; 6. 485 B.

Whorl, the great, 10. 616.

Wicked, the, punishment of, 2. 363; 10. 614; thought by men to be happy, 1. 354; 2.

364 A; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A).

Wine, lovers of, 5. 475 A.

Wisdom (*σοφία*, *φρόνησις*) and injustice, 1. 349, 350; in the state, 4. 428; akin to truth, 6. 485 D; the power of, 7. 518, 519; the only virtue which is innate in us, *ib.* 518 E.

Wise man, the, = the good, 1. 350; definition of, 4. 442 C; alone has true pleasure, 9. 583 B; life of, *ib.* 591;—'the wise to go to the doors of the rich,' 6. 489 B;—wise men said to be the friends of the tyrant, 8. 568.

Wives to be common in the state, 5. 457 foll.; 8. 543.

Wolves, men changed into, 8. 565 D; 'wolf and flock' (proverb), 3. 415 D.

Women, employments of, 5. 455; differences of taste in, *ib.* 456; fond of complaining, 8. 549 D; supposed to differ in nature from men, 5. 453; inferior to men, *ib.* 455; ought to be trained like men, *ib.* 451, 466; in the gymnasia, *ib.* 452, 457; in war, *ib.* 453 foll., 466 E, 471 E; to be guardians, *ib.* 456, 458, 468; 7. 540 C; (and children) to be common, 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543.

World, the, cannot be a philosopher, 6. 494 A.

World below, the, seems very near to the aged, 1. 330 E; not to be reviled, 3. 386 foll.; pleasure of discourse in, 6.

498 D; punishment of the wicked in, 2. 363; 10. 614 foll.; sex in, 10. 618 B;—[heroes] who have ascended from the world below to the gods, 7. 521 C.

Xerxes, 1. 336 A.

Young, the, how affected by the common praises of injustice, 2. 365; cannot understand allegory, *ib.* 378 E; must be subject in the state, 3. 412 B; must submit to their elders, 5. 465 A. Cp. Children, Education.

Youth, the corruption of, attributed to public opinion, 6. 492 A;—youthful enthusiasm

for metaphysics, 7. 539 B;—youthful scepticism, *ib.* D.

Zeus, his treatment of his father, 2. 377 E; throws Hephaestus from heaven, *ib.* 378 D;—Achilles descended from, 3. 391 C;—did not cause the violation of the treaty in the Trojan War, or the strife of the gods, 2. 379 E; or send the lying dream to Agamemnon, *ib.* 383 A; or lust for Herè, 3. 390 B; ought not to have been described by Homer as lamenting for Achilles and Sarpedon, *ib.* 388 C;—Lycaean Zeus, 8. 565 D;—Olympian Zeus, 9. 583 B.

THE END.

Oxford Translation Series

All volumes sold separately. Price 5s. net each.

§ Greek

HESIOD. *The Poems and Fragments.* By A. W. MAIR.

PLATO. *The Four Socratic Dialogues.* By BENJAMIN JOWETT, with Preface by EDWARD CAIRD.

PLATO. *The Republic.* By BENJAMIN JOWETT. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net. In one volume on India paper, 10s. 6d. net.

DEMOSTHENES. *Public Orations.* By A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

ARISTOTLE. *Politics.* By BENJAMIN JOWETT, with Introduction by H. W. C. DAVIS.

LUTARCH. *Selected Essays.* By T. G. TUCKER. Selected Essays from *The Moralia*, by A. O. PRICKARD. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

EPICTETUS. *The Discourses and Manual*, with Fragments of his Writings. By P. E. MATHESON. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

MARCUS AURELIUS. *The Meditations.* By JOHN JACKSON, with Introduction by CHARLES BIGG.

LUCIAN. By H. W. and F. G. FOWLER. Four vols. 16s. net.

PHILOSTRATUS. *In Honour of Apollonius of Tyana.* By J. S. PHILLIMORE. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

LONGINUS. *On the Sublime.* By A. O. PRICKARD.

MARK THE DEACON. *The Life of Porphyry of Gaza.* By G. F. HILL.

§ Latin

CAESAR. *The Gallic War.* By F. P. LONG.

CAESAR. *The Civil War.* By F. P. LONG.

LUCRETIUS. *On the Nature of Things.* By CYRIL BAILEY.

Latin (contd.)

VERGIL. By JOHN JACKSON. On India paper, 7s. 6d.

DRACE. By E. C. WICKHAM.

PROPERTIUS. By J. S. PHILLIMORE.

STATIUS. *The Silvae*. By D. A. SLATER.

ACITUS. *The Histories*. By W. HAMILTON F.
Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

ACITUS. *The Dialogus, Agricola and Germania*.
By W. HAMILTON FYFE.

PULEIUS. *The Apologia and Florida*. By H.
UTLER.

PULEIUS. *The Metamorphoses*. By H. E. BUT
Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

IDONIUS. *The Letters*. By O. M. DALTON.
Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.

T. BERNARD. *On Consideration*. By GEO.
LEWIS.

Miscellaneous

THE PARALLEL PSALTER. The Prayer
version of the Psalms and a new version on opposite p
By S. R. DRIVER.

BEOWULF. By JOHN EARLE.

ALFRED. Version of the Consolations of Boet
By W. J. SEDGEFIELD.

DANTE. *The Convivio*. By W. W. JACKSON.

DANTE. *The Divine Comedy*. By H. E. T.

MACHIAVELLI. *The Discourses*. By J. H. G.

HEINE. *The Book of Songs*. By J. H. G.
On India paper, 7s. 6d. net.

